Abstract
The present paper considers the exploitation of a common-property, nonrenewable resource, by individuals subject to habit formation. We formalize their behavior by means of a utility function, depending on the difference between the individuals’ current consumption and the consumption level which they aspire, the latter being a weighted average of past consumptions in the population. We derive and compare the benchmark cooperative solution and a noncooperative Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of the differential game. We investigate how the intensity, persistence and initial level of habits shape the cooperative and noncooperative solutions. We prove that habit formation may either mitigate or worsen the tragedy of the commons.
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Notes
In fact, the model based on latter assumption can be seen as limit cases of our model, when the persistence of habits tends to zero.
Rouillon [27] proposes a general formulation, which embeds both assumptions.
Alternatively, the parameter \(\alpha \) also gives the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and aspiration.
In particular, \(u\left( q\right) =\ln q\) and \(u\left( q\right) =\left( q^{1-\mu }-1\right) /\left( 1-\mu \right) \).
Constantinides [10] and Pollak [24] explicitly use the same condition. This condition is implicit in Ljungqvist and Uhlig [18], and Long and McWhinnie [21]. Campbell and Cochrane [7] avoid the problem by means of a formalization of habits preventing the aspiration level to become larger than the rate of consumption.
Here, \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( c_{i}\left( t\right) -\alpha y\left( t\right) \right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \).
Corollary 1 will be satisfied for example if \(u(q)=(q^{1-\mu }-1)/(1-\mu )\), with \(\mu >0\).
Remember that \(z=x-\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }\frac{y}{\beta }\).
Here and below, in saying that \(q^{\circ }\) is decreasing in \(\sigma \left( \cdot \right) \), we mean that when comparing two problems only differing with respect to their elasticity of marginal utility, \(\sigma _{1}\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(\sigma _{2}\left( \cdot \right) \) (say), the optimal consumption \(q^{\circ }\) will be smaller in the second problem when \(\sigma _{1}\left( q\right) <\sigma _{2}\left( q\right) \), for all q.
Again, here, \(\sigma _{1}\left( \cdot \right) \) is said smaller than \(\sigma _{2}\left( \cdot \right) \) if \(\sigma _{1}\left( q\right) <\sigma _{2}\left( q\right) \), for all q.
Recall that \(q^{\circ }<\underline{c}^{\circ }\). If \(y\le \underline{c}^{\circ }\), as \(c^{\circ }=\left( 1-\alpha \right) q^{\circ }+\alpha y\), we have \(c^{\circ }\le \underline{c}^{\circ }\); otherwise, if \(y>\underline{c}^{\circ }\), we get \(c^{\circ }\gtreqless \underline{c}^{\circ }\) if and only if \(\alpha \gtreqless \left( \underline{c}^{\circ }-q^{\circ }\right) /\left( y-q^{\circ }\right) \) .
Here, \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( c_{i}\left( t\right) -\alpha y\left( t\right) \right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \).
As \(\left( n-1\right) /n<1\), for all n, examples of standard utility functions satisfying this condition are \(u\left( c\right) =\ln \left( c\right) \) and \(\left( c^{1-\mu }-1\right) /\left( 1-\mu \right) \), with \(\mu >1\).
Remember that \(z=x-\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }\frac{y}{\beta }\).
Again, \(\sigma _{1}\left( \cdot \right) \) is said smaller than \(\sigma _{2}\left( \cdot \right) \) if \(\sigma _{1}\left( q\right) <\sigma _{2}\left( q\right) \), for all q.
Again, \(\sigma _{1}\left( \cdot \right) \) is said smaller than \(\sigma _{2}\left( \cdot \right) \) if \(\sigma _{1}\left( q\right) <\sigma _{2}\left( q\right) \), for all q.
We dedicate Sect. 5 to deepen this important question.
Remember that \(c^{*}\) and \(q^{*}\) vary parallely.
