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Bayesian Belief Revision Based on Agent’s Criteria

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Abstract

In the literature of belief revision, it is widely accepted that: there is only one revision phase in belief revision which is well characterized by the Bayes’ Rule, Jeffrey’s Rule, etc.. However, as I argue in this article, there are at least four successive phases in belief revision, namely first/second order evaluation and first/second order revision. To characterize these phases, I propose mainly four rules of belief revision based on agent’s criteria, and make one composition rule to characterize belief revision as a whole.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the National Social Science Foundation of China [16CZX051].

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  1. Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai), Sun Yat-sen University, Tangjiawan, Xiangzhou District, Zhuhai, 519082, Guangdong, China

    Yongfeng Yuan

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Yuan, Y. Bayesian Belief Revision Based on Agent’s Criteria. Stud Logica 109, 1311–1346 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-021-09951-4

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