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Market Power Effects of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act in the U.S. Meat Industry: a Stochastic Frontier Approach Under Uncertainty

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Abstract

The present study evaluates changes in market power in the U.S. red meat industry after the implementation of the 1999 Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) Act. It employs the recently developed stochastic frontier approach of market power estimation and accounts for uncertainty in the market, capturing this way the counteractive strategic and risk effects generated by the increased transparency of the Act. The net effect of the LMR Act on market power exerted by packers was estimated. Time series data on the U.S. cattle/beef and hog/pork industries for the period 1970–2010 were employed. The empirical findings suggest that the mandatory reporting program has generated a pro-competitive impact in both livestock markets.

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Notes

  1. The Act went into effect in April of 2001 and expired in September of 2005. It was reauthorized in October 2006 and in September 2010. Between September 2005 and October 2006 price reporting took place under the mandatory system but participation was voluntary.

  2. Before the Act, packers used to report to AMS on a voluntary basis.

  3. In the U.S. meatpacking industry more than two thirds of hogs and lambs, and above eighty percent of cattle, are procured by the top four packers (USDA - GIPSA 2014).

  4. Azzam (2003) assumes that packers hold consistent conjectures, ruling out the possibility of collusion between packers.

  5. The terms “strategic effect,” “collusive effect” and “facilitate coordination” are used interchangeably to describe an increase in oligopsony power exerted by packers when purchasing livestock.

  6. Mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. meatpacking sector have created multi–output firms, i.e. firms slaughtering both beef and pork. Accordingly, one can also assume that the unit of analysis in this work is either the meatpacking plant or a single firm operating multiple plants.

  7. Although the model can accommodate oligopoly in the sale of the processed meat, we focus on oligopsony power in the procurement of livestock.

  8. Demand for processed meat at industry level is stochastic and downward sloping. For each packer, the price of the meat is stochastic but parametric (exogenous and constant), since meat packing firms are price takers.

  9. As Dockner (1992) proved, we can use the conjectural variation concept within a static framework to describe a dynamic game.

  10. Since \(\sigma ^{2} = \sigma _{e_{w}}^{2} + \sigma _{e_{p}}^{2}\), less volatility in the livestock market, due to the LMR Act, translates into a lower value for the term \(\sigma _{e_{w}}^{2}\). The latter measures the volatility of livestock prices.

  11. The term ui is an increasing function of \(u_{i}^{ol}\) and \(u_{i}^{risk}\). Certain assumptions on the statistical distributions of the terms \(u_{i}^{ol}\) and \(u_{i}^{risk}\) are needed in order to separate the strategic effect from the risk effect of the Act. This is not the purpose of this work.

  12. The present study assumes that the firm is operating efficiently.

  13. Kumbhakar et al. (2012) measure market power as: (PMC)/MC

  14. Although the translog cost function proposed by Christensen et al. (1973) is the most–widely used function because of linearity and flexibility properties, its industry analog can be obtained, with the employment of the HHI index, only under the restrictive assumption for equally-sized firms (Dickson 1994). This is not the case for the firms in the U.S. meatpacking industry. In the presence of firm-level data, the industry analog is derived in Appendix B.

  15. For the time period after the implementation of the LMR Act (2002–2010 for the present study), changes in the quantities of processed beef and processed pork range between 0.4%–6.5% and 1%–6.4%, respectively. For the same time period changes in the values of the variables K, L, M, E are even smaller. Hence, this work assumes that any changes in the estimated values of the degree of market power (𝜃) are caused by changes in the values of the term u in the nominator of Eq. 26 rather than changes in the values of the expression in the denominator.

  16. If there were no noise in the market the ME0 curve would rotate clockwise.

  17. NBER-SIC2011 database reports deflators for the factors of production material and energy.

  18. Assuming a 20-year equipment working life in the food processing industry and a linear form, a value of 0.05 was applied to the depreciation rate (Lopez et al. 2015).

  19. The marginal processing costs account for costs faced by the meatpacking industry only at the processing stage and do not include the cost of purchasing cattle or hogs.

  20. Panagiotou and Stavrakoudis (2017) estimate market power in the cattle market with the employment of the physical quantities of the factors of production. The estimated value of oligopsony power is equal to 0.1862, suggesting that, on average, the price received by the cattle producers is 18.62% lower than the net value of the marginal product of cattle.