Recall that \(q^{*}<\underline{c}^{*}\). If \(y_{0}\le \underline{c}^{*}\), as \(c^{*}=\left( 1-\alpha \right) q^{*}+\alpha y_{0}\), we have \(c^{*}\le \underline{c}^{*}\); otherwise, if \(y_{0}>\underline{c}^{*}\), we get \(c^{*}\gtreqless \underline{c}^{*}\) if and only if\(\alpha \gtreqless \left( \underline{c}^{*}-q^{*}\right) /\left( y_{0}-q^{*}\right) \) .
When \(q\left( t\right) =f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \), \(\mu \left( t\right) =-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }u^{\prime }\left( f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \) and \(\eta \left( t\right) =0\), (8) simplifies to \(\dot{\mu }\left( t\right) =\delta \mu \left( t\right) \).
When \(q\left( t\right) =0\), \(\mu \left( t\right) =-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }\mathrm{e}^{\delta \left( t-T\right) }u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) \) and \(\eta \left( t\right) =\left( \mathrm{e}^{\delta \left( t-T\right) }-1\right) u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) \), (8) simplifies to \(\dot{\mu }\left( t\right) =\delta \mu \left( t\right) \) .
Here, we use \(\partial s_{j}^{*}\left( x,y\right) /\partial x=\left( 1-\alpha \right) g'\left( x-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }y\right) \) and \(\partial s_{j}^{*}\left( x,y\right) /\partial y=\frac{\alpha }{\beta }\big (\beta -g'\big (x-\frac{\alpha }{(1-\alpha )\beta }y\big )\big )\).
When \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \), \(\lambda _{i}\left( t\right) =u'\left( g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \), \(\mu _{i}\left( t\right) =-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1\,-\,\alpha \right) \beta }u'\left( g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \) and \(\eta _{i}\left( t\right) =0\), (14) and (15) simplify to \(\dot{\lambda }_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( \delta +\left( n-1\right) g'\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \lambda _{i}\left( t\right) \) and \(\dot{\mu }_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( \delta +\left( n-1\right) g'\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \mu _{i}\left( t\right) \).
When \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =0\), \(\lambda _{i}\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{\rho \left( t-T\right) }u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) \), \(\mu _{i}\left( t\right) =-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1\,-\,\alpha \right) \beta }\mathrm{e}^{\rho \left( t-T\right) }u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) \) and \(\eta _{i}\left( t\right) =\left( \mathrm{e}^{\rho \left( t-T\right) }-1\right) u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) \), (14) and (15) simplify to \(\dot{\lambda }_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( \delta +\left( n-1\right) g'\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \lambda _{i}\left( t\right) \) and \(\dot{\mu }_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( \delta +\left( n-1\right) g'\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \mu _{i}\left( t\right) \).
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Proof of Condition 1
Suppose that \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( c_{i}\left( t\right) -\alpha y\left( t\right) \right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) =0\), for all i and t. Substituting \(c_{i}\left( t\right) =\alpha y\left( t\right) \), for all i and t, (1) and (2), respectively, write
and
From this, we can obtain
and
From \(y\left( t\right) \ge 0\), we verify that \(c_{i}\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t. It is clear that \(x\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t, if and only if \(x_{0}-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }y_{0}\ge 0\). \(\square \)
1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
By concavity of \(u\left( \cdot \right) \), the cooperative solution is symmetric. Hence, substituting \(c_{i}\left( t\right) =c\left( t\right) \), for all i and t, the social problem is to choose \(c\left( \cdot \right) \) to maximize
where we write \(q\left( t\right) =\left( c\left( t\right) -\alpha y\left( t\right) \right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \) to simplify the notations.
Define the current-value Hamiltonian
where \(\lambda \) and \(\mu \) are costate variables associated with the states x and y, and \(\eta \) is a Lagrangian multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint.
If a feasible control path \(c\left( \cdot \right) \), with the corresponding states trajectories \(x\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(y\left( \cdot \right) \), is optimal, there exists (continuous with piecewise-continuous derivatives) costate variables \(\lambda \left( \cdot \right) \) and \(\mu \left( \cdot \right) \), and a (continuous) multiplier \(\eta \left( \cdot \right) \) such that
Now, \(f\left( z\right) \) being such that
for all t, let \(c\left( t\right) \) be such that
where \(x\left( t\right) \) and \(y\left( t\right) \) are the corresponding states trajectories.
