Abstract
The archetypal Neo-Confucian philosopher, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), worked out a compelling summation of Confucius’ humanistic ethics, centered on Ren (humaneness, humane) practice and cultivation. Faced with competing philosophies and religions, Zhu Xi strove to deepen and broaden Confucius’ ethics and core teaching of Ren. He drew on Zhou Dunyi’s “Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity” to lay a naturalistic foundation for Confucius’ ethics, and on Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription” to affirm the consanguinity between cosmos and humanity. He opened his “Treatise on Humanity” by linking Ren with the pervasive cosmic impulse to create, thus showing that the Way of Ren is not limited to the proper conduct of human affairs but springs from a pervasive beneficent creative impulse in the world. Zhu Xi also worked out a justification for Confucius’ Humanistic ethics centered on Ren cultivation and practice. This justification supports a sort of relational Humanistic ethics, the East Asian counterpart to Kant’s justification of an individual centered Humanistic ethics. Taken together, Zhu Xi’s mature comments and reflections on the formation of a moral exemplar (junzi) show that he, like Kant, set forth several conditions for the moral worth of ethical agency, decision, and action. For Kant, the moral agent must will to act from duty out of respect for reason (the Moral Law) which underlies the Golden Rule as the Categorical Imperative. Zhu Xi’s account is more practical and less theoretical than Kant’s. Zhu Xi’s aspiring moral exemplar undertakes his learning, cultivation, and practice in the spirit of reverence. Such reverence not only assures the concentration and seriousness of his dedication but purifies his mind-heart (xin) such that he becomes increasingly discerning of Heavenly pattern (tianli), which in turn sharpens his sense of appropriateness (yi). This deeper discernment also catalyzes his moral determination of will (zhuzai) to form within and to anchor his motivation to live by Ren, humanity. As Kant’s model incorporates the role of love and the Golden Rule, Zhu Xi’s centers on the cultivation of Ren and Confucius’ formulation of the Silver Rule, which are grounded in love and empathy. These teachings express a deeply emotional, relational, yet still rational form of Humanism that shows promise for a more salient Humanism by underscoring the unity of cosmos, nature, and humanity in a moral-ethical perspective.
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Notes
This study is part of the effort of a global network of scholars led by professors Chun-chieh Huang (Taiwan), Joern Ruesen (Germany), and Sorin Antohi (Romania), to identify and examine Humanist expressions around the world and develop a field of intercultural Humanism. Ancient Chinese civilization produced forms of Humanism which held several traits in common with Western Humanism: (1) faith in the emotional and intellectual capacity of human beings to formulate humane values and ethical systems without divine revelation, (2) faith in the possibility of human cultivation and perfectibility, (3) dedication to the study of classical texts, (4) with various senses of religiosity (Bockover 2008; Thompson 1990).
Humaneness and the related concepts are usually regarded as “virtues,” but since they involve sensitive response and performance, I tend to prefer the expression “cultivation and practice.” The term virtue can be operative as character or cultivated propensity. See Ames’ and Rosemont’s exquisite discussions on these terms (1998, pp. 45–55).
For an account of relational self as a fact of human psychology and not just a theoretical or ethical construct, see Gergen, Relational Being (2009).
Confucian moral-ethical self would be relational by definition, i.e., committed to cultivating upright interpersonal relations, attitude, practices and conduct. See note 11 below.
Li traditionally was translated as principle but “pattern” works better, since li are immanent in the formations of things like the marbling of meat, the veins in leaves, and the grains in wood, as noted by Zhuangzi and Zhu Xi. The notion of li has an integrative organic character that is lost when translated as principle, which is more a propositional notion. Importantly, li and qi (cosmic vapor) are complementary terms for Zhu Xi that refer to two facets of holistic phenomena and do not indicate a fundamental dualism in his thought (Needham 1956, p. 477f; Graham 1986; Thompson 1988, 2015b).
Shu involves imagining oneself in the position of the other, and sensitizes oneself in applying the Silver Rule; discussed below.
It is my contention that the individual and relational components of self each contribute something that is irreducible to the notion of an ethical self (see note 11 below).
Thompson (2012, p. 68f).
