Skip to main content
Log in

Risk-induced discounting

  • Published:
Theory and Decision Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We establish a direct connection between time preference and risk about an attribute (health) of the instantaneous utility function. In doing so, we derive a risk-induced discount function that corresponds to a normalized expectation of that attribute. We provide several results characterizing this risk-induced discount function depending on the stochastic properties of the risk, which we model as a discrete Markov process. When it is well-defined, which we refer to as full approximation, the risk-induced discount function coincides with exponential discounting if the Markov process is stationary. However, a slight perturbation of the beliefs can trigger time-inconsistent discounting. When considering non-stationary Markov processes, time-inconsistency also emerges in situations where individuals’ beliefs change in a non-anticipated fashion over time, as exemplified by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Results are illustrated via several applications.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In The Man Who Mastered Time, p.1, 1929.

  2. In this paper, we employ the term time preference to refer to preference for immediate utility over delayed utility as in Frederick et al. (2002).

  3. The conditions are symmetry, standard gamble invariance, the zero condition and either marginality (Theorem 1 - based on expected utility theory) or generalized utility dependence (Theorem 2 - based on rank-dependent utility theory).

  4. This notation allows for the discount function to depends on both the date of reference t and the delay k.

  5. See Burness (1976) for a general result.

  6. We use the word belief as a generic term to denote probability or decision weight to allow for both objective and subjective interpretations.

  7. This is the class of models that Starmer (2000) refers to as simple decision weighed utility, which encompasses a wide range of theories, including the Expected Utility theory and the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility theory.

  8. In reference to Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999), there is no need to relax their additional assumption of symmetry or to impose assumptions such as impatience and stationarity.

  9. That is, a memoryless process for which (conditional) beliefs are independent of the history of realizations.

  10. This means that there is some variation, albeit small, in the value of the different health statuses. This rules out trivial risk or “sunspots”.

  11. That is a state such that the transition probabilities from that state to other states are equal to zero. Besides death, other examples of absorbing states could include illness, long-term unemployment, or having graduated from a school.

  12. A matrix is irreducible if there is a non-zero probability of transitioning from any state to any other state within a finite number of dates. A matrix that is not irreducible is reducible. The presence of any absorbing state implies that P is reducible.

  13. A more general formulation could allow the sequences to also be date-specific.

  14. The two concepts coincide when \(N=2\) with \(a_1=1\), \(a_2=0\), i.e., with mortality risk.

  15. Recall that full approximation and partial approximation coincide when \(N=2\).

  16. Note that every Markov matrix P admits at least one stationary distribution.

  17. Ergodicity means that the process is irreducible and aperiodic. Such a process is one where any state can be reached from another one within a finite number of dates. In terms of health statuses, it would mean that any of the health statuses can occur again soon regardless of the current state. Note that such a condition rules out mortality risk or any absorbing state.

  18. Numerical computations (not included here) show that the largest entry of \(P^5- \Pi \) is on the order of 0.002.

References

  • Azfar, O. (1999). Rationalizing hyperbolic discounting. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38, 245–252.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baucells, M., & Heukamp, F. H. (2012). Probability and time trade-off. Management Science, 58(4), 831–842.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G., & Mulligan, C. B. (1997). The endogenous determination of time preference. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 729–758.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bleichrodt, H., & Quiggin, J. (1999). Life-cycle preferences over consumption and health: When is cost-effectiveness analysis equivalent to cost benefit analysis? Journal of Health Economics, 18(6), 681–708.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bommier, A. (2006). Uncertain lifetime and intertemporal choice: Risk aversion as a rationale for time discounting. International Economic Review, 47(4), 1223–1246.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burness, H. S. (1976). A note on consistent naive intertemporal decision making and an application to the case of uncertain lifetime. The Review of Economic Studies, 43(3), 547–549.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Epstein, L .G. (1983). Stationary cardinal utility and optimal growth under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory, 31(1), 133–152.

  • Ermolieva, T., et al. (2010). Induced discounting and risk management. Coping with Uncertainty. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O’donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 351–401.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halevy, Y. J. (2008). Strotz meets Allais: Diminishing impatience and the certainty effect. American Economic Review, 98(3), 1145–1162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 443–478.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lichtendahl, K. C, Jr., & Bodily, S. E. (2012). Multiplicative utilities for health and consumption. Decision Analysis, 9(4), 314–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rae, J. (1834). The sociological theory of capital. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Starmer, C. (2000). Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 332–382.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sobel, M. J. (2013). Discounting axioms imply risk neutrality. Annals of Operations Research, 208(1), 417–432.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sozou, P. D. (1998). On hyperbolic discounting and uncertain hazard rates. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 265, 2015–2020.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yaari, M. E. (1965). Uncertain lifetime, life insurance and the theory of the consumer. The Review of Economic Studies, 32(2), 137–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marc St-Pierre.

Additional information

I wish to thank anonymous referees for their constructive comments. All remaining errors are mine.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Proof

Under full approximation, \(p_{i}^{\prime }P^{k-1}a=\delta _k a_i\) for \(k \ge 1\). Therefore, the following system of equations is satisfied:

$$\begin{aligned} (P^{k}-\delta _k I)a = 0 \quad \forall \quad T-t \ge k\ge 1, \end{aligned}$$
(16)

which implies \((\delta _k,a) \in E_r(P^{k})\). Since \((\delta _1,a) \in E_r(P)\) and that each eigenvector has a unique corresponding eigenvalue, then \(\delta _k=\delta _1^{k+1}\). Rewriting \(\delta \equiv \delta _1\) yields \(\delta _{t}(k|i)=p_{i}^{\prime }P^{k-1}a=\delta ^{k+1}\). This completes the proof as any eigenvalue \(\delta \) of a transition matrix is such that \(0<\delta \le 1\). \(\square \)

1.2 Proof of Corollary 1

Proof

(1)Using the default state, \(p_d^{\prime }a=\delta a_d=\delta \), since \(a_d=1\).