(1) Feasibility We first show, in Lemmas 1 and 2, that the proposed control path \(c\left( \cdot \right) \) is feasible.
Lemma 1
For all \(z>0\), \(f\left( z\right) >0\), and \(f\left( 0\right) =0\).
Proof
If \(z=0\), \(f\left( 0\right) =0\) follows from \(\Theta \left( 0\right) =0\). Likewise, \(\lim _{z\rightarrow \infty }f\left( z\right) =\infty \) follows from \(\lim _{q\rightarrow \infty }\Theta \left( q\right) =\infty \). If \(0<z<\infty \), as \(\Theta \left( 0\right)<\delta z/n<\lim _{q\rightarrow \infty }\Theta \left( q\right) \) and \(\Theta \left( q\right) \) is continuous, there exists \(0<f\left( z\right) <\infty \) such that \(\Theta \left( f\left( z\right) \right) =\delta z/n\) (by the intermediate value theorem). As \(\Theta \left( q\right) \) is increasing (since \(\Theta '\left( q\right) =\sigma \left( q\right) >0\) for all \(q>0\)), this solution is unique. \(\square \)
Lemma 2
For all t, \(q\left( t\right) \ge 0\) and \(x\left( t\right) \ge 0\).
Proof
By definition, the individual consumption path \(c\left( \cdot \right) \) generates trajectories \(x\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(y\left( \cdot \right) \), such that \(\dot{x}\left( t\right) =-nc\left( t\right) \), \(x\left( 0\right) =x_{0}\), and \(\dot{y}\left( t\right) =\beta n\left( c\left( t\right) -y\left( t\right) \right) \), \(y\left( 0\right) =y_{0}\). Thus, letting
we can show that
Under Condition 1, Lemma 1 implies that \(z\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t, and \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }z\left( t\right) =0\). Now, substituting \(c\left( t\right) =\left( 1-\alpha \right) f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) +\alpha y\left( t\right) \), we can obtain
implying that
Clearly, as \(y_{0}\ge 0\) and \(f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \ge 0\), for all t, \(y\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t. Finally, as \(y\left( t\right) \ge 0\) and \(z\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t, we can show that \(c\left( t\right) =\left( 1-\alpha \right) f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) +\alpha y\left( t\right) \ge 0\) and \(x\left( t\right) =\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1\,-\,\alpha \right) \beta }y\left( t\right) +z\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t. \(\square \)
Remark
Given that \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) =0\), we can show that \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }y\left( t\right) =0\). It follows that \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }x\left( t\right) =\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }y\left( t\right) =\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }z\left( t\right) =0\).
(2) Necessary Conditions Let T be the time when \(z\left( t\right) =0\) (including the possibility that \(T=\infty \)). We first construct \(\lambda \left( \cdot \right) \), \(\mu \left( \cdot \right) \) and \(\eta \left( \cdot \right) \) to simultaneously satisfy the maximum condition (5) and the adjoint Eqs. (7) and (8). We then show that the transversality condition (9) holds.
The following lemma will be useful below.
Lemma 3
The marginal utility \(u^{\prime }\left( f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \) grows at the rate \(\delta \), for all \(t<T\), and is equal to \(u'\left( 0\right) \), for all \(t\ge T\).
