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Merleau-Ponty on shared emotions and the joint ownership thesis

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Abstract

In “The Child’s Relations with Others,” Merleau-Ponty argues that certain early experiences are jointly owned in that they are numerically single experiences that are nevertheless given to more than one subject (e.g., the infant and caregiver). Call this the “joint ownership thesis” (JT). Drawing upon both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis, as well as studies of exogenous attention and mutual affect regulation in developmental psychology, I motivate the plausibility of JT. I argue that the phenomenological structure of some early infant–caregiver dyadic exchanges is best described as involving joint subjects. From birth, some experiences are constitutively social in that certain phenomenal states, such as the positive emotions that arise within these early exchanges, are jointly owned. Along the way, I consider a possible objection. I conclude by considering the explanatory significance of adopting JT.

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Notes

  1. Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1964b, pp. 96–155).

  2. This second intention is a continuation of Merleau-Ponty’s own extensive dialogue with psychology—a dialogue also found in classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, Gurwitsch, and Sartre, among others. Of course, the phenomenological tradition harbors a number of rich and extremely varied treatments of intersubjectivity, many of which may be of similar use to cognitive science. In light of my focus on Merleau-Ponty’s joint ownership thesis, I won’t consider these alternative treatments here. For other examples of how phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity can helpfully inform various discussions in cognitive science, see, for example, Fuchs (2010), Gallagher (2008, 2012), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), Krueger (2008, 2012), Krueger and Overgaard (2012), Overgaard (2007), Ratcliffe (2008), Stawarska (2009), Thompson (2001), Zahavi (2011).

  3. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 114).

  4. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 114).

  5. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 114).

  6. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 115).

  7. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 115).

  8. See, for example, Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, pp. 171–196), Gurwitsch (1979, pp. 9–33), Krueger and Overgaard (2012), Malcolm (1962), Ryle (1949), Sartre (1956, pp. 301–404), Scheler (1954, pp. 238–284).

  9. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 115).

  10. Morton and Johnson (1991).

  11. Mondloch et al. (1999), Johnson et al. (1991).

  12. Slater and Quinn (2001).

  13. Meltzoff and Moore (1997), Legerstee (1991), Kugiumutzakis et al. (2005). But see Jones (2009) for a critical appraisal of this interpretation of neonate imitation.

  14. O’Neill (1986, p. 205).

  15. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 117).

  16. Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 410).

  17. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 118).

  18. Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 410).

  19. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 119).

  20. See, for example, Carruthers (1989).

  21. Rochat (2009, p. 64); see also Legerstee (2005), Zelazo (1996).

  22. See, for example, Gopnik and Wellman (1992), Gallese (2001), Goldman (2006).

  23. Merleau-Ponty (2010, p. 147).

  24. Neisser (1995), Butterworth and Jarrett (1991).

  25. Eilan (2007) offers an alternative strategy for defending JT (or what she terms the “phenomenological thesis”). She suggests that adopting a relational view of experience (e.g., Campbell 2002), according to which the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the layout and characteristics of objects (their intrinsic properties, how they are arranged in relation to one another and to the subject, etc.) as well as their surrounding environment, offers resources for explicating the notion of a jointly owned mental state. According to the relational view of experience, perception is an irreducibly experiential relation with a physical object or some intrinsic aspect of it as a constituent of the experience. Accordingly, if young infants are capable of directly (noninferentially) perceiving an emotion in another’s facial expression, that emotion is a constituent of their experience and is thus jointly owned; it is a constituent of both the subject’s and the infant’s experience. This is an intriguing suggestion. However, it’s not clear why the same thing can’t be said of adult perceivers, too. This strategy thus appears insensitive to important ontogenetic and phenomenological differences between infant and adult perceivers. Rather than pursue this line of argument, I want to dig more deeply into the phenomenology of infant consciousness and offer reasons why, at this stage, consciousness is structurally poised to be shared in a way not the case for adult experience.

  26. Meltzoff and Moore (1997), Kugiumutzakis et al. (2005).

  27. Rochat and Hespos (1997), Marlier et al. (1998).

  28. Standley and Madsen (1990).

  29. Plantinga and Trainor (2009). Unlike the visual system, the auditory system is stimulated in utero (DeCasper et al. 1994).

  30. Gopnik (2009, pp. 106–123), Posner and Rothbart (1998).

  31. This developmental trajectory appears to be reflected at the neurochemical level. Cholinergic transmitters, which heighten attention, are abundant at birth; inhibitory transmitters, which suppress attention, develop later. Additionally, Luria’s (1973) distinction between an early developing, largely involuntary biological attention system and a later developing, largely voluntary and socially-mediated attention system has been supported by more recent work (Posner and Rothbart 1998). Parietal and sensory systems involved in exogenous attention are thus online early, developmentally speaking, while top-down frontal regions controlling endogenous attention only mature later (Gopnik 2008).