This was the social background of Confucius’ moral dichotomy of junzi 君子 (gentleman, moral exemplar, well-cultivated person) and xiaoren 小人 (petite person, self-centered person), which underscores that for Confucius these terms referred to ethical stances rather than social classes.
I regard “moral” as referring to one’s personal character and handling of close relationships and “ethical” as referring to one’s more professional and public code of conduct.
Cua (2002).
Thompson (2012, p. 72).
Thompson (2002). Rites were not moral rules or laws but commonly accepted practices, so they did not necessarily express binding moral-ethical norms. Confucius, Mencius, and Zhu Xi reminded people to use their discretion and devise alternative responses when observances of the rites and customs would entail unintended hardship or suffering or simply be too costly.
Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean, Focusing the Familiar) is the title of a text focused on this very topic. As this text was originally a chapter of the Liji 禮記 (Record of Rites), the notion of zhongyong as hitting the utmost propriety in the common situation was originally intended for observances of ritual propriety. Zhu Xi broadens this notion to cover a well-cultivated person’s conduct generally by including Zhongyong as an independent work in the Sishu jizhu 四書集註 (Four books, with collected commentaries).
Thompson, “The Archery of Wisdom,” (2007).
Confucius’ own feelings of love could be deeply emotional and strong; consider his response to the death of his favorite follower, Yan Hui, which exceeded the bounds of propriety: Analects 11.8-10.
Confucius is aware of the need for each person to be ethically responsible and motivated, and not just be appropriately responsive in relationships.
Thompson, “Lessons,” (2012, p. 69ff).
Notably, the rites lose their ultimacy in this conception. They have heuristic value, and in certain crucial situations, such as at court, they must be followed to the letter; however, generally they are just accepted vehicles to follow in paying one’s respect in a dignified way, which may be modified or replaced according to one’s wisdom and cultivated sense of humaneness, appropriateness and propriety.
Bockover, “Ren Dao,” (2008).
Thompson, “The Religious,” (1990).
Kalton, To Become a Sage (1988).
This is thus virtue in the classical sense rather than the Christian sense.
The formation of virtuous character refers both to inner character and outer conduct. An early alternative form of the graph for ren 仁 appears in the excavated scripts of this text featuring the radical for body/person, shen 身 above the radical for mind-heart, xin 心, which has aroused reflection on the embodimental, performative character of Confucius’ humaneness.
Heaven endows the natural propensity to form virtuous character. Informed by role models, one’s moral efficacy has to be nurtured and practiced in interpersonal conduct.
Mencius’ moral psychology has been compared with David Hume’s in this regard (Liu 2003).
This is echoed in Zhang Zai’s Western Inscription. See below.
At this time, the idea that human nature was good or tended to the good flew in the face of people’s everyday experience of political and military strife and social upheaval.
Xunzi’s doctrines that human nature tends toward evil and that nature is simply natural cycles and processes possibly yielded undesirable political consequences. During Xunzi’s later life, Legalist (Fajia 法家) thinkers, such as Hanfeizi 韓非子 (d. 233 B.C.E.), made the case that since human nature was basically evil, it didn’t make sense to make people undergo costly, drawn out regimens of cultural education, cultivation, ritualization, and practice. What was needed was to govern people by strict regimens and sharply defined codes of reward and punishment to keep them (including the royal family and high ministers) obedient and in line with the ruler’s game plan. These ideas contributed to the rise of the state of Qin, the formation of the Qin dynasty, and the enthronement of Qinshihuang 秦始皇 in 221 B.C.E. Later, Han dynasty Confucians, such as Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (c. 179-c. 104 B.C.E.), drew upon Xunzi in establishing bureaucratic Confucianism for organizing society and ruling the empire that forwent the spirit of humaneness and related humanistic values and cultivations of early Confucianism.
Zhu Xi held a multifaceted view of human nature that accommodated both Mencian and Xunzian insights: while he saw good natural propensities and intuitions to nurture, he also registered the advent of appearances of selfishness and missteps to be rectified and cultivated away.
See Laozi chs. 37 and 80 (Ames and Hall 2003).
Chan, A Source Book (1963, p. 456ff).