Proof
First remark that \(\Theta \left( f\left( z\right) \right) =\delta z/n\), for all z, implies that \(\sigma \left( f\left( z\right) \right) f^{\prime }\left( z\right) =\delta /n\), for all z (by differentiation). Define \(p\left( t\right) =u^{\prime }\left( f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \), for all t. If \(t<T\), differentiation yields
Substituting \(\dot{z}\left( t\right) =-nf\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \) and dividing by \(p\left( t\right) =u^{\prime }\left( f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \), we get
If \(t\ge T\), \(z\left( t\right) =0\) (by definition) and \(f\left( 0\right) =0\) imply that \(p\left( t\right) =u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) \). \(\square \)
For all \(t<T\), let
As \(u^{\prime }\left( f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) =\lambda \left( t\right) -\beta \mu \left( t\right) -\eta \left( t\right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \) (by construction), the maximum condition (5) is satisfied if \(q\left( t\right) =f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \). The adjoint Eqs. (7) and (8) are satisfied from Lemma 3.Footnote 20
For all \(t\ge T\), let
As \(u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) =\lambda \left( t\right) -\beta \mu \left( t\right) -\eta \left( t\right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \) (by construction), the maximum condition (5) is satisfied if \(q\left( t\right) =f\left( 0\right) =0\). The adjoint Eqs. (7) and (8) are satisfied by construction.Footnote 21
To verify the transversality condition (9), define \(A\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{-\delta t}\left( \lambda \left( t\right) x\left( t\right) +\mu \left( t\right) y\left( t\right) \right) \). We need to separate the cases where T is infinite or finite. If T is infinite, we can show that \(A\left( t\right) =u^{\prime }\left( f\left( z_{0}\right) \right) z\left( t\right) \), for all t. Then, the transversality condition follows from \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }z\left( t\right) =0\) (see the proof of Lemma 2). If T is finite, we can show that \(A\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{-\delta T}u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) z\left( t\right) \), for all \(t\ge T\). As \(z\left( t\right) =0\) for all \(t\ge T\) (by definition of T), the transversality condition is trivially satisfied.
(3) Sufficiency Conditions We show that the Hamiltonian, calculated with the adjoint variables and multiplier defined above, is strictly concave.
For \(t<T\), substituting (10), the Hamiltonian can be written after simplification
Likewise, for \(t\ge T\), substituting (11), we obtain
Hence, under Assumption 1, the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in \(c_{i}\), x and y. This proves that Proposition 1 characterizes the unique optimal solution. \(\square \)
1.3 Proof of Corollary 1.
Along the cooperative path, we have \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =f\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \), where \(f\left( z\right) \) is implicitly defined by \(\Theta \left( f\left( z\right) \right) =\intop _{0}^{f\left( z\right) }\sigma \left( s\right) \mathrm{d}s=\delta z/n\) and \(z\left( t\right) \) satisfies \(\dot{z}\left( t\right) =-nf\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \) and \(z\left( 0\right) =z_{0}\). Given that \(f\left( z\right) >0\) for all \(z>0\) (see Lemma 1), it will be sufficient to show that \(z\left( t\right) >0\) for all t.
Assume that \(\sigma \left( q\right) \ge \mu \) for all q, for some \(\mu >0\). It follows that \(\Theta \left( q\right) \ge \mu q\). In particular, \(\Theta \left( f\left( z\right) \right) \ge \mu f\left( z\right) \). Using \(\Theta \left( f\left( z\right) \right) =\delta z/n\), this implies that \(f\left( z\right) \le \frac{\delta }{\mu }\frac{z}{n}\) and \(\dot{z}\left( t\right) =-nf\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \ge -\frac{\delta }{\mu }z\left( t\right) \). In turn, this allows to show that \(z\left( t\right) \ge z_{0}\mathrm{e}^{-\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}\). (Indeed, let \(F\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}z\left( t\right) \). Then \(F'\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}\left( \dot{z}\left( t\right) +\frac{\delta }{\mu }z\left( t\right) \right) \ge 0\) and \(F\left( t\right) \) is increasing. Hence, \(F\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}z\left( t\right) \ge z_{0}=F\left( 0\right) \) for all t). Assuming that \(z_{0}>0\), this proves that \(z\left( t\right) >0\) for all t.
