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NGO Failure: A Theoretical Synthesis

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Abstract

An extensive literature identifies conditions under which markets and states work efficiently and effectively toward their stated missions. When these conditions are violated, these institutions are deemed to show some level of failure. In contrast to the study of market and government failures, scholars have tended to focus on non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) successes instead of failures. This is probably because they view NGOs as virtuous actors, guided by principled beliefs rather than instrumental concerns, not susceptible to agency conflicts, accountable to the communities they serve, and working cooperatively with each other. A growing literature questions this “virtue narrative.” When virtue conditions are violated, NGOs could exhibit different levels of failure. In synthesizing this literature, we offer an analytic typology of NGO failures: agency failure, NGOization failure, representation failure, and cooperation failure. Finally, given NGOs’ important role in public policy, we outline institutional innovations to address these failures.

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Notes

  1. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43112200.

  2. Scholars note that dependence of many NGOs on government funding raises questions about their non-governmental character. If the NGO sector gets “captured” by the government (as is typical in authoritarian regimes), it will be less effective in safeguarding citizen autonomy against governmental intrusion. We examine this issue later in the paper in our discussion of cooperation failure.

  3. How are advocacy NGOs different from interest groups? After all, both advocate policy positions. We recognize the vast political science literature on interest groups (Truman, 1951; Berry, 1977; Salisbury, 1984; Walker, 1991; Baumgartner & Leech, 1998). Moreover, within political science, scholars tend to adopt different definitions of interest groups. Baroni et al. (2014) note that some scholars define interest groups in terms of their activities, while others define them based on organizational characteristics such as membership (Dür & Mateo, 2013). NGO scholars have tended to favor the former approach by differentiating advocates from service providers. Moreover, NGO scholars implicitly claim that even advocacy NGOs are different from traditional interest groups because interest groups seek to shape public policy in favor of particular interests, while advocacy NGOs serve to advance the public good (the virtue narrative). For them, NGOs do so because they are guided by moral principles and not instrumental concerns (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). As we discuss subsequently, literature notes problems with this virtue assertion because many NGOs (such as unions) do purse particularist and sometimes materially focused goals.

  4. Furthermore, the distinction between advocates and service providers sometimes breaks down with the rise of rights-based advocacy which has encouraged service providers to undertake advocacy. Perhaps, instead of claiming that there are two types of NGOs, scholars should think in terms of types of functions a modern NGO might undertake: advocacy and service delivery.

  5. The welfare state—the state tasked with correcting distributional failures by providing social safety nets—is distinct from the regulatory state that corrects externality-based market failures. Viewed this way, NGOs seek to correct regulatory failures (as policy advocates) and welfare failures (as service providers).

  6. A similar argument is made in the “resource curse” literature (Ross, 2015): When governments can survive on revenue from resource extraction and no longer depend on local taxation, their implicit contract with the citizens is weakened. They have fewer incentives to provide local public good such as education and public health.

  7. Should then NGOs not accept outside resources when a natural disaster strikes a community? We suggest that they should but for a limited time only. The reason is that dependence on aid for post-disaster recovery can lead to perverse outcomes. A very good example is Haiti, which is sometimes termed the “Republic of NGOs” (Kristoff and Panarelli, 2010). The flood of outside money after the 2010 earthquake brought in a very large number of global NGOs. Many of them have not left the country, and their continued presence has created political and social problems. Indeed, Haiti was the location of the Oxfam scandal (Scurlock et al., 2020), which brought to light governance failures in several other global NGOs.

  8. There is a vast and growing literature on upward, lateral, and downward dimensions of NGO accountability. In addition to Ebrahim, important works include O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), Jordan and van Tuijl (2012), Murtaza (2012), Abou Assi and Trent (2016), Hielscher et al. (2017), and Bryan et al. (2021).

  9. https://www.diversegreen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Green2.0_ES.pdf.

  10. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-has-31-lakh-ngos-twice-the-number-of-schools-almost-twice-number-of-policemen/.

  11. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/global-assault-on-ngos-reaches-crisis-point/.

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  1. School of Marine & Environmental Affairs, University of Washington, Seattle, USA

    Nives Dolšak

  2. Department of Politics Science & Center for Environmental Politics, University of Washington, Seattle, USA

    Aseem Prakash

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Dolšak, N., Prakash, A. NGO Failure: A Theoretical Synthesis. Voluntas 33, 661–671 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-021-00416-9

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