Abstract
The paper deals primarily with the standard question in what exactly, according to Husserl, consists the crisis of the European sciences. In the literature so far, there have been two tendencies on this question, one focusing on the loss of the sciences’ meaningfulness for life, the other emphasizing the inadequacy of their scientificity. Instead of arguing for one of these two options or for some sort of combination of both, another interpretation of this topic will be suggested. The focus will be on Husserl’s notion of historicity and its connection with the concept of life-world. It will be argued that it is the historical detachment of sciences from ideas and consequently the sphere of meaning altogether which lies at the core of their ill state. On this basis, it will show that Husserl’s approach to science in Crisis is actually double. For one, it is an attempt to supplement science with a philosophical justification. The other is a historical de-construction of scientific objectivism as a misleading metaphysical claim concerning the lived world. This second, historical approach is developed exclusively in the Crisis. However, it does bring out questions leading to rethinking the meaning and goals of transcendental phenomenology itself.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The work on this paper was funded by GA ČR, project nr. 16-11707S.
Hua VI, p. 1.
Hua VI, p. 5.
Hua VI, pp. 48–53, 342–343.
Hua III/1, p. 110.
Hua VI, p. 130.
Hua VI, p. 130.
Dodd 2004, p. 150.
Hua VI, p. 321.
Trizio (2016).
Hua VI, pp. 126–128, 342–343, 460.
Hua VI, pp. 128, 332.
Hua VI, pp. 6–7, 13.
Hua VI, pp. 7. 9.
Hua VI, p. 338.
Hua VI, pp. 135–138.
Hua VI, pp. 337–338, 347–348.
Hua VI, p. 315.
Hua VI, p. 316.
Hua VI, p. 317.
Hua VI, pp. 159–166.
Hua VI, p. 318.
As is sometimes attempted in the literature for the sake of greater clarity, usually also connected with the attempt to introduce a firm distinction between the concepts of “Lebenswelt” and “Umwelt.” See Welter 1986, pp. 90–91.
Hua VI, p. 345.
Carr 2010.
“In a word, what is acquired through scientific activity is not something real but something ideal. But what is more, that which is so acquired as valid, as truth, is serviceable as material for the possible production of idealities on a higher level, and so on again and again.” Hua VI, p. 323.
Hua VI, pp. 123–140.
This argument against the natural sciences providing their historical genealogy is therefore a structurally different (and in a sense more radical) argument than that over the subject-relativity of the life-world, which Husserl uses when introducing the concept of transcendental reduction. Hua VI, pp. 126–135.
Hua VI, pp. 74–76.
Hua VI, pp. 322, 324.
Hua VI, p. 339.
Kant 2003
References
Bernet, R., Kern, I., & Marbach, E. (1989). Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Carr, D. (1984). Time-consciousness and historical consciousness. In K. K. Cho (Ed.), Philosophy and science in phenomenological perspective (pp. 31–44). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Carr, D. (2010). The crisis as philosophy of history. In D. Hyder & H.-J. Rheinberger (Eds.), Science and the life-world. Essays on Husserl’s “Crisis of European Sciences” (pp. 83–99). Standford, California: Standford University Press.
Claesges, U. (1972). Zweideutigkeiten in Husserls Lebenswelt-begriff. In U. Claesges & K. Held (Eds.), Perspektiven transzendentalphänomenologischer Forschung (pp. 85–101). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Dodd, J. (2004). Crisis and reflection. An essay on Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Heffernan, G. (2017). The concept of Krisis in Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Husserl Studies, 33(3), 229–257.
Hua VII, Husserl, E. (1956). Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte. R. Boehm (Hg.) Haag, Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua VI, Husserl, E. (1962 [1936]). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. 2. Auflage. W. Biemel (Hg.) Haag: Matinus Nijhoff.
Hua XVII. Husserl, E. (1974 [1929]). Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. P. Janssen (Hg.) Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua III/1. Husserl, E. (1976 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reiene Phänomenologie. K. Schumann (Hg.) Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Kant, I. (2003 [1781, 1787]). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Nach der ersten und zweiten Originalausgabe herausgegeben von Jens Timmermann. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
Klein, J. (1940). Phenomenology and history of science. In M. Farber (Ed.), Philosophical essays in memory of Edmund Husserl (pp. 143–163). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Moran, D. (2012). Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ströker, E. (1984). Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and history. In K. K. Cho (Ed.), Philosophy and science in phenomenological perspective (pp. 195–207). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Trizio, E. (2016). What is the crisis of Western sciences? Husserl Studies, 32(3), 191–211.
Welter, R. (1986). Der Begriff der Lebenswelt. Theorien vortheoretsicher Erfahrungswelt. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Trnka, J. The Crisis of Western Sciences and Husserl’s Critique in the Vienna Lecture. SOPHIA 59, 185–196 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0694-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-018-0694-1