Abstract
Methodological naturalism, the exclusion of the supernatural from the natural sciences, has drawn critique from both proponents of Intelligent Design and some philosophical naturalists who argue that the methods of science can also be used to evaluate supernatural claims. One principal objection to methodological naturalism has been what I call the truth seeking objection. In this article I develop an understanding of methodological naturalism capable of answering the truth seeking objection. I further also argue that methodological naturalism as a convention of science can be best defended by abandoning scientism. In this way methodological naturalism can be reconnected to the original theistic context in which it was first developed.
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Notes
In this article I will use the terms “natural” and “supernatural” as they are commonly used in the discussion over methodological naturalism. However, it is important to note that many theologians would object to the use of the term “supernatural”. For example, Conor Cunningham (2010, p. 177) argues that we might rather call God natural, and nature supernatural. On the origin of distinction between the natural and the supernatural, see Bartlett (2008).
Johnson’s theistic realism is related to the idea of theistic science, according to which Christian believers should conduct science from the standpoint of assuming that God exists, taking into account all that they believe as Christians. On this discussion see Ratzsch (2004) and Labody (2015) (defending theistic science) as well as Stenmark (2004), chapters 8 and 9 (defending the neutrality of science).
Monton (2013) puts the point as follows: “If science really is committed to methodological naturalism, then it automatically follows that the aim of science is not generating true theories. Instead, the aim of science would be something like: generating the best theories that can be formulated subject to the restriction that those theories are naturalistic”.
I am assuming a critical realist understanding of the nature of science here. This is the assumed philosophy of most working scientists, but not uncontroversial in the philosophy of science. (See Niiniluoto (2002) and McGrath (2002) for more on this discussion.) If we adopt a different, antirealist understanding of the goals of scientific theories, then the truth seeking objection does not work, at least without heavy modification.
It is possible to argue that while this is a serious possibility (and so premise 4 is credible), it is not a scientific hypothesis, but a theological and philosophical idea which is not in competition with scientific explanations such as evolution. I will come back to this below.
Here’s a quote illustrating this from David Hume´s "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion", spoken in part III by the character Cleanthes:
“Consider, anatomize the eye; survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support Infidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments?”.
See Numbers (2003) for the history.
De Vries 1986. Many different motivations for strong methodological naturalism have been posited. ID proponents Dembski and Witt (2010, pp. 23–24) argue that the main motivation of methodological naturalism is atheism: “Only about one in ten Americans is an out-and-out atheist, but atheists have managed to extend their influence by selling religious people a related idea called methodological materialism.” (Similarly Bartlett and Holloway forthcoming) Prior belief in metaphysical naturalism would indeed be one possible way of grounding methodological naturalism. If it seems likely that nothing supernatural exists, then this also makes it reasonable not to refer to supernatural entities within the natural sciences. However, as noted, to make methodological naturalism appealing to people other than those who are already committed to philosophical naturalism, some other grounds would be needed. Also, as I note in the main text, methodological naturalism initially did not emerge as an atheistic idea, so it seems reasonable to think that its initial main motivation must have been compatible with theism.
This type of rejection of a priori arguments against ID is also implicit in some accounts in which the rise of Darwinian evolutionary theory is seen as the central reason why biological design arguments can now be rejected. For example, cosmologist Sean M. Carroll (2003, p. 631) writes that “A few centuries ago, for example, it would have been completely reasonable to observe the complexity and subtlety exhibited in the workings of biological creatures, and conclude that such intricacy could not possibly have arisen by chance, but must instead be attributed to the plan of the Creator. The advent of Darwin’s theory of evolution, featuring descent with modification and natural selection, provided a mechanism by which such apparently improbable configurations could have arisen via innumerable gradual changes”. This implies that without Darwinian evolutionary biology, design would still be the best explanation for biological order. This assumes that design possesses at least some rationality as an explanation and cannot be dismissed on a priori grounds, just by invoking the definition of science. In my understanding, proponents of ID would welcome this kind of understanding of methodological naturalism, but would just differ on the state of the evidence. There has been some debate whether Hume or Darwin was more important in refuting biological design arguments. Historically, biological design arguments continued to be defended long after Hume, and indeed Paley’s Natural Theology was written only after Hume. Gregory Dawes (2007) argues that Darwin is indeed necessary, as Carroll says. Walhberg (2012) goes further and argues that biological design arguments are even compatible with Darwinian evolutionary biology.
