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Three kinds of worlds and two kinds of truth

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Abstract

This paper argues for three kinds of possible worlds: Wittgensteinian totalities of facts, Lewisian worlds or universes, concrete objects of maximal essence, and the world, a concrete object of minimal essence. It moreover explains that correspondence truth applies to Wittgensteinian totalities and pragmatic truth to Lewisian universes. And it finally argues that this conceptualization lays proper foundations to two-dimensional semantics.

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Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Michael De for checking my English and various helpful comments.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, 78457, Constance, Germany

    Wolfgang Spohn

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  1. Wolfgang Spohn
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Correspondence to Wolfgang Spohn.

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Spohn, W. Three kinds of worlds and two kinds of truth. Philos Stud 173, 1335–1359 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0549-3

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