  32. Gopnik (2009, p. 123).

  33. Krueger (2013).

  34. Hopkins (1983, p. 131).

  35. Kaye (1982).

  36. Alberts et al. (1983).

  37. Murphy (1978), Bates et al. (1975).

  38. Butterworth and Jarrett (1991).

  39. Legerstee (2005, p. 16).

  40. Wexler (2008, p. 102).

  41. James (1950, v. 1, p. 142).

  42. An analogous experience in adult perceivers may be the radically self-effacing character of some advanced stages of meditation, particularly those that emphasize “open presence” in which the field of attention is dramatically broadened and the various contents of consciousness are simultaneously illuminated (Lutz et al. 2007).

  43. Neisser (1995, p. 23).

  44. Gopnik 2008. Additionally, the cross-modal character of early neonate experience (Meltzoff and Moore 1997; Meltzoff and Borton 1979; Kaye and Bower 1994; Rochat 1999) may contribute to the feeling of nonduality in that objects of experience (faces, sounds, touches, etc.) are simultaneously given with a richness and felt immediacy—an immersive or encompassing character, in other words—that reinforces the sense of being experientially united with the world. Similarly, cross-modal (synaesthetic) experiences in adults are often reported to be a feature of the nondual heights of advanced contemplative experiences, along with, suggestively, an attenuated sense of self-world differentiation (Walsh 2005).

  45. Merleau-Ponty (2010, p. 147). James terms this the “psychologist’s fallacy,” that is, “the confusion of [the psychologist’s] own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report” (James 1950, v. 1, p. 196).

  46. Niedenthal (2007).

  47. Solomon (2004).

  48. Thompson (2007), pp. 360–381, Zeedyk (2006)

  49. Rothbart (1989).

  50. Hobson (2005), Tronick (2005).

  51. Beebe and Gerstman (1984).

  52. Trevarthen (1979).

  53. Rochat et al. (1999, p. 951).

  54. Hayes (1984).

  55. Field (1981).

  56. Feldman (2007, p. 609).

  57. Stern (2010, p. 108).

  58. This exchange is recorded in Stern (1995, pp. 421–422).

  59. See (Murray and Trevarthen 1985; Tronick et al. 1979).

  60. Stern (1985).

  61. Tronick et al. (1998).

  62. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 140).

  63. See Welsh (2007).

  64. Gallagher (2005), Bermudez (1998).

  65. See Legerstee (2005, pp. 79–82).

  66. Merleau-Ponty accepted the dominant view of his day that the body-schema is acquired, and not innate (Gallagher 2005, pp. 66–69). Accordingly, he does appear to endorse the idea that the infant initially lacks any means for distinguishing her own experiences from her environment. However, given the wealth of developmental evidence now available suggesting that the body-schema is in place at birth, he might be willing to modify his view here.

  67. Stern (1995, p. 428).

  68. Stern (1995, p. 427).

  69. This characterization seems to exclude the possibility of infant-to-infant sharing since, as we’ve seen, infants (at least early on) lack the developmental resources needed to cultivate and regulate positive affect and therefore can’t provide one another with the necessary input needed to experience shared (positive) emotions. My thanks to a reviewer for raising this point.

  70. Greenwood (2013).

  71. See Hass (2008, pp. 102–112) and Overgaard (2013) for a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s strategy for dissolving the epistemological problem of other minds.

  72. Premack and Woodruff (1978).

  73. See, for example, Gopnik and Wellman (1992).

  74. See, for example, Goldman (2006).

  75. Gallese (2001).

  76. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), Krueger and Overgaard (2012).

  77. Trevarthen (1979), De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007).

  78. Gopnik (1996), Goldman (2006).

  79. Merleau-Ponty (1968). As a reviewer notes, Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology of the flesh offers additional resources for conceptualizing this sort of elemental, embodied intersubjectivity. I am in full agreement. Adequately situating JT next to this subtle ontology, however, entails careful exegesis beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, one way to understand Merleau-Ponty’s JT, I submit, is to see it as a microcosm of his later work. JT is Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to work out how individual experience can harbor alterity as a constitutive feature without falling back onto the subject-object dichotomy of Cartesian metaphysics. A similar motivation informs his later ontological concerns. With this later work—and by employing ontological concepts like écart, “reversibility,” “flesh,” chiasm, etc.—Merleau-Ponty moves beyond his earlier “philosophy of consciousness,” as he refers terms it (and which presumably includes JT) to develop a more general non-Cartesian approach to the problem of Being. For a lucid discussion, see Hass (2008, pp. 100–145).

  80. Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 167).

  81. Tronick et al. (1998, p. 296).

  82. Zeedyk (2006).

  83. Beebe and Lachmann (1998).

  84. Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 413)

  85. See, for example, De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007), Froese and Di Paolo (2010).

  86. See Legerstee (2005, pp. 158–182).

  87. See Slaby (2013) for further discussion.

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Acknowledgment

I am grateful for helpful input from an anonymous reviewer, as well as extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay from Julian Kiverstein, Giovanna Colombetti, and John Michael.

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Krueger, J. Merleau-Ponty on shared emotions and the joint ownership thesis. Cont Philos Rev 46, 509–531 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-013-9278-5

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