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Conditions on social-preference cycles

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Abstract

Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory 21:28–45, 1979) and Schwartz (J Econ Theory 137:688–695, 2007).

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Notes

  1. Gibbard (2014), Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972), Blair and Pollak (1982), and Kelsey (1984) show Arrovian impossibility theorems when social preferences are required to be acyclic. Generalizations of the voting paradox are provided by Ward (1961), Brown (1975), Nakamura (1979), Weber (1993), and Banks (1995). Sen (1970) demonstrates that a Paretian liberal aggregation rule must generate social-preference cycles. See also Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976) and Gehrlein (1983).

  2. See, for example, Breton and Truchon (1995). See also Kelsey (1985) and Truchon (1995, 1996).

  3. Tullock (2005) argues historical aspects of the voting paradox. Riker (1961) is an earlier survey of the problem of voting.

  4. Marquis de Condorcet uses a more complicated example.

  5. Positive association of social and individual values requires that for all \(\pi , \pi '\), if (i) \(\forall i \in N: \ x' \succsim _i y' \Rightarrow x' \succsim '_i y'\) for all \(x',y' \in X {\setminus } \{ x \}\); (ii) \(\forall i \in N: \ x \succsim _i y' \Rightarrow x \succsim _i y'\) for all \(y' \in X {\setminus } \{ x \}\); and (iii) \(\forall i \in N: \ x \succ _i y' \Rightarrow x \succ '_i y'\) for all \(y' \in X {\setminus } \{ x \}\), then \(x \succ _{\pi } y \Rightarrow x \succ _{\pi '} y\). Arrow (1951) imposed this condition in the original version of his impossibility theorem. See Arrow (1951, p. 25).

  6. Note that the exclusion of a trivial situation is assumed in Schwartz’s necessity result (Schwartz 2007, Theorem 2). This suggests a similarity between Ferejohn and Fishburn’s and Schwartz’s arguments.

  7. A binary relation \(\succ '_i\) is a subrelation of \(\succ _i\) if and only if for all \(x,y \in X\), \(x \succ '_i y \Rightarrow x \succ _i y\) and \(x \succsim '_i y \Rightarrow x \succsim _i y\).

  8. A generalization of Szpilrajn’s theorem is provided by Suzumura (1976). Suzumura (1976) specifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an ordering extension.

  9. Young (1974) characterizes Borda’s method; Sanver and Selçuk (2010) characterize Copeland’s method. Using Arrow-type axioms, Bossert and Suzumura (2008) and Cato and Hirata (2010) provide characterizations of a class of CCRs that generate an acyclic social preference for any preference profile.

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to anonymous referees, Tomohiko Kawamori, Toyotaka Sakai, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, and Kotaro Suzumura for helpful comments. This paper was financially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

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Correspondence to Susumu Cato.

Appendix: Ferejohn and Fishburn’s result

Appendix: Ferejohn and Fishburn’s result

In this section, we briefly review Ferejohn and Fishburn’s (1979) framework. As noted before, Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) restrict their attention to a special class of CCRs. First, they consider a collection of CCRs that satisfy Arrow’s IIA. They term them binary decision rules (BDRs). Furthermore, they introduce the concept of constitution and necessitate a connection between a CCR and constitution.

Remember that \(O :=\{(A,B):A \subseteq N, B \subseteq N, A \cap B = \emptyset \}\). Let \(\hat{X}:= \{(x,y) \in X \times X:x \ne y\}\), and \(2^O\) be the family of all subsets of \(O\). A constitution \(C\) is a mapping from \(\hat{X}\) to \(2^O\) that satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} \forall (x,y) \in \hat{X},\quad \forall (A,B) \in O,\quad (A,B) \in C(x,y) \Leftrightarrow (B,A) \notin C(y,x). \end{aligned}$$

Each \(f\) induces a \(C\) defined by

$$\begin{aligned}&\forall (x,y) \in \hat{X}, \quad (A,B) \in C_f(x,y) \Leftrightarrow \exists \pi \in {\mathcal {D}}\nonumber \\&\quad \text{ such } \text{ that } x \succ _{\pi } y \quad \text{ and } \quad \pi (x,y)=(A,B). \end{aligned}$$
(3)

Each \(C\) induces an \(f_C\) defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \forall \pi \in {\mathcal {D}},\quad \forall (x,y) \in \hat{X},\quad x \succ _{\pi }^C y \Leftrightarrow \pi (x,y) \in C(x,y). \end{aligned}$$
(4)

The original condition proposed by Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) is as follows.

Condition R1:

\(\forall T \ge 2\), \(\forall \) distinct \(a^1,\dots ,a^T \in X\), \(\forall (A_1,B_1),\dots ,(A_T,B_T) \in O\), if \((A_t,B_t) \in C(a^t ,a^{t+1}), t=1,\dots ,T-1\), while \((A_t,B_t) \in C(a^T ,a^{1})\), then

$$\begin{aligned}&\text{ either } \quad A_t \not \subseteq \bigcup _{s \ne t}^{T}B_s\quad \text{ for } \text{ some } t\in \{1,\dots ,T \}, \end{aligned}$$
(5)
$$\begin{aligned}&\text{ or } \quad B_t \not \subseteq \bigcup _{s \ne t}^{T}A_s \text{ for } \text{ some } \quad t\in \{1,\dots ,T \}. \end{aligned}$$
(6)

Note that this is the condition for a constitution, not for a CCR.

Theorem 6

(Ferejohn and Fishburn 1979, Theorem 3) Suppose that \(f\) and \(C\) are related as in (3) and (4). Then, \(f\) that satisfies IIA is acyclic if and only if R1 holds for \(C\).

By restricting their attention to a class of CCRs, Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) show an interesting relationship between acyclicity and R1. On the other hand, we and Schwartz (2007) do not impose the background restrictions—IIA, (3) or (4).

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Cato, S. Conditions on social-preference cycles. Theory Decis 79, 1–13 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9457-9

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