1.4 Proof of Property 1
Denote by \(q^{\circ }\) the optimal individual subjective consumption. It satisfies \(\Theta \left( q^{\circ }\right) =\frac{\delta }{n}z\), where \(z=x-\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }\frac{y}{\beta }\). By differentiation, we can obtain
Now, denote by \(c^{\circ }\) the optimal individual consumption. It is given by \(c^{\circ }=\left( 1-\alpha \right) q^{\circ }+\alpha y\). Using the previous results, we get after differentiation and substitution
The comparative statics with respect to \(\alpha \) is ambiguous. If \(\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta n\sigma \left( q^{\circ }\right) \le \delta \), knowing that \(q^{\circ }>0\), we show that \(\hbox {d}c^{\circ }/\hbox {d}\alpha <0\). Otherwise, the derivative \(\hbox {d}c^{\circ }/\hbox {d}\alpha \) can be negative, zero or positive, depending on \(q^{\circ }\) and y. However, let S be the set of all pairs x and y such that \(x-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1\,-\,\alpha \right) \beta }y=z\), as shown in Fig. 7.
Remark that \(q^{\circ }=f\left( z\right) \), for all \(\left( x,y\right) \in S\). Thus, since \(\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta n\sigma \left( q^{\circ }\right) >\delta \) and \(q^{\circ }\) is constant, \(\hbox {d}c^{\circ }/\hbox {d}\alpha \) is linearly decreasing in y, for all \(\left( x,y\right) \in S\). This proves that for all \(\left( x,y\right) \in S\), there exists \(\theta >0\) such that \(dc^{\circ }/d\alpha \gtreqless 0\) if and only if \(y/x\gtreqless \theta \). This completes the proof of Property 1. \(\square \)
1.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider any player i. Assume that all individuals \(j\ne i\) play the stationary Markovian strategy \(s_{j}^{*}\left( x,y\right) =\left( 1-\alpha \right) g\left( x-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }y\right) +\alpha y\) , where \(g\left( z\right) \) satisfies
The problem of the remaining player i is to find a consumption path, \(c_{i}\left( \cdot \right) \), maximizing
where we write \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =\left( c_{i}\left( t\right) -\alpha y\left( t\right) \right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \) to simplify the notations.
Define the current-value Hamiltonian
where \(\lambda _{i}\) and \(\mu _{i}\) are costate variables associated with the states x and y, and \(\eta _{i}\) is a Lagrangian multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint.
If a feasible control path \(c_{i}\left( \cdot \right) \), with the corresponding states trajectories \(x\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(y\left( \cdot \right) \), is optimal, there exists (continuous with piecewise-continuous derivatives) costate variables \(\lambda _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(\mu _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \), and a (continuous) multiplier \(\eta _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) such thatFootnote 22
where we write \(z\left( t\right) =x\left( t\right) -\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }y\left( t\right) \).
Now, let \(c_{i}\left( t\right) \), for all t, satisfy
where \(x\left( t\right) \) and \(y\left( t\right) \) are the corresponding states trajectories. Remark that it is equivalent to write
We show below that the proposed consumption path \(c_{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) is feasible, and we find \(\lambda _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \), \(\mu _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(\eta _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \), to satisfy conditions (12) to (16). Proposition 2 follows.
(1) Feasibility We first show, in Lemmas 4 and 5, that the proposed control path \(c_{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) is feasible.
Lemma 4
For all \(z>0\), \(g\left( z\right) >0\), and \(g\left( 0\right) =0\).
Proof
If \(z=0\), \(g\left( 0\right) =0\) follows from \(\Psi \left( 0\right) =0\). Likewise, \(\lim _{z\rightarrow \infty }g\left( z\right) =\infty \) follows from \(\lim _{q\rightarrow \infty }\Psi \left( q\right) =\infty \). If \(0<z<\infty \), as \(\Psi \left( 0\right)<\delta z/n<\lim _{q\rightarrow \infty }\Psi \left( q\right) \) and \(\Psi \left( q\right) \) is continuous, there exists \(0<g\left( z\right) <\infty \) such that \(\Psi \left( g\left( z\right) \right) =\delta z/n\) (by the intermediate value theorem). As \(\Psi \left( q\right) \) is increasing (assuming \(\Psi '\left( q\right) =\sigma \left( q\right) -\left( n-1\right) /n>0\) for all \(q>0\)), this solution is unique. \(\square \)
Lemma 5
For all t, \(q_{i}\left( t\right) \ge 0\) and \(x\left( t\right) \ge 0\).