For the contrary perspective that design-based explanations are in all relevant respects similar to natural scientific explanations, see Meyer (1999).
Some have argued that the value of the regularity of the cosmos makes it unlikely that God would act miraculously in nature without good reason. (See e.g. McDonald and Tro forthcoming). Thus one could argue that if there is no good reason to expect that God would have acted miraculously within natural history, then the Christian believer should expect to find that biological evolution happens through the effect of secondary causes which can be studied wholly by the natural sciences. One might also argue that the problem of natural evil requires assuming that God never intervenes in nature—otherwise we could easily ask why God does not intervene more. (On this discussion see especially Corabi 2009). While these arguments are interesting, ultimately I do not think they are strong enough to allow us to rule the possibility of supernatural activity in natural history already without considering the empirical evidence. It is not impossible for defenders of supernatural design to think of some reason why God might have acted supernaturally. For example, McCullough (2013) argues that miracles in nature serve as a powerful testimony of the existence of a theistic (as opposed to deistic) God who takes a personal interest in life. See further Kojonen (2016a, chapters 9–10) and Kojonen (2016b).
See Wahlberg (2012) for the natural theological argument that perceiving biology as designed is compatible with evolutionary biology; see further also Kojonen (forthcoming) for an analysis of this argument strategy.
For a similar pragmatic defense of methodological naturalism, see McDonald and Tro (forthcoming). They do not consider methodological naturalism in the natural sciences to be a part of the definition of natural science as such, but argue that methodological naturalism is adopted in the natural sciences simply because of the past success of natural explanations.
This conclusion also fits with Michael Ruse´s definition of methodological naturalism as a necessary part of the natural sciences by definition. Ruse argues that “even if Scientific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as science, it would not yield a scientific explanation of origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there can be no scientific explanation of origins”. (Ruse 1982, p. 322; quoted in Plantinga 1997, p. 1). Thus Ruse is also not ruling out the possibility that creationists might be right a priori, but only based on what his (and the majority’s) estimate of the scientific evidence is. If creationists or ID proponents were successful in making their arguments, then it would on the aforementioned understanding of methodological naturalism still not be natural science. However, in that case the domain of the natural sciences would be smaller than it is currently thought to be. This is not to say that the ID research program could not on this understanding also have parts that can be investigated within methodologically naturalistic science, such as the ID proponent´s ideas about the limits of evolutionary processes. (See further Collins 2006).
I have also not considered the arguments for “theistic science” at length in this paper. To develop the argument of this paper further, the definition of natural science as methodologically naturalistic would also have to be related to the discussion over the unity of science, dating back to medieval times (On this see Cat 2014). At some point we will probably want to integrate the results of the different sciences into a broader view of the world. Plantinga’s theistic science as a rival to methodological naturalism is one method for attempting such an integration. (See Ratzsch 2004). Defenders of methodological naturalism will likely want to adopt a different method of integration, e.g. Russell’s (2008) model of mutual creative interaction between different disciplines. See further also Stenmark (2004), chapters 8 and 9.
Dembski (1998, pp. 26–27) explains that the emphasis is because science is the ‘only universally valid form of knowledge in our culture’. From the side of ID critics, Quinn (2009) argues that “it is morally permissible for us to use the bad effective argument” if the complex truth is uneffective in opposing the idea that creationism could be science and thus could be acceptable for teaching in public schools in the U.S.
Similarly, Petri Ylikoski (2001, p. 51) argues that “it is unclear why we should raise the issue of demarcation at all. An appeal to virtus dormitiva is a bad explanation outside science as well. We should be analyzing what makes explanations good in general. There are good explanations that are not scientific, and there are bad scientific explanations. It would be inconceivable, at least to me, if scientific and everyday explanations did not share some basic ideas about good and bad explanations. After all, science has its origin in common sense cognition. There should be some kind of continuity. Of course, it now includes much that is apparently incompatible with common sense, but I seriously doubt that this incompatibility also extends to the general principles of explanatoriness”.
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Kojonen, E.V.R. Methodological naturalism and the truth seeking objection. Int J Philos Relig 81, 335–355 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9575-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9575-0