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Collective Moods. A Contribution to the Phenomenology and Interpersonality of Shared Affectivity

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Abstract

Collective moods are ubiquitous in social life. People may experience the sharing of a mood at a large sporting event, a concert or a religious ceremony, but also at a small family celebration or as part of a tour group. However, in philosophical discussions, collective moods are often framed as experiences of ecstasy, intoxication (Rausch) or even disinhibition at mass events without examining other aspects. Yet we practice and cultivate the sharing of moods in quite varied forms. In this paper I intend to offer a differentiating suggestion as to the levels and forms of the sharing of moods, drawing on discussions of shared feelings, work on the phenomenology of social understanding, and social theory.

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Notes

  1. There are certainly other forms of sharing a mood – for example via identification, via technologically scaffolded forms of sharing, etc. The topic of this paper is restricted to co-presence and mutual awareness, the prerequisites for the direct and immediate sharing of moods. On this point I agree with Landweer 2016, pp. 151 ff. (on shared feelings).

  2. This point may apply more generally, for example for shared feelings and emotions, as well. Cf. Landweer 2016, also Krueger 2013.

  3. Schmid 2009, p. 76.

  4. Cf. Ratcliffe 2010, p. 354, footnote 2 on the directedness of experience.

  5. Heidegger 1962, p. 176.

  6. Heidegger 1962, p. 176. Cf. Ratcliffe 2010, p. 356; cf. Fuchs 2013a, p. 225.

  7. Ratcliffe 2010, p. 350.

  8. Fuchs 2013a, p. 224.

  9. Cf. Ratcliffe 2010, p. 354.

  10. Goldie 2000, p. 143. Cf. Bulka 2015, p. 51–71.

  11. Heidegger 1995, p. 66.

  12. Ibid.

  13. Ibid., p. 67.

  14. Ibid., p. 66 f. Cf. Dreyfus 2012, p. 147.

  15. Fuchs 2013a, p. 224.

  16. Fuchs 2013a, p. 225.

  17. Ibid., p. 224 f.

  18. One exception is the German philosopher Hermann Schmitz. He provides a systematic analysis and detailed descriptions of moods and also shared moods in his work (comprising several volumes). Unfortunately his works are not translated into English. Hasse 2015 draws on Schmitz - in his inquiry into the atmospheres of urban space. Cf. Landweer 2016 who is analyzing shared feelings in a broad sense (comprising shared moods). Krebs (in her recent work on the dialogical sharing of emotions) draws critical on the understanding of moods as atmospheres at Schmitz. Cf. Krebs 2015, p. 187–199.

  19. Cf. Schmid 2008, p. 77, Schmid 2009, p. 76.

  20. Krebs also emphasizes personal autonomy and individuality as preconditions of authentic emotional sharing resp. dialogical sharing. Cf. Krebs 2015 for example p. 198 f., 220–229, 288 f.

  21. Schmid 2009, p. 64.

  22. Schmid 2008. p. 80, Schmid 2009, p. 79. [italics in the original].

  23. See for example Barbalet and Demertzis 2013, p. 176 (on emotional climate); Salmela 2012; Sanchéz-Guerrero 2011.

  24. Cf. Schmid 2009, p. 70 f.

  25. Schmid 2008, p. 69 [italics in the original].

  26. Fuchs 2013a, p. 221.

  27. Ibid., p. 223.

  28. Schmid 2008, p. 69 [italics in the original].

  29. Ratcliffe 2010, p. 350. Cf. Fuchs 2013a, pp. 223–226.

  30. Although there are differences between the concepts of the lived body (Merleau-Ponty) vs. the felt body (Schmitz, Landweer), the results of this investigation would be very similar with both accounts. In this text I focus mainly on the lived body.

  31. Cf. Landweer 2013, p. 133.

  32. Toadvine 2016.

  33. Cf. Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009. Cf. Landweer 2013 on corporeal interaction. Schmitz’ account of “corporeal communication” is in some aspects similar (cf. Schmitz et al. 2011, p. 251 i.a.). As Schmitz’ works have not yet been translated into English (excepting Schmitz et al. 2011), I focus here on Merleau-Ponty 1962, Fuchs 2013a, 2013b, Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009 and on Landweer 2013.

  34. Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 475.

  35. Ibid., p. 473.

  36. Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 472 [italics added, N.T.].

  37. Ibid., p. 475.

  38. Ibid., p. 475 [italics added, N.T.].

  39. Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 185.

  40. Krebs discusses in detail Scheler’s account of contagion and its role for the dialogical type of sharing an emotion – cf. Krebs 2015, p. 112–124 and for the corresponding forms of community ibid., p. 124–132.

  41. As adult persons we have acquired the ability to distance ourselves in different degrees from embodied interaction. Infants initially lack this capability. Krueger focuses in this regard on affect regulation. According to Krueger (2013) infants lack the self-regulatory capacities. The developmental origins (affective intimacy) provide the basis of adult interpersonal understanding. See also Krueger 2015.

