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Human Rights Without Political Participation?

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Abstract

John Rawls claims that “benevolent absolutisms” honor human rights without honoring political participation rights. Critics argue that he is mistaken. One objection appeals to the instrumental value of political participation rights. This objection holds that without political participation rights, individuals cannot secure the content of their rights against encroachment. Given this, individuals without political participation rights cannot be said to have rights at all. Here, I evaluate this instrumental objection. I identify three ways of relating political participation rights to human rights and show that one makes sense of Rawls’s claim. I then defend this view from instrumental objections. This has implications beyond the realm of Rawls scholarship. Many societies are not democratic and are not democratizing. We must determine whether any of these societies can secure at least the content of human rights and, if so, what shape their social and political institutions must take to do so.

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Notes

  1. Rawls mentions these societies three times. On two occasions, he says they “honor human rights,” but on another occasion, he says they honor “most” human rights. He does not explain the difference.

  2. I want to thank two anonymous reviewers for getting me to consider this objection.

  3. A liberal society has a “common good” too, says Rawls: “achieving political justice for all its citizens over time and preserving the free culture that justice allows” (1999, p. 71).

  4. Rawls leaves open the question of whether there are other, non-associationist decent societies.

  5. Reidy does not comment on the distinction Rawls seems to draw between human rights proper and political participation rights.

  6. In fact, it may be the case that even thin democratic participation cannot secure the content of rights generally in this way. As I pointed out earlier, the logic of elections and thin democratic participation is inadequate as an account of the success modern liberal societies have in securing the content of human rights for all.

  7. Again, it is fair to ask if this should count as an absolutism. I will address this concern in the final section of the paper.

  8. An anonymous reviewer suggests that what Rawls says in A Theory of Justice (1999, rev. ed., Section 70) about the morality of authority is not consistent with the idea that absolutisms can honor human rights as rights. This is a very interesting piece of the puzzle, and I am not sure how it might fit. My initial reaction is to wonder if the moral psychology Rawls develops in A Theory of Justice can be easily transferred to the case of benevolent absolutisms. I am not sure that it can. We should distinguish the children Rawls discusses, who lack the knowledge and understanding they would need to assess parental injunctions, from the subjects of a benevolent leader who might have the knowledge and understanding they would need to assess government injunctions, but who are never offered an opportunity to do so. In any case, this is an issue that requires a better response than I can give at this point.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of West Georgia, 1601 Maple Street, Carrollton, GA, 30118, USA

    Walter J. Riker

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  1. Walter J. Riker
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Correspondence to Walter J. Riker.

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Riker, W.J. Human Rights Without Political Participation?. Hum Rights Rev 15, 369–390 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-014-0341-3

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