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Theory and Decision

, Volume 79, Issue 1, pp 1–13 | Cite as

Conditions on social-preference cycles

  • Susumu CatoEmail author
Article

Abstract

Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory 21:28–45, 1979) and Schwartz (J Econ Theory 137:688–695, 2007).

Keywords

Voting mechanism Social-preference cycle Voting paradox Decisiveness Generalization 

JEL Classification

D71 D72 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to anonymous referees, Tomohiko Kawamori, Toyotaka Sakai, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, and Kotaro Suzumura for helpful comments. This paper was financially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

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