  42. Schmitz et al. 2011, p. 257.

  43. Bollnow 2009, p. 118 [Translated by Alison Borrowman.]. In the context of existential orientations Slaby (2010, p. 105) states helpfully that “stance” and “posture” may be close to the German term “Haltung”, in the sense of the “activity of ‘holding oneself’”. Cf. Landweer 2016, p. 145 f. A different account of attitude could be found in Krebs 2015 (love as emotional and practical attitude) – cf. Krebs 2015, p. 226–229.

  44. Bollnow 2009, p. 118. Schmitz has done detailed work on the association of personhood, attitude and feelings. In Schmitz et al. 2011, p. 254 the term “attitude” is the translation for “Fassung”, which has a similar function as “Haltung” at Bollnow. For attitude and mood see Slaby 2008, chapter 7 and Slaby 2010, p. 105; also Fuchs 2013b, p. 14 f.

  45. Fuchs 2006, p. 109; cf. Zutt 1963 pp. 1–88 on „innere Haltung“.

  46. Cf. Fuchs 2006, p. 111.

  47. Ibid., p. 109 f.

  48. It should be taken into account that moods could be collective (because they are shaping the encompassing expressive space) without being shared (in the narrow sense of the word) by all persons that are present.

  49. Landweer 2016 (with respect to feelings) interprets this differently (ibid., p. 158).

  50. Bodily resonance comes into play here. See, e.g. Landweer 2016; Eberlein 2011. - Fuchs (2013a, p. 222 ff.) speaks of the “emotional space”, that is determined by the affective qualities of the surroundings or of interpersonal ‘climates’.

  51. Cf. Fuchs 2013a, p. 223.

  52. Just for example cf. Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, pp. 208 ff.; Krueger 2013, pp. 509–531, p. 510.

  53. Schmitz (1980, p. 111) quotes this example from Leopold von Wiese.

  54. Here affect regulation comes into play. ”Thus, not only can I as a mature perceiver inhibit my attention. Additionally, I can inhibit (or elevate) my felt responses to things happening around me.” (Krueger 2013, p. 518). The way a person employs his or her regulating capacities may vary with that person’s attitude.

  55. I am referring here to the concept of attitude (Fassung, Haltung) as introduced above. Of course, other factors like intentions or concerns play also a role for partaking in the collective mood.

  56. “Incorporation is not restricted to that which is near skin […].” (Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 473).

  57. Emotional expression can only be homogenized because it is synchronous.

  58. For the role of synchronized emotional responses for shared emotions cf. Salmela 2012, p. 9.

  59. Cf. Landweer 2013, p. 137; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 472. Landweer differentiates along somewhat different lines than Fuchs/De Jaegher – cf. critical: Landweer 2016, p. 156, footnote 30. I do not regard the difference as being that great. The distinction between the fundamental forms of corporeal interaction goes back to Schmitz.

  60. Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009, p.474) differentiate the coordination to someone/something in unidirectional incorporation from coordination with someone/something in mutual incorporation. In this case the individuals coordinate to the synchronized and homogenous expressive behaviour.

  61. Fuchs 2013a, p. 225.

  62. Simmel 1949, p. 257; in German more precisely: “Die Geselligkeit schafft, wenn man will, eine ideale soziologische Welt: denn in ihr ist […] die Freude des Einzelnen durchaus daran gebunden, dass auch die andern froh sind, hier kann prinzipiell niemand auf Kosten ganz entgegengesetzter Empfindungen des Andern seine Befriedigung finden […]. “(Simmel 1999, p. 111).

  63. Simmel 1949, p. 255.

  64. Ibid, p. 254.

  65. Ibid., p. 256: Tact “guides the self-regulation of the individual in his personal relations to others”.

  66. Ibid., p. 256.

  67. Ibid., p. 257.

  68. Not every mood can be shared in this kind; anxiety for example not. Collective anxiety shapes an anonymous mood space.

  69. Thus it could be compared to the dialogical sharing of an emotion, cf. Krebs 2015, p. 220–229, with reference to love ibid., p. 226–229. As kinds of inevitably shared moods Krebs mentions the solemn or festive atmosphere (with reference to Bollnow) – cf. ibid., 229.

  70. Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 474 f.; Landweer 2013. Schmitz calls it encorporation in an antagonistic mode (cf. Schmitz et al. 2011, p. 251).

  71. Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 354. A dialogue rests upon mutual incorporation; which, of course, does not mean that on its own it constitutes a dialogue.

  72. Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009, p. 472.

  73. Cf. Burkart (2007) on feeling and distinction.

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    Nina Trcka

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Trcka, N. Collective Moods. A Contribution to the Phenomenology and Interpersonality of Shared Affectivity. Philosophia 45, 1647–1662 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9934-9

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