Abstract
The so-called Buddhist momentarists (kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin or kṣaṇikavādin), such as Dharmakīrti and his followers, defend the momentariness of all things. However, with equal force they also defend the persistence of all things, not just within a single lifetime but over an indefinite cycle of rebirth. Naturally, they have an interesting theory of persistence, according to which things persist without being self-identical over time. The theory is best presented in the Lokāyatāparīkṣā chapter of Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha and Kamalaśīla’s Paṅjikā, as they clearly articulate the criteria of persistence without identity. The purpose of this paper is to formulate a Buddhist theory of persistence through the analysis of these texts. Here is the basic formula: Things persist as series (santāna), which is constituted by momentary entities that are causally related as upādāna and upādeya. Upādāna causal relation is demarcated from other causal relations by the principle of changeability with temporal restriction (Ut), and the principle adopts further qualifications to accommodate complex cases and personal persistence. I have addressed a problem that contemporary physicalism might pose a threat to the Buddhist account of personal persistence, and argued that the problem can be evaded by regarding persons as psycho-physical entities rather than strictly non-physical. In its general outlook, the Buddhist theory of persistence is close to Theodore Sider’s stage theory in that persistence is a matter of distinct individuals standing in a special causal relationship. As regards personal persistence, the Buddhist has a stricter condition than Parfit’s IDM thesis, which states that psychological connectedness with any cause is what matters for survival. The Buddhist would say it is moral connectedness (a specific kind of psychological connectedness) with a special cause called upādāna.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Primary
Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalashīla. Edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Vol. 1. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.
Secondary
Aristotle. (1933, 1989). Metaphysics (Hugh Tredennick, Trans.). Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Arnold, D. (2014). Brains, Buddhas, and believing: The problem of intentionality in classical Buddhist and cognitive-scientific philosophy of mind. New York: Columbia University Press.
Franco, E. (1997). Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Heft 38. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
Ganeri, J. (2012). The self: Naturalism, consciousness, and the first-person stance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garfield, J. L. (2001). Empty words: Buddhist philosophy and cross-cultural interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Griffiths, P. (1983). On being mindless: The debate on the reemergence of consciousness from the attainment of cessation in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam and its commentaries. Philosophy East & West, 33(4), 379–394.
Hakamaya, N. (1975). Nirodhasamāpatti—Its historical meaning in the Vijñaptimātratā system. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 23(2), 33–43.
Hawley, K. (2004). How things persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hayashi, I. (2017). Can flux bring about flux? An appraisal of the Buddhist momentarist’s response to the causal objection. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 45, 1.
Hill, J. (2004). The philosophy of sleep: The views of Descartes, Locke and Leibniz. Richmond Journal of Philosophy, 6, Spring.
Hotori, R. (1998). The doctrine and the daily life in the Indian Buddhism: On Saṃsāra, Nirvāṇa. Nihon Buddhist Research Association, 63.
Inami, M. (1986). Dharmakīrti ni yoru Rinne no Ronsho (Jo). Nanto Bukkyo No. 56.
Inami, M. (1987). Dharmakīrti ni yoru Rinne no Ronsho (Ge). Nanto Bukkyo No. 57.
Inami, M. (2012). Two kinds of causal capacities: Sāmānyā śakti and pratinyatā śakti. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 61(1).
Inami, M. (2012b). Sonzairon: Sonzai to Inga. In S. Katsura, A. Saito, M. Shimoda, & F. Sueki (Eds.), Series Daijo Bukkyo 9: Ninshikiron to Ronrigaku. Shunjusha: Tokyo.
Jha, G., trans. (1937). Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla (Vol. 2). Baroda: Oriental Institute.
Katsumata, S. (1988). A study of the Citta-Vijñāna thought in Buddhism. Tokyo: Sankibo-busshorin.
Kim, J. (2010). Supervenience, emergence, realization, reduction. In M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McClintock, S. L. (2010). Omniscience and the Rhetoric of reason: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on rationality, argumentation, & religious authority. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Mookerjee, S. (2006). The Buddhist philosophy of universal flux (6th ed.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (first published in 1935).
Namai, C. (1996). On Paralokasiddhi in the Buddhist epistemological tradition: Buddhist refutation of Bārhaspatya. Osaka: Toho Shuppan.
Namai, C. (1984). TS(P) 1916, 1917 ad PV II 46. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 32, 2.
Moriyama S. also emphasizes the centrality of upādāna-upādeya relation as what constitutes series.
Moriyama, S. (2012). Zenchisha Shomei, Rinne no Shomei. In S. Katsura, A. Saito, M. Shimoda, & F. Sueki (Eds.), Series Daijo Bukkyo 9: Ninshikiron to Ronrigaku. Shunjusha: Tokyo.
Parfit, Derek. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Powers, John. (2018). Compassion and Rebirth: Some Ethical Implications. In Steven M. Emmanuel (Ed.), Buddhist philosophy: A comparative approach. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley.
Sakai, M. (2017). Dharmakīrti no Buddha-kan Kosatsu no ichi shiryo: Arakan no Saigo-shin ni kansuru giron ni tsuite. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 65(2).
Shaw, J. L. (2002). Causality: Sāṃkhya, Bauddha and Nyāya. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 30, 3.
Sider, T. (1996). All the world’s a stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 3.
Sider, T. (2010). Four dimensionalism: An ontology of persistence and time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. (2012). On the notion of cause. In J. Kim, D. Z. Korman, & E. Sosa (Eds.), Metaphysics: An anthology (2nd ed.). West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
Siderits, M. (2017). Buddhist reductionist action theory. In J. H. Davis (Ed.), A mirror is for reflection: Understanding Buddhist ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taber, J. (2003). Dharmakīrti against physicalism. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 31, 4.
Whitehead, A. N. (1985). Process and reality (D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne, Eds.). New York: The Free Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hayashi, I. A Buddhist Theory of Persistence: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rebirth. J Indian Philos 47, 979–1001 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-019-09403-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-019-09403-3