(2)–(3) Since \(\delta < 1\), then \(p_N^{\prime }a=\delta a_N\) is impossible unless \(p_{NN}=1\) and \(a_N=0\).

(4) Since \(P \not =I\) and \(\delta < 1\), then the transition probability to at least one higher indexed state must be positive, i.e., \(p_{i({i+k})}>0\) for all \(1 \le i \le N\) and some \( 1 \le k \le N-i\).

(5) Since \(\delta =1\), then \(p_1^{\prime }a=\delta a_1\) and \(p_N^{\prime }a=\delta a_N\) are impossible unless \(p_{11}=1\) and \(p_{NN}=1\). \(\square \)

1.3 Proof of Proposition 3

Proof

Consider row \(p_i\) for some \(i \not \in \{d,N \}\) and let \(\hat{p}_i\) be a perturbation of \(p_i\). Define the \(N \times 1\) vector of perturbation \(\mathbbm {\epsilon }^{\prime } = [\epsilon _1, \epsilon _2,\ldots \epsilon _N]\) and let \(\hat{p}_i=p_i+\epsilon \), where \(\hat{p}_{ij} \ge 0\) and \(\epsilon ^{\prime }\mathbbm {1}=0\) for all \(1 \le j \le N\). Such a perturbation is said to be admissible. Construct the transition matrix \(\hat{P}\) from P by substituting row \(p_i\) with row \(\hat{p_i}\) while leaving all of the other rows the same.

(1) Observe that \(\delta _{t}(1|i)=\frac{1}{a_i}\hat{p}_i^{\prime }a=\frac{1}{a_i}(p_i^{\prime }a+\epsilon ^{\prime }a)\). Since \((\delta ,a) \in E_r(P)\) then \(\delta _{t}(1|i)=\delta +\frac{1}{a_i}{\epsilon ^{\prime }a}\). Similarly, \(\delta _{t}(1|d)={\hat{p}_d^{\prime }a}={{p}_d^{\prime }a} =\delta \). Full approximation is impossible if \(\delta _{t}(1|i) \not =\delta _{t}(1|d)\), which occurs when \({\epsilon ^{\prime }a} \not =0\). We can show that the latter condition holds for a suitably chosen perturbation. Pick an index \(j_1\), so that \(p_{i{j_1}}>0\) and set \(\epsilon _{j_1}<0\). Select another index \(j_2 \not = j_1\), so that \(p_{i{j_2}}<1\) and let \(\epsilon _{j_2}=-\epsilon _{j_1}>0\) and assume that \(\epsilon _j=0\) for all other j values. By choosing \(\epsilon _{j_1}\) small enough, this admissible perturbation exists and by construction \({\epsilon ^{\prime }a}=\epsilon _{j_1}(a_{j_1}-a_{j_2}) \not =0\), since \(a_1>a_2> \cdots >a_N \ge 0\).

(2) By Corollary 1 part (4), we can select \(j_1>j_2\) and \(j_2=i\). Note that the ratio \(\frac{\delta _{t}(3|d)}{\delta _{t}(2|d)}=\frac{p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}^{2}a}{p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}a}=\frac{p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}(\hat{P}a)}{p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}a}\) with \(\hat{P}a=Pa+(\epsilon ^{\prime }a)\chi _i\), where \(\chi _i\) is a characteristic vector taking a value of 1 for row i and 0 otherwise. Since \((\delta ,a) \in E_r(P)\), then \(\hat{P}a=\delta a+(\epsilon ^{\prime }a)\chi _i\). Therefore, \(\frac{\delta _{t}(3|d)}{\delta _{t}(2|d)}=\frac{\delta p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}a+p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}(\epsilon ^{\prime }a)\chi _i}{p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}a}=\delta +\epsilon ^{\prime }a\frac{p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}\chi _i}{p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}a}\). The term \(p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}a\) becomes \(p_d^{\prime }Pa+p_{di}\epsilon _{j_1}(a_{j_1}-a_{j_2})=\delta ^2+p_{di}\epsilon _{j_1}(a_{j_1}-a_{j_2})>0\), since \(j_1> j_2\) and \(\epsilon _{j_1}<0\). Furthermore, the term \(p_d^{\prime }\hat{P}\chi _i\) becomes \(p_d^{\prime }P\chi _i+p_{di}\epsilon _{i}\), where \(\epsilon _{i} \equiv \epsilon _{ij_2}>0\). Since \(p_d^{\prime }P\chi _i \ge 0\) and \({\epsilon ^{\prime }a}>0\), then \(\frac{\delta _{t}(3|d)}{\delta _{t}(2|d)}>\delta = p_d^{\prime }a=\delta _{t}(1|d)\), which shows that risk-induced discount function in the default state is time-inconsistent. \(\square \)

1.4 Proof of Proposition 4

Proof

Let \(p_d \in \mathbf{S}\). By definition, \(p^{\prime }_dP= p_d^{\prime }\) or \((1, p_d) \in E_l(P)\) and therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \delta _{t}(k|d)=p_d^{\prime }P^{k-1}a = p_d^{\prime }a, \quad T-t \ge k \ge 1. \end{aligned}$$
(17)

Letting \(\beta =p_d^{\prime }a\) and \(\delta =1\) completes the proof. \(\square \)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

St-Pierre, M. Risk-induced discounting. Theory Decis 82, 13–30 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9555-y

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9555-y

Keywords

Navigation