Abstract
Possible worlds have become important in analyses of modal or intensional notions such as necessity and possibility. In this entry we will look at (i) the importance of possible worlds analyses, (ii) two ontological accounts of possible worlds, and (iii) two important applications of possible worlds to conditionals and truth in fiction.
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Notes
- 1.
If there are abstract objects, such as numbers and propositions, then perhaps they are not part of our world in the usual sense. Nonetheless, every concrete object is part of our world.
- 2.
I am ignoring systematic failures of completeness, such as might be caused by vagueness, non-denoting terms, etc.
- 3.
See (Barwise and Perry 1983).
- 4.
See e.g. (Lewis 1986).
- 5.
See, e.g., (Linsky and Zalta 1994).
- 6.
A world could be complete in another sense that would complicate the notion of representation. It could contain enough sentences to imply for any sentence that either it is true at the world or else false there, so that sentences not explicit members of the world would be implicitly represented as being true or false there. For instance, a world might be a collection of sentences including (i) which fundamental particles exist, where they are located, and what properties they have, and (ii) postulates stipulating how to get the macro-truths from the micro-truths.
- 7.
- 8.
See (Lewis 1986).
- 9.
He moreover gives a sort of indispensability argument for believing in other worlds in the first place.
- 10.
- 11.
See, e.g., (Pritchard 2005).
- 12.
Event e causes c iff had e not occurred, c would not have occurred (and e and c occurred). See, e.g., (Lewis 1973a).
- 13.
An object o is disposed to Ï• under conditions c just in case, were o in c, o would Ï•. See, e.g., (Lewis 1997).
- 14.
See (Lewis 1978).
- 15.
See (Lewis 1978) for details.
References
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Lewis, D. (1973a). Causation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(17), 556–567.
Lewis, D. (1973b). Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, D. (1978). Truth in fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(1).
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly, 47(187), 143–158.
Linsky, B., & Zalta, E. (1994). In defense of the simplest quantified modal logic. Philosophial Perspectives, 8, 431–458.
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford University Press.
Sider, T. (2002). The ersatz pluriverse. The Journal of Philosophy, 99(6), 279–315.
Stalnaker, R. C. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Studies in logical theory (pp. 98–112). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
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De, M. (2022). Possible Worlds. In: Glăveanu, V.P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_248
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_248
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