Abstract
In sequential auctions the phenomenon of declining prices is often observed, which in theory can be represented by a supermartingale. This paper employs the perspective that bidders’ values may change over stages and the common priors are sequentially adjusted by the remaining bidders. It is shown that the declining price sequence can be explained by the adjustment of common priors between auctions. The adjustment of common priors is characterized by stochastic orders. Sufficient and necessary conditions for a supermartingale price sequence are derived.
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This research was supported by Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project (YETP0964), the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71171053 and 71473282, 211 Projects Foundation and Projects from School of Economics at Central University of Finance and Economics.
This paper was recommended for publication by Editor ZHANG Xun.
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Qiao, H., Ma, J. The changing of common priors in sequential auctions. J Syst Sci Complex 29, 1342–1357 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-016-4295-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-016-4295-1