Abstract
Our paper makes a fundamental contribution by studying loan loss provisioning over the credit cycle as three distinct phases. Looking at the three distinct phases of the financial crisis – the pre-crisis period, crisis period, and post-crisis period – is important as loan loss provisioning is driven by different factors in each, in part due to extensive shifts in (or in the application of) regulatory rule. Controlling for credit market information using data from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveys (SLOOS) we extend the work of previous studies of forward-looking loan loss provisions using the delayed expected loss recognition approach. We contribute to the growing literature on forward-looking loan loss provisioning and early in the cycle loss recognition by incorporating a broader range of available credit information and explicitly controlling for structural breaks in the sample corresponding to the financial crisis.
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Notes
Bushman and Williams (2011) provide evidence that the ability of banks to delay expected loss recognition may be a source of systemic risk in the banking system as it reduces the ability of banks to absorb negative shocks and leads to greater opacity of earnings, which in turn weakens market discipline.
Refer to Leventis et al. (2011)
We thank the anonymous reviewer for this point. .
The SLOOS survey covers four general areas of lending: commercial real estate, commercial and industrial, home mortgage, and consumer loans. Consumer lending is further broken down into subcategories such as auto loans and credit cards. Unfortunately, differences in the breakdowns in consumer loans on the SLOOS and on the Call Reports made matching for consumer loans problematic for us. Hence, the consumer lending category was dropped from our sample. Of the three categories used in our analysis, the average of the fraction of C&I loans in the loan portfolio is about 35 %. The average for CRE and Home loans are 30, and 35 % respectively.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
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Acknowledgments
We thank William F. Bassett and Francisco B. Covas of Monetary Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board for providing the SLOOS micro data, Larry Wall (discussant) at the 2014 Internal Stress Test Model Conference in Boston, participants of the 2014 Surrey-Fordham FEBS Conference, Vladimir Kotomin (discussant) at the 2014 Midwest Finance Association Meeting, Jose Fillat (discussant) at the 2014 System Committee Meeting on Financial Structure and Regulation in Houston, Leonard Nakamura (discussant) at the 2014 Federal Regulatory Interagency Risk Quantification Forum in Washington DC.
We also thank the participants of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland brownbag seminar and in particular Edward Knotek, Joseph Haubrich, Ellis Tallman and Ben Craig for their comments and discussion. We also thank Matthew Koepke and Bill Bednar for excellent research assistance. All errors and omissions are our own.
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This research commenced when James Thomson was at The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Primer on Senior Loans Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS)
The Federal Reserve’ Senior Loans Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices is a qualitative survey that includes close to twenty core questions related to supply and demand for various categories of credit. Depending on the prevailing economic and financial conditions, the survey may include additional ad hoc questions specific to problems and trends in the credit markets. The survey is usually conducted four times per year, keeping in view the schedule of the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). As a result, the SLOOS survey is a quarterly survey that can take place at different points within a quarter. Even though the surveys are routinely conducted four times a year, the Federal Reserve Board has the authority to conduct up to six surveys in a year. The extra surveys are typically reserved for volatile times when the financial and credit markets are unstable. For our study, we do not use the information from extra surveys. It is important to note that the SLOOS survey includes reported changes in lending standards and loan demand over the three months preceding the date the survey was distributed. So when merging it with other quarterly data sources one need to adjust for this fact. In our case, we matched the quarter of the Call Report data with the quarter of SLOOS responses. For example, the January SLOOS corresponds to the SLOOS responses reported over the period October to December of the previous year. Accordingly, we merge the January SLOOS with the fourth quarter Call report data.
The SLOOS sample size is modest as it includes about roughly 60 large domestic banks (recently it has been expanded to 80). All of these banks are headquartered in one of the twelve Federal Reserve Districts, with a minimum of two and a maximum of twelve from each district. Given the increasing concentration of banking sector assets among large banks, the survey is intentionally weighted towards the large banks because doing so will allow it to capture and monitor a significant fraction of the total loans outstanding within the banking system. It also permits responses for each of the loan categories covered by the survey, since big banks are likely to be lending in all main loan categories.
The participation in the survey is voluntary but the response rate is almost 100 %, meaning that banks that are requested to participate almost always do. Furthermore, even though survey participants have an option not to respond to any specific question they almost always responds. The main reason the banks drop out of the panel is due to acquisition by another SLOOS bank in the panel.
One very important aspect of the SLOOS is that their identity and individual responses are kept confidential and specifically not shared with the supervision and regulation staff at the Federal Reserve System. The primary reason behind this is to insure accurate and honest responses from the banks without worrying the impact their responses would have on the actions of their regulators. And so in reporting the summary statistics and other results we are very being extremely careful and so do not report minimum, maximum and other statistics that may compromise the identity and responses of the SLOOS participants.
For a detailed and complete description of the SLOOS such as panel selection criteria, methodology, timing of the surveys, exact questions and their wordings, loan categories covered please refer to http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey and Bassett et al. (2012).
1.2 Construction of the diffusion indexes: lending standards and loan demand (same as documented in Bassett et al. (2012))
In SLOOS, the loan officers are asked whether they have changed lending standards since the quarter before for the following loan categories: commercial and industrial, commercial real estate, residential mortgages to buy homes, home equity lines of credit, and consumer loans (auto loans, credit cards, and consumer loans other than credit cards or auto loans). In our study we will instead work with first three loan categories: commercial and industrial, commercial real estate, residential mortgages to buy homes. For each of these loan categories, the loan officers are also asked about their perception of the changes in loan demand.
A typical question about changes in standards looks like the following (consider for C&I loan category):
“Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards for approving loan applications for C&I loans or credit lines changed?”
