Abstract
Among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread (but not universal) consensus that begging the question is a grave argumentative flaw. However, there is presently no satisfactory analysis of what this flaw consists of. Here, I defend a notion of question-begging in terms of analyticity. In particular, I argue that an argument begs the question just in case its conclusion is an analytic part of the conjunction of its premises.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Sorensen (roughly) argues along the following lines. Consider the argument: question-begging is an argumentative flaw, therefore question-begging is an argumentative flaw. This is an argument whose conclusion is identical to its premise—a paradigmatic case of question-begging. Suppose this argument were put before Robinson. He, at least, cannot object to the argument on the grounds that it begs the question; after all, he maintains that question-begging arguments are innocuous. Because Robinson cannot consistently object to this argument, Sorensen argues, the argument is epistemically faultless against him. Sorensen’s and Lippert-Rasmussen’s examples are not widely accepted and have been criticized in the literature. See Teng (1997) for one potential reply.
It is worth noting that not all epistemic accounts are as transparently psychologistic as this example might suggest.
I suspect that this is due to the fact that Hamblin, who introduced this approach to the literature, did so in the context of formal representations of logical fallacies (1970).
Understanding many of these violations would require covering the formal systems in more detail than I have the space to here. However, one example from Walton and Woods (1978) is that a participant usually violates the dialectic rules if she makes multiple claims before her interlocutor responds. This may be rude, but need not be circular.
See Sanford (1981) for a reply. One potential worry is that, on this characterization it is possible for two propositions to each be ‘more knowable’ than the other, since each may be known independently of one another.
Many find Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument unpersuasive. For example, Ritola argues that he ignores a crucial distinction (2006). In the case above, I am justified in believing that Smith is in the dining hall or the library due to the fact that the situation I am in warrants that belief. The evidence that I possess—yet unfortunately ignore—supports the belief that Smith is in the dining hall or the library. Nevertheless, I do not justifiably believe that Smith is in the dining hall or the library, because I base my belief on a question-begging argument rather than on legitimate evidence. Ritola claims that, in arguing that question-begging is occasionally permissible, Lipptert-Rasmussen conflates situational justification (being justified in believing something) and doxastic justification (justifiably believing something). If Ritola is correct, then there are no cases in which an argument begs the question and is epistemically permissible, so the worry that epistemic accounts of question-begging cannot accommodate those cases in which question-begging is permissible does not arise.
For my part, I find epistemic analyses of analyticity implausible. Those who defend such views, minimally, owe a reply to Williamson (2007) . However, I do not take a stand on this issue here. My point is only that if analyticity is defined in epistemic terms, then an analytic account of begging the question is compatible with an epistemic account of begging the question; the two may both be correct.
I discuss one such argument—Moore’s proof of the existence of an external world—below.
Although Kant introduces the notion of analyticity in terms of predicative and conceptual containment, he later endorses a coarse-grained notion of analyticity such that A is contained within the concept B just in case a contradiction can be derived from \(A \wedge \lnot B\). This has the implausible result that every tautology is an analytic part of all predicates. As MacFarlane notes, this oversight may be largely due to the meager logical resources available in Kant’s time (2002).
Additionally, \(\emptyset \vdash A \rightarrow (A \vee B)\) is not a theorem, so L also differs from standard relevance logic as well.
Note that I am quantifying over names of objects.
Although easier, this is not to say that every account of question-begging gets this case correct. Hoffman, for example, claims that an argument begs the question just in case the proposition expressed by the conclusion is identical to a proposition expressed by a premise (1971). Sanford objects, partially on the grounds that someone could replace a premise with its double negation. Although this premise arguably expresses a different proposition, surely this does not avoid the charge of begging the question (1972).
Such arguments are not restricted to inferences from contradictions. Similarly, an inference from p to \(p \vee q\) does not beg the question on this account.
Recall that Angell’s logic supplies only a sufficient condition. So this elaboration is plausible.
It may be that ‘hand’ mediately contains the meaning of ‘extended object.’ Perhaps the meaning of ‘hand’ contains the meaning of a term defined in terms of spatial extension. Given that the containment of meaning is transitive, this would be a case in which ‘hand’ contains the meaning of ‘spatial extension.’