The Taijitu 太極圖 (Diagram of the Supreme Polarity) was rooted in alchemical Daoism for which it was a chart of the human psyche and body, hence depicting microcosm-macrocosm identity. See Fung (1953, v. 2, pp. 438–442).
Chan, A Source Book (1963, p. 463f).
Chan (1963, p. 497).
Chan (1963, p. 523f).
Chan (1963, p. 571).
On the Treatise on Humaneness, see Sato (1986) and Chan (1989). Chan in particular shows that whereas the Treatise is bold and forthright in its presentation, it was written in the wake of Zhu Xi’s discussions with other scholars and critical reflections. While the Treatise shows humaneness’ systematic relations in Neo-Confucian thought, Zhu Xi was concerned to express it’s emotional grounds in love and expression in ethical concern. “This fecundity” is spelled out by Zhou Dunyi in the opening paragraphs of Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity. Zhu Xi’s Treatise was highly influential in East Asia down to the turn of the last century. Kalton (1988) and Huang (2015) present traditional Korean and Japanese receptions and responses. Tan (1898, 1984, 2000) wrote a more eclectic Renxue 仁學 (A Study of Humanity) in support of radical reform in the late Qing.
In the context of Heaven and Earth, “mind” refers to a ubiquitous natural tendency or impulse. Even with respect to human beings, this refers to a tendency or impulse but with a varying degree of intentionality. This proposition gains significance in light of the macrocosm-microcosm identity implicit in Zhou Dunyi’s Explanation. as noted in note 29 above. Notably, “things” refers primarily to living creatures and more generally to things, which are more properly “events” in Zhu Xi’s process ontology. This ubiquitous impulse to (pro)create has classic Greco-Roman counterparts, such as Plato’s Eros (Geier 1990; Gordon 2012) and world soul (Plato 1972, p. 46f) and Lucretius’ Venus (1994, p. 10). Interestingly, we see a parallel between the relation between love and humaneness in Zhu Xi’s thought and eros and justice in Plato’s thought. For both, love and eros signify a sort of basal impulse both to create and, ultimately, to return to a holistic primal origins. For both, each human being needs guidance and direction along the way to achieve both inner excellence and outer relations so that both inner realization and outer community are sought and mutual concern and assistance are shared along the way to realization. While Zhu Xi kept to the practical ethical path, Plato let himself get sidetracked by theoretical concerns; in later life, however, Plato criticized the theory of Forms in the Parmenides and turned to more practical concerns in the Statesman and the Laws. Plato’s dialogues also presented cultivation as preparation for an afterlife and rebirth, topics which Zhu Xi did not take up; however, Plato presented these accounts as conscious myths and not as factual or true accounts. Zhu Xi’s view of life and death is decidedly more naturalistic in temper than Plato’s (Gordon 2012; Kim 1984, 2000).
Qian stands for Heaven as Kun stands for Earth, and the two hexagrams are assigned appropriate properties and associations, such as male and female, respectively. This line harks back to Explanation of the Diagram of the Supreme Polarity, paragraph 4 (Chan 1963, p. 463). See the opening sentence of Western Inscription by Zhang Zai (Chan 1963, p. 497) where Qian and Kun are directly translated as Heaven and Earth (Chan 1963, p. 497).
Ti and yong are often translated as substance and function, respectively. But this over-interprets ti and under-interprets yong. Ti is just the formation or structure that produces a certain effect or impact, and does not necessarily indicate a fundamental ontological status. Yong refers to how that structure is expressed or plays out. For Zhu Xi, these were relative terms in that something could be a ti at one level and a yong at another. The substance/function interpretation also introduces an inappropriate dualism into the terminology.
With respect to the virtues, formation and expression refer to human basic propensities xing and emotions qing, which are also intimately correlated.
Thompson, “Li and Yi,” (1988).
See Zhu Xi’s extended remark on Great Learning, ch. 5 (Chan 1963, p. 89).
I believe that Mencius’ notion of moral will or determination was an inspiration to Zhu Xi in this regard.
