Abstract
The use of fictional models is extensive and rewarding in modern science. This fact captured the attention of philosophers of science, who are focusing on questions such as the following: is it possible for a fictional model to be explanatory? And, if so, in virtue of what is such a fictional model explanatory? In this paper, I discuss these questions in relation to the realism vs. anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. I focus on work developed by Alisa Bokulich who has argued for the explanatory role played by fictional models, claiming that it can be accommodated by realism in ‘a broad sense’. To this end, Bokulich introduced what she called ‘an eikonic conception’ of explanation, as opposed to the so-called ‘ontic’ conception. This move, Bokulich claims, allows non-causal explanations to be acceptable to a modified version, as opposed to a ‘naïve’ brand of realism. Roughly, a fictional model can capture aspects of reality if it manages to act as a proxy for a theory targeting a physical system. As Bokulich explains with the example of James Clerk Maxwell’s use of mechanical models, this is due to structural correspondences between a model and a theory at a certain level of abstraction. However, Bokulich does not explain how the model grasps reality. In this paper, I fill this missing piece of the puzzle. While I agree with Bokulich on the explanatory function of fictional models, I shall invoke her reading of Maxwell’s work to draw a different conclusion. Specifically, I argue that structural correspondences at various levels form what I call ‘a ladder of abstractions’ which connects aspects of a target system to the corresponding depths of descriptions. Modifying in these terms the scope of ‘representing a system’, I suggest that Bokulich’s proposed modification of realism is obviated.
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Notes
“While the naive deployment of realism to distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory models is blocked, a moderate realism does have a role to play in distinguishing which fictions are generating real physical insight and knowledge, and hence can be genuinely explanatory, and which fictions are not” (Bokulich 2012, 736).
See Bokulich (2018b, 143).
See Bokulich (2011, 39).
‘[The justificatory step] is important in so far as it plays a central role in distinguishing those models that are merely phenomenological, “saving the phenomena”, from those models that are genuinely explanatory’ (Bokulich 2011, 40).
See Nguyen (2021, 3229).
As Giora Hon and Bernard Goldstein have argued, what Maxwell did “was akin to constructing a model; indeed, the move was from fiction to physics and this methodology goes beyond the traditional use of analogy. In modern terms, it would be safe to say […] that Maxwell created a model” (Hon et al. 2021, 254).
Care should be taken in using this term, because “what [Maxwell] did was to construct a genuinely new methodology which is distinct from the standard use of analogy” (Hon et al. 2021, 237).
As Cat explains, Maxwell “[D]ecided to seek a representation of electromagnetic action in terms of the more general possible variables that would obviate the more specific representation in terms of hidden mechanical connections. The Lagrangian formalism provided just that, a description in terms of fields and energies that, while standing for a specific hidden system of connected parts, did not require the detailed knowledge of its mechanical characteristics” (Cat 2001, 405).
Cf. Cat (2001, 413).
Recall the ‘vertical axis’ along which inter-theoretic structural correspondences are established.
I am indebted to Vassilis Sakellariou for suggesting to me this account of a ‘ladder of abstractions’, which he associates with the hierarchical structural makeup of theories as captured in David Hilbert’s sixth problem concerning the rigorous treatment of mathematically formulated theories.
It goes without saying that the condition for all such considerations is the success of fictional models. Recalling the distinctions I made above, a fictional model can be successful without being ‘credentialed’, in Bokulich’s sense (Bokulich 2016, 275). Success is judged by comparing descriptions and predictions of the model, in conjunction with experimental/observational practices, with physical situations in the world. It is justification that ensures the model’s non-phenomenological character. There is no universal rule for the connection of success with justification. Bohr’s model successfully described the frequencies in Rydberg’s formula before the advent of modern quantum mechanics. More importantly, it was only in the early 1990s that classical ‘planetary’ trajectories proved to be instrumental in solving the helium atom (Bokulich 2008a, 111). Maxwell deliberately invoked the idea of ‘embodied mathematics’ to construct his mechanical model.
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Zorzato, L. The Puzzle of Fictional Models. J Gen Philos Sci (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09662-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09662-5