Quineans might accept that Predicative Containment is vacuously true. Because there are no predicates F and G such that \(\ulcorner \)to be F is to be \(G \urcorner \) is an analytic truth, all predicates F and G are such that if \(\ulcorner \)to be F is to be \(G \urcorner \) is an analytic truth, then \(\forall x ( \ulcorner Gx \urcorner \) is an analytic part of \(\ulcorner Fx \urcorner ).\)
References
Angell, R. (1977). Three systems of first degree entailment. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 47(1), 147.
Angell, R. (1989). Deducibility, entailment and analytic containment. In J. Norma & R. Sylvan (Eds.), Directions in relevance logic (pp. 119–143). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Angell, R. (2002). A-logic. Lanham: University Press of America.
Aristotle. (1982). Topics and prior analytics. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Barker, J. A. (1976). The fallacy of begging the question. Dialogue, 15(2), 241–55.
Beebee, H. (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly, 51(204), 356–74.
Biro, J. I. (1977). Rescuing begging the question. Metaphilosophy, 8(4), 257–71.
Biro, J. I. (1984). Knowability, believability and begging the question. Metaphilosophy, 15(3–4), 239–47.
Correia, F. (2004). Semantics for analytic containment. Studia Logica, 77(1), 87–104.
Davies, M. (2000). The problem of armchair knowledge. In P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (Eds.), New essays on the a priori (pp. 23–55). Oxford: Claredon Press.
Empiricus, S. (1990). Outlines of pyrrhonism (R. G. Bury, Trans.). Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
Fine, K. (2015). Angellic content. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(2), 199–226.
Fine, K. (forthcoming). Compliance and command I & II.
Frege, G. (1884) [1980]. The foundations of arithmetic (J. L. Austin, Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Hamblin, C. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hoffman, R. (1971). On begging the question at any time. Analysis, 32(2), 51.
Jackson, F. (1987). Petitio and the purpose of arguing. In Conditionals (pp. 100–114). Oxford: Blackwell.
Jacquette, D. (1993). Logical dimensions of question-begging argument. American Philosophical Quarterly, 30(4), 317–27.
Kant, I. (1781) [1998]. The critique of pure reason (P. Guyer, A. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2001). Are question-begging arguments necessarily unreasonable? Philosophical Studies, 104(2), 123–41.
MacFarlane, J. (2002). Frege, Kant, and the logic of logicism. The Philosophical Review, 111(1), 25–65.
Mackenzie, J. D. (1979). Question-begging in non-cumulative systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), 117–33.
Mill, J. S. (1843). A system of logic. London: Forgotten Books.
Quine, W. V. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60(1), 20–43.
Ritola, J. (2006). Justified and justifiable beliefs: The case of question-begging. Philosophical Studies, 128(3), 565–583.
Robinson, R. (1971). Begging the question. Analysis, 31(4), 113–7.
Sanford, D. (1972). Begging the question. Analysis, 32(6), 197–9.
Sanford, D. (1981). Superfluous information, epistemic conditions of inference, and begging the question. Metaphilosophy, 12(2), 145–58.
Sorensen, R. (1996). Unbeggable questions. Analysis, 56(1), 51–5.
Teng, N. (1997). Sorensen on begging the question. Analysis, 57(3), 220–222.
Van Inwagen, P. (1974). The incompatibility of free will and determinism. Philosophical Studies, 27(3), 185–199.
Walton, D. (1994). Begging the question as a pragmatic fallacy. Synthese, 100(1), 95–131.
Walton, D., & Woods, J. (1978). Arresting circles in formal dialogues. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7(1), 73–90.
Walton, D., & Woods, J. (1982). Question-begging and cumulativeness in dialectical games. Noûs, 16(4), 585–605.
Williamson, T. (2007). Philosophy of philosophy. Malden: Blackwell.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Shamik Dasgupta, Michael Della Rocca, Catherine Elgin, and Kit Fine for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Elgin, S.Z. On question-begging and analytic content. Synthese 197, 1149–1163 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1669-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1669-4