The multiple-choice answers:
1) Eased considerably, 2) eased somewhat, 3) about unchanged, 4) tightened somewhat, 5) tightened considerably.
Similarly, a typical question about changes in demand looks like the following (consider for C&I loan category):
“Over the past three months, how has the demand for C&I loans or credit lines at your bank changed?”
The possible answers:
1) increased considerably, 2) increased somewhat, 3) about unchanged, 4) decreased somewhat, 5) decreased considerably.
Given in the past, loan officers have hardly ever characterized changes in either standards or demands as ‘considerably’, we therefore simplify our analysis by recoding the reported responses into three categories and accordingly create lending and demand categorical variables respectively.
Step 1: Creating categorical variables
The lending categorical variable, \( \overset{-}{{\boldsymbol{S}}_{\boldsymbol{it}}} \) [c]
\( \overset{-}{{\boldsymbol{S}}_{\boldsymbol{it}}} \) [c] |
−1 if bank i reported easing standards on loan category c in quarter t |
0 if bank i reported no change in standards on loan category c in quarter t |
+1 if bank i reported tightening standards on loan category c in quarter t |
And similarly the demand categorical variable, \( \overset{-}{{\boldsymbol{D}}_{\boldsymbol{it}}} \) [c]
\( \overset{-}{{\boldsymbol{D}}_{\boldsymbol{it}}} \) [c] |
−1 if bank i reported decreased demand for loan category c in quarter t |
0 if bank i reported no change in demand for loan category c in quarter t |
+1 if bank i reported increased demand for loan category c in quarter t |
Step 2: Constructing a diffusion index for changes in lending standards and one for changes in loan demand
Next we construct a composite or diffusion index of changes in lending standards and loan demand for each bank in our panel as weighted averages:
where 0 ≤ w it [c] ≤ 1 represents the fraction of bank i’s core loan portfolio that consists of three loan categories in category c, as reported on bank i’s Call Report in quarter t.
∆Standards it and ∆Demand it takes on continuous values between −1 and +1.
Interpretation:
∆Standards it represents the net fraction of loans on bank i’s balance sheet that were in categories for which bank reported changing lending standards over the survey period.
∆Demand it represents the net fraction of loans on bank i’s balance sheet that were in categories for which bank (as reported) experienced a change in demand over the survey period.
Step 3: (Optional) Constructing an aggregate diffusion index for changes in lending standards and one for changes in loan demand (not used in the regressions)
In the previous step we constructed bank specific composite indexes, which can be aggregated across banks to come up with an aggregate composite or diffusion indexes:
where 0 ≤ w it ≤ 1 represents the fraction of total core loans on SLOOS respondents’ balance sheets that are held by bank i in quarter t.
∆Standards t and ∆Demand t takes on continuous values between − 1 and + 1.
These indices summarize the economy wide changes in credit supply and demand.
Figure 1b plots both the aggregate lending standards and loan demand alongside the real GDP growth.
1.3 Bank mergers
As mentioned earlier, the primary cause of attrition in the SLOOS is due to bank mergers. Accordingly we adjust for the bank mergers in our sample as follows (see also English and Nelson 1998):
When banks merge they are two possible accounting methods that are used to handle the merger. One of those accounting approach is called ‘purchase accounting’. Under this approach, the balance sheet items of the acquired bank are combined together and reported in the quarter of the merger, but the year-to-date flow of income and expense of the acquired bank as of the date of merger is not reported by the acquiring institution after the merger. Whereas in the second accounting approach called ‘pooling of interest accounting’ both balance sheets and income statements of the merging banks are combined and reported as of the date of the merger. Luckily the sample period we are working with identifies the accounting method used for bank mergers. Specifically we use the bank merger data files that are publicly available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s website (http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/financial_institution_reports/merger_data.cfm) to identify bank mergers in our sample. We keep the bank mergers that used pooling of interest accounting but discard those that used purchase accounting. That is we drop those observations corresponding to the quarter in which the merger took place and the accounting method used was purchase accounting. The observations dropped amounted to 6 % of the sample.
1.4 Call report data description
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION | CALL REPORT ITEMS/DATA SOURCE | MNEMONICS |
---|---|---|
C&I Loans | ||
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LOANS | RCFD1766 | TBL |
SMALL FIRM LENDING | RCON5571 + RCON5573 + RCON5575 | SBL |
SMALL FIRM LENDING WEIGHT | (RCON5571 + RCON5573 + RCON5575) /(RCFD1766) | SML_RATIO |
LARGE FIRM FIRM WEIGHT | 1- {SML_RATIO} | LRG_RATIO |
C&I LOANS 90 DAYS OR MORE PD & NONACCRUAL | RCFD 1607 + RCFD 1608 | BAD_CI_LNS_90 |
C&I LOANS 90 DAYS OR MORE PD & NONACCRUAL FOR SMALL FIRMS | SML_RATIO* (RCFD 1607 + RCFD 1608 ) | BAD_CI_LNS_90_SML |
C&I LOANS 90 DAYS OR MORE PD & NONACCRUAL FOR LARGE MID SIZED FIRMS | LRG_RATIO * (RCFD 1607 + RCFD 1608) | BAD_CI_LNS_90_LRG |
CHARGE-OFFS ON C&I LOANS | RIAD4638 | CHGOFF_CI |
RECOVERIES ON C&I LOANS | RIAD4608 | RECOV_CI |
NET CHARGEOFFS ON C&I LOANS | RIAD4638 - RIAD4608 | NET_CHGOFF_CI |
NET CHARGEOFFS ON C&I LOANS FOR SMALL FIRMS | SML_RATIO * (RIAD4638 - RIAD4608) | NET_CHGOFF_CI_SML