Proof
By definition, the individual consumption path \(c_{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) generates trajectories \(x\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(y\left( \cdot \right) \), such that \(\dot{x}\left( t\right) =-\sum \limits _{j=1}^{n}c_{j}\left( t\right) \), \(x\left( 0\right) =x_{0}\), and \(\dot{y}\left( t\right) =\beta \left( \sum \limits _{j=1}^{n}c_{j}\left( t\right) -ny\left( t\right) \right) \), \(y\left( 0\right) =y_{0}\). Thus, letting
we can show that
Under Condition 1, Lemma 4 implies that \(z\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t, and \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }z\left( t\right) =0\). Now, substituting \(c_{j}\left( t\right) =\left( 1-\alpha \right) g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) +\alpha y\left( t\right) \), for all j, we can obtain
implying that
Clearly, as \(y_{0}\ge 0\) and \(g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \ge 0\), for all t, \(y\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t. Finally, as \(y\left( t\right) \ge 0\) and \(z\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t, we can show that \(c\left( t\right) =\alpha y\left( t\right) +\left( 1-\alpha \right) g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \ge 0\) and \(x\left( t\right) =\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }y\left( t\right) +z\left( t\right) \ge 0\), for all t. \(\square \)
Remark
Given that \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) =0\), \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }y\left( t\right) =0\). Hence, we can show that \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }x\left( t\right) =\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }y\left( t\right) =\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }z\left( t\right) =0\).
(2) Necessary Conditions Let T be the time when \(z\left( t\right) =0\) (including the possibility that \(T=\infty \)). We first construct \(\lambda _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \), \(\mu _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) and \(\eta _{i}\left( \cdot \right) \) to simultaneously satisfy the maximum condition (12) and the adjoint Eqs. (14) and (15). We then show that the transversality condition (16) holds.
The following lemma will be useful below.
Lemma 6
The marginal utility \(u^{\prime }\left( g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \) grows at the rate \(\delta +\left( n-1\right) g'\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \), for all \(t<T\), and is equal to \(u'\left( 0\right) \), for all \(t\ge T\).
Proof
First remark that \(\Psi \left( g\left( z\right) \right) =\delta z/n\), for all z, implies that \(\sigma \left( g\left( z\right) \right) g'\left( z\right) =\left( \delta +\left( n-1\right) g'\left( z\right) \right) /n\), for all z (by differentiation). Define \(p\left( t\right) =u'\left( g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \), for all t. If \(t<T\), differentiation yields
Substituting \(\dot{z}\left( t\right) =-ng\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \) and dividing by \(p\left( t\right) =u^{\prime }\left( g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) \), we get
If \(t\ge T\), \(z\left( t\right) =0\) (by definition) and \(g\left( 0\right) =0\) imply that \(p\left( t\right) =u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) \). \(\square \)
For all \(t<T\), let
As \(u'\left( g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) =\lambda _{i}\left( t\right) -\beta \mu _{i}\left( t\right) -\eta _{i}\left( t\right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \) (by construction), the maximum condition (12) is satisfied if \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \). The adjoint Eqs. (14) and (15) are satisfied from Lemma 6.Footnote 23
For all \(t\ge T\), let
where we let \(\rho \equiv \delta +\left( n-1\right) g'\left( 0\right) \). As \(u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) =\lambda _{i}\left( t\right) -\beta \mu _{i}\left( t\right) -\eta _{i}\left( t\right) /\left( 1-\alpha \right) \) (by construction), the maximum condition (12) is satisfied if \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =g\left( 0\right) =0\). The adjoint Eqs. (14) and (15) are satisfied by construction.Footnote 24
To verify the transversality condition (16), define \(A_{i}\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{-\delta t}\left( \lambda _{i}\left( t\right) x\left( t\right) +\mu _{i}\left( t\right) y\left( t\right) \right) \). We need to separate the cases where T is infinite or finite. If T is infinite, we can show that \(A_{i}\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{-\delta t}u'\left( g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \right) z\left( t\right) \) for all t. By Lemma 6, we can get by differentiation
Since \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }z\left( t\right) =0\) (see the proof of Lemma 5) and \(g\left( 0\right) =0\), we have
which implies that
As \(g'\left( 0\right) >0\) by assumption, it follows that \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }A_{i}\left( t\right) =0\). If T is finite, we can show that \(A_{i}\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{-\delta t}\mathrm{e}^{\rho \left( t-T\right) }u^{\prime }\left( 0\right) z\left( t\right) \) for all \(t\ge T\). As \(z\left( t\right) =0\) for all \(t\ge T\) (by definition of T), the transversality condition is trivially satisfied.
