Conditions on social-preference cycles
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Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn (J Econ Theory 21:28–45, 1979) and Schwartz (J Econ Theory 137:688–695, 2007).
KeywordsVoting mechanism Social-preference cycle Voting paradox Decisiveness Generalization
JEL ClassificationD71 D72
I am grateful to anonymous referees, Tomohiko Kawamori, Toyotaka Sakai, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, and Kotaro Suzumura for helpful comments. This paper was financially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
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