Abstract
Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory 21:28–45, 1979) and Schwartz (J Econ Theory 137:688–695, 2007).
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Gibbard (2014), Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein (1972), Blair and Pollak (1982), and Kelsey (1984) show Arrovian impossibility theorems when social preferences are required to be acyclic. Generalizations of the voting paradox are provided by Ward (1961), Brown (1975), Nakamura (1979), Weber (1993), and Banks (1995). Sen (1970) demonstrates that a Paretian liberal aggregation rule must generate social-preference cycles. See also Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976) and Gehrlein (1983).
Marquis de Condorcet uses a more complicated example.
Positive association of social and individual values requires that for all \(\pi , \pi '\), if (i) \(\forall i \in N: \ x' \succsim _i y' \Rightarrow x' \succsim '_i y'\) for all \(x',y' \in X {\setminus } \{ x \}\); (ii) \(\forall i \in N: \ x \succsim _i y' \Rightarrow x \succsim _i y'\) for all \(y' \in X {\setminus } \{ x \}\); and (iii) \(\forall i \in N: \ x \succ _i y' \Rightarrow x \succ '_i y'\) for all \(y' \in X {\setminus } \{ x \}\), then \(x \succ _{\pi } y \Rightarrow x \succ _{\pi '} y\). Arrow (1951) imposed this condition in the original version of his impossibility theorem. See Arrow (1951, p. 25).
Note that the exclusion of a trivial situation is assumed in Schwartz’s necessity result (Schwartz 2007, Theorem 2). This suggests a similarity between Ferejohn and Fishburn’s and Schwartz’s arguments.
A binary relation \(\succ '_i\) is a subrelation of \(\succ _i\) if and only if for all \(x,y \in X\), \(x \succ '_i y \Rightarrow x \succ _i y\) and \(x \succsim '_i y \Rightarrow x \succsim _i y\).
References
Arrow, K. J. (1951). 1963. Social choice and individual values (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
Banks, J. S. (1995). Acyclic social choice from finite sets. Social Choice and Welfare, 12, 293–310.
Blair, D. H., & Pollak, R. A. (1982). Acyclic collective choice rules. Econometrica, 50, 931–943.
Bossert, W., & Suzumura, K. (2008). A characterization of consistent collective choice rules. Journal of Economic Theory, 138, 311–320.
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (2002). Voting procedures. In K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, & K. Suzumura (Eds.), Handbook of social choice and welfare (Vol. 1, pp. 173–236). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Brown, D. J. (1975). Aggregation of preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, 456–469.
Cato, S., & Hirata, D. (2010). Collective choice rules and collective rationality: A unified method of characterizations. Social Choice and Welfare, 34, 611–630.
Ferejohn, J. A., & Fishburn, P. C. (1979). Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures. Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 28–45.
Gehrlein, W. V. (1983). Condorcet’s paradox. Theory and Decision, 15, 161–197.
Gehrlein, W. V., & Fishburn, P. C. (1976). Condorcet’s paradox and anonymous preference profiles. Public Choice, 26, 1–18.
Gibbard, A. (2014) Social choice and the Arrow conditions. Economics and Philosophy. doi:10.1017/S026626711400025X.
Kelsey, D. (1984). Acyclic choice without the Pareto principle. Review of Economic Studies, 51, 693–699.
Kelsey, D. (1985). Acyclic choice and group veto. Social Choice and Welfare, 2, 131–137.
Le Breton, M., & Truchon, M. (1995). Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power. Social Choice and Welfare, 12, 43–58.
Mas-Colell, A., & Sonnenschein, H. (1972). General possibility theorems for group decisions. Review of Economic Studies, 39, 185–192.
Nakamura, K. (1979). The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences. International Journal of Game Theory, 8, 55–61.
Riker, W. H. (1961). Voting and the summation of preferences: An interpretive bibliographic review of selected developments during the last decade. American Political Science Review, 55, 900–911.
Sanver, M. R., & Selçuk, Ö. (2010). A characterization of the Copeland solution. Economics Letters, 107, 354–355.
Schwartz, T. (2007). A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference. Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 688–695.
Sen, A. K. (1970). Collective choice and social welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
Sen, A. K. (1979). Personal utilities and public judgements: Or what’s wrong with welfare economics. Economic Journal 89, 537–558.
Suzumura, K. (1976). Remarks on the theory of collective choice. Economica, 43, 381–390.
Szpilrajn, S. (1930). Sur l’extension de l’ordre partiel. Fundamenta Mathematicae, 16, 386–389.
Truchon, M. (1995). Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules. Mathematical Social Sciences, 29, 165–179.
Truchon, M. (1996). Acyclicity and decisiveness structures. Journal of Economic Theory, 69, 447–469.
Tullock, G. (2005). Problems of voting. Public Choice, 123, 49–58.
Ward, B. (1961). Majority rule and allocation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5, 380–389.
Weber, J. S. (1993). An elementary proof of the conditions for a generalized Condorcet paradox. Public Choice, 77, 415–419.
Young, H. P. (1974). An axiomatization of Borda’s rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 9, 43–52.
Young, H. P. (1988). Condorcet’s theory of voting. American Political Science Review, 82, 1231–1244.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to anonymous referees, Tomohiko Kawamori, Toyotaka Sakai, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, and Kotaro Suzumura for helpful comments. This paper was financially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix: Ferejohn and Fishburn’s result
Appendix: Ferejohn and Fishburn’s result
In this section, we briefly review Ferejohn and Fishburn’s (1979) framework. As noted before, Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) restrict their attention to a special class of CCRs. First, they consider a collection of CCRs that satisfy Arrow’s IIA. They term them binary decision rules (BDRs). Furthermore, they introduce the concept of constitution and necessitate a connection between a CCR and constitution.
Remember that \(O :=\{(A,B):A \subseteq N, B \subseteq N, A \cap B = \emptyset \}\). Let \(\hat{X}:= \{(x,y) \in X \times X:x \ne y\}\), and \(2^O\) be the family of all subsets of \(O\). A constitution \(C\) is a mapping from \(\hat{X}\) to \(2^O\) that satisfies
Each \(f\) induces a \(C\) defined by
Each \(C\) induces an \(f_C\) defined by
The original condition proposed by Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) is as follows.
Condition R1:
\(\forall T \ge 2\), \(\forall \) distinct \(a^1,\dots ,a^T \in X\), \(\forall (A_1,B_1),\dots ,(A_T,B_T) \in O\), if \((A_t,B_t) \in C(a^t ,a^{t+1}), t=1,\dots ,T-1\), while \((A_t,B_t) \in C(a^T ,a^{1})\), then
Note that this is the condition for a constitution, not for a CCR.
Theorem 6
(Ferejohn and Fishburn 1979, Theorem 3) Suppose that \(f\) and \(C\) are related as in (3) and (4). Then, \(f\) that satisfies IIA is acyclic if and only if R1 holds for \(C\).
By restricting their attention to a class of CCRs, Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979) show an interesting relationship between acyclicity and R1. On the other hand, we and Schwartz (2007) do not impose the background restrictions—IIA, (3) or (4).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Cato, S. Conditions on social-preference cycles. Theory Decis 79, 1–13 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9457-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9457-9