(3) Sufficiency conditionsWe show that the Hamiltonian, calculated with the adjoint variables and multiplier defined above, is strictly concave.
For \(t<T\), using \(s_{j}^{*}\left( x,y\right) =\left( 1-\alpha \right) g\left( x-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }y\right) +\alpha y\) and substituting (17), the Hamiltonian can be written after simplification
Likewise, for \(t\ge T\), using \(s_{j}^{*}\left( x,y\right) =\left( 1-\alpha \right) g\left( x-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta }y\right) +\alpha y\) and substituting (18), we obtain
Using \(\Psi \left( g\left( z\right) \right) =\delta z/n\), for all z, we can show by differentiation that \(g'\left( z\right) =\delta /\left( n\sigma \left( g\left( z\right) \right) -n+1\right) \) and \(g''\left( z\right) =-\delta ^{2}/\left( \sigma \left( g\left( z\right) \right) -\left( n-1\right) /n\right) ^{3}<0\), for all z. Hence, under assumption 1, the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in \(c_{i}\), x and y. This proves that the strategy considered above is the unique best-reply of player i to the strategies \(s_{j}^{*}\left( x,y\right) \) played by the other players. \(\square \)
1.6 Proof of Corollary 2.
Along the noncooperative path, we have \(q_{i}\left( t\right) =g\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \), where \(g\left( z\right) \) is implicitly defined by \(\Psi \left( g\left( z\right) \right) \equiv \int _{0}^{g\left( z\right) }\left( \sigma \left( s\right) -\left( n-1\right) /n\right) \mathrm{d}s=\frac{\delta }{n}z\) and \(z\left( t\right) \) satisfies \(\dot{z}\left( t\right) =-ng\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \) and \(z\left( 0\right) =z_{0}\). Given that \(g\left( z\right) >0\) for all \(z>0\) (see Lemma 4), it will be sufficient to show that \(z\left( t\right) >0\) for all t.
Assume that \(\sigma \left( q\right) -\left( n-1\right) /n\ge \mu \) for all q, for some \(\mu >0\). It follows that \(\Psi \left( q\right) \ge \mu q\). In particular, \(\Psi \left( f\left( z\right) \right) \ge \mu f\left( z\right) \). Using \(\Psi \left( f\left( z\right) \right) =\delta z/n\), this implies that \(g\left( z\right) \le \frac{\delta }{\mu }\frac{z}{n}\) and \(\dot{z}\left( t\right) =-ng\left( z\left( t\right) \right) \ge -\frac{\delta }{\mu }z\left( t\right) \). In turn, this allows to show that \(z\left( t\right) \ge z_{0}\mathrm{e}^{-\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}\).(Indeed, let \(F\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}z\left( t\right) \). Then \(F'\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}\left( \dot{z}\left( t\right) +\frac{\delta }{\mu }z\left( t\right) \right) \ge 0\) and \(F\left( t\right) \) is increasing. Hence, \(F\left( t\right) =\mathrm{e}^{\frac{\delta }{\mu }t}z\left( t\right) \ge z_{0}=F\left( 0\right) \) for all t.) Assuming that \(z_{0}>0\), this proves that \(z\left( t\right) >0\) for all t.
