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Synthese

pp 1–15 | Cite as

On question-begging and analytic content

S.I.: PhilMethods

Abstract

Among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread (but not universal) consensus that begging the question is a grave argumentative flaw. However, there is presently no satisfactory analysis of what this flaw consists of. Here, I defend a notion of question-begging in terms of analyticity. In particular, I argue that an argument begs the question just in case its conclusion is an analytic part of the conjunction of its premises.

Keywords

Analyticity Beg the question Meaning Circularity 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Shamik Dasgupta, Michael Della Rocca, Catherine Elgin, and Kit Fine for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yale UniversityNew HavenUSA

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