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AGM 25 Years

Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change

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Abstract

The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not included in the original framework, iterated change, applications of the model, its connections with other formal frameworks, computatibility of AGM operations, and criticism of the model.

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    Eduardo Fermé

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    Sven Ove Hansson

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Fermé, E., Hansson, S.O. AGM 25 Years. J Philos Logic 40, 295–331 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9171-9

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