1.7 Proof of Property 2
Denote by \(q^{*}\) the Nash equilibrium individual subjective consumption. It satisfies \(\Psi \left( q^{*}\right) =\Theta \left( q^{*}\right) -\frac{n-1}{n}q^{*}=\frac{\delta }{n}z\), where \(z=x-\frac{\alpha }{\left( 1\,-\,\alpha \right) \beta }y\). Remember that the elasticity of the marginal utility \(\sigma \left( \cdot \right) \) is assumed larger than \(\left( n-1\right) /n\). By differentiation, we can obtain
The comparative statics with respect to n is ambiguous. However, by the mean value theorem, given that \(\Theta \left( 0\right) =0\), there exists q, with \(0<q<q^{*}\), such that
Assume that \(\sigma \left( q\right) >1\) for all q. Then, \(\Theta \left( q^{*}\right) >q^{*}\), implying that \(\mathrm{d}q^{*}/\mathrm{d}n<0\). Likewise, one can prove that \(\mathrm{d}q^{*}/\mathrm{d}n=0\) if \(\sigma \left( q\right) =1\), for all q, and \(\mathrm{d}q^{*}/\mathrm{d}n>0\) if \(\sigma \left( q\right) <1\), for all q.
Now, denote by \(c^{*}\) the optimal individual consumption. It is given by \(c^{*}=\left( 1-\alpha \right) q^{*}+\alpha y\). Using the previous results, we get after differentiation and substitution
The comparative statics with respect to \(\alpha \) is ambiguous. If \(\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta n\left( \sigma \left( q^{*}\right) -\frac{n-1}{n}\right) \le \delta \), knowing that \(q^{*}>0\), we show that \(\mathrm{d}c^{*}/\mathrm{d}\alpha <0\). Otherwise, the derivative \(\mathrm{d}c^{*}/\mathrm{d}\alpha \) can be negative, zero or positive, depending on \(q^{*}\) and \(y_{0}\). Indeed, let S be the set of all pairs x and y such that \(x-\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }\frac{y}{\beta }=z\), as drawn in Fig. 7. Remark that \(q^{*}=g\left( z\right) \), for all \(\left( x,y\right) \in S\). Thus, since \(\left( 1-\alpha \right) \beta n\left( \sigma \left( q^{*}\right) -\left( n-1\right) /n\right) >\delta \) and \(q^{*}\) is constant, \(dc^{*}/d\alpha \) is linearly decreasing in y. This proves that for all \(\left( x,y\right) \in S\), there exists \(\theta >0\) such that \(dc^{*}/d\alpha \gtreqless 0\) if and only if \(y/x\gtreqless \theta \). Using the same argument as for \(q^{*}\), we can show that \(dc^{*}/dn\gtreqless 0\) when \(\sigma \left( q^{*}\right) \lesseqgtr 1\). This completes the proof of Property 2. \(\square \)
1.8 Proof of Property 3
Using results from the proofs of Properties 1 and 2, we can obtain
It follows that \(\sigma \left( q^{*}\right) -\sigma \left( q^{\circ }\right) \le \left( n-1\right) /n\) implies \(\mathrm{d}\Delta /\mathrm{d}\alpha <0\) (using \(q^{*}>q^{\circ }\)). It is immediate that \(\mathrm{d}\Delta /\mathrm{d}\beta \gtreqless 0\) and \(\mathrm{d}\Delta /\mathrm{d}y\lesseqgtr 0\) if and only if \(\sigma \left( q^{*}\right) -\sigma \left( q^{\circ }\right) \lesseqgtr \left( n-1\right) /n\).
Given that \(q^{*}>q^{\circ }\), it is easy to see that \(\sigma \left( q^{*}\right) -\sigma \left( q^{\circ }\right) <\left( n-1\right) /n\) will be true if the elasticity of marginal utility is nonincreasing. It will also be true if \(\left| \sigma \left( q\right) -\sigma \left( q'\right) \right| <\left( n-1\right) /n\), for all q and \(q'\). \(\square \)
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Rouillon, S. Cooperative and Noncooperative Extraction in a Common Pool with Habit Formation. Dyn Games Appl 7, 468–491 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-016-0192-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-016-0192-4