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Correspondence to Dimitrios Panagiotou.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Description of the variables and their sources are as follows:

  • Source: NBER– CES Manufacturing Industry Database / SIC2011 (meatpacking)

    $$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} L &=& \text{Production worker hours (million hrs)} \\ W_{L} & =& \frac{\text{Production worker wages (million}~\$)} {\text{L}} \\ W_{K} &=& \text{interest rate} + \text{depreciation rate} \\ W_{M} &=& \text{Deflator for MATCOST}~ (1987 = 1.00) \\ W_{E} &=& \text{Deflator for ENERGY}~(1987 = 1.00) \end{array} $$
  • Source: United States Department of Agriculture—Economic Research Service

    $$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} Q&=& \text{Commercial beef/pork production (carcass weight, million lbs)}\\ (P-W)&=& \text{Farm--wholesale price spread (cents per retail pound equivalent)} \end{array} $$

Appendix B

According to Eq. 16, the expression for \(\frac {dln C_{i}}{dln q_{i}}\) is:

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{dln C_{i} } {dln q_{i}} = \beta_{q}+\beta_{qq}\,\ln q_{i} +\beta_{qT}\,T+\beta_{qK}\,\ln \frac{w_{K}}{w_{M}}+\beta_{qL}\,\ln \frac{w_{L}}{w_{M}}+\beta_{qE}\ln \frac{w_{E}}{w_{M}} \end{array} $$

The expression \(\frac {dlnC_{i}} {dlnq_{i}}\) can also be written as:

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{dlnC_{i}} {dlnq_{i}} = \frac{dC_{i}} {dq_{i}} \frac{q_{i}} {C_{i}} \end{array} $$

Hence, the marginal processing cost for the i th meatpacking firm is:

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} MC_{i}\,=\, \frac{dC_{i}} {dq_{i}}\,=\, \frac{C_{i}} {q_{i}}\, \left( \beta_{q}+\beta_{qq}\,\ln q_{i} +\beta_{qT}\, T+\beta_{qK}\,\ln \frac{w_{K}}{w_{M}}+\beta_{qL}\,\ln \frac{w_{L}}{w_{M}}+\beta_{qE}\,\ln \frac{w_{E}}{w_{M}}\right) \end{array} $$

Aggregating and deriving Eq. 21 from Eq. 10, we have:

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{dlnC} {dlnQ} = \frac{Q} {C} \,\, MC(Q) =\frac{Q} {C} \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N} \frac{q_{i}} {Q}\,\, MC_{i} \end{array} $$

Substituting for MCi and continue with the calculations, we get:

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{Q} {C} \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N} \frac{q_{i}} {Q}\,\, MC_{i}&=& \frac{Q} {C} \sum\limits_{i = 1}^{N} \frac{q_{i}} {Q}\, \frac{C_{i}} {q_{i}}\, \left( \beta_{q}+\beta_{qq}\, \ln q_{i} +\beta_{qT}\, T+\beta_{qK}\,\ln \frac{w_{K}}{w_{M}}\right.\\&&\qquad\qquad\qquad\,\,\left.+\beta_{qL}\,\ln \frac{w_{L}}{w_{M}}+\beta_{qE}\,\ln \frac{w_{E}}{w_{M}}\right)\\ &=&\beta_{q}+\beta_{qq}\, {\sum}_{i = 1}^{N} \frac{C_{i}} {C}\,\,\ln q_{i} +\beta_{qT}\, T+\beta_{qK}\,\ln \frac{w_{K}}{w_{M}}+\beta_{qL}\,\ln \frac{w_{L}}{w_{M}}\\&&+\beta_{qE}\ln \frac{w_{E}}{w_{M}}\\ \end{array} $$

The second term on the right hand side of the equation above is the cost-share-weighted sum of the logarithm of firms’ quantities. Had data on firm level been available, i.e. observations on each firm’s qi, we would be able to calculate the terms Ci and C and proceed with our estimation. In the absence of panel data on firm level, an aggregate translog processing cost function is employed. Hence, this study approximates the cost-share-weighted sum of the logarithm of firms’ quantities with the logarithm of the industry’s total quantity. The expression \(\frac {dlnC} {dlnQ}\) assumes the following form:

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \frac{dlnC} {dlnQ} \,=\, B_{Q}\,+\,B_{QQ}\,\ln Q +B_{QT}\, T +B_{QK}\, \ln \frac{w_{K}}{w_{M}}+B_{QL}\, \ln \frac{w_{L}}{w_{M}}+B_{QE}\,\ln \frac{w_{E}}{w_{M}} +u+\eta \end{array} $$

The expression above is the relationship on the right hand side of Eq. 25.

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Panagiotou, D. Market Power Effects of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act in the U.S. Meat Industry: a Stochastic Frontier Approach Under Uncertainty. J Ind Compet Trade 19, 103–122 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-018-0280-9

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