This assumption is also made in Zhuangzi’s anecdote of the happiness of the fish, which concludes the “Autumn Floods” chapter of the Zhuangzi (Watson 1965). Also, Dong Zhongshu writes of a minister who releases a fawn, against his prince’s orders, because he is moved by worried bleats of the fawn’s mother. The ruler reduces the minister’s penalty for this disregard of his order, because, “He had encountered a fawn and treated it with compassion. How much more would this be the case with regard to other human beings?” (De Bary 1999, p. 310). Rowland argues for this emotional similitude, which implicates human moral sensitivity and thus responsibility toward other species as well as humanity in Animals Like Us (2002). His “Introduction” is recommended.
Chan, Reflections (1967, p. 302), slightly modified.
Ibid., 303.
For discussion, see Adler, Reconstructing (Adler 2014a, b) and Thompson, “Hierarchy of Immanence,” (1994). It is essential for East Asia to recognize its indigenous humanistic values, including their implications for animal welfare and environmental, ecological, and sustainability, to justify and spur needed developments in these domains.
On treating the young, the infirm, and the elderly, see Mencius 1A.7, 1B.5 (translator’s note).
Cf. the Doctrine of the Mean, ch. 19 (Chan 1963, p. 103f) (translator’s note).
Quoting the Odes, ode no. 256. “The recesses” refers to the northwest corner, the darkest place in the house (translator’s note).
Founder of the Xia dynasty (r. 2183–2175 B.C.E.). The story alludes to Mencius 4B.20 (translator’s note).
The story is found in Zuozhuan, Duke Yin, 1st year. See Legge trans. (1960 rpt.) Ch’un ch’iu, p. 4 (translator’s note).
Legendary sage emperor (3rd millennium B.C.E.). The story alludes to Mencius 4A.28 (translator’s note).
Heir apparent of the state of Jin who committed suicide because he was falsely accused of attempting to poison his father. Duke Xian (r. 676–651 B.C.E.). See Book of Rites (Legge trans. 1885) Li Ki, vol 1, pp. 126f (translator’s note).
Zengzi (505-c. 436 B.C.E.), pupil of Confucius, was known for his filial respect. In the Book of Filial Respect (Xiaojing), traditionally attributed to him, it is said, “Our bodies—to every hair and bit of skin—are received by us from our parents, and we must not presume to injure or wound them.” See Makre trans.Hsiao King, p. 3 (translator’s note).
Yin Boqi’s was a ninth century B.C.E. prince. He obediently accepted his father’s expulsion of him at the instigation of his stepmother, who wanted her own son to be the crown prince. See annotations on the eulogy at the end of ch. 79 of Qian Hanshu (History of the Former Han), 206 B.CE.-8 A.D. (translator’s note).
Chan trans., A Source Book (1963, p. 497f). Translator W.T. Chan comments (1963, p. 498ff): “Zhang Zai’s Western Inscription has become the basis of Neo-Confucian ethics. Cheng Yi was not exaggerating when he said there was nothing like it since Mencius…. As Cheng Yi said, it deals with the formation of Humanity (ren). Its primary purpose, as Yang Shi 楊時 (1053–1135) pointed out, was to urge students to cultivate and practice ren.
“Zhu Xi commented, “There is nothing in the entire realm of creatures that does not regard Heaven as the father and Earth as the mother. This means that pattern/principle is one…. Each regards his parents as his own parents and his son as his own son. This being the case, how can pattern/principle not be regarded as many?… When the intense affection for parents is extended to broaden the impartiality that knows no ego, and absolute sincerity in serving one’s parents leads to the understanding of the way to serve Heaven, then everywhere there is the operation that “the pattern/principle is one but its manifestations are many.”
In summary, “in the understanding of Neo-Confucianism, the Western Inscription in thus preserving the harmony of formation and expression of humaneness and putting it on a deeper basis, carries the doctrine of humaneness to a higher level than before. It also paves the way Zhu Xi to work out his mature Neo-Confucian account of humaneness” (Chan 1963, p. 497f).
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Thompson, K.O. Zhu Xi’s completion of Confucius’ humanistic ethics. Int. Commun. Chin. Cult 3, 605–629 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40636-016-0055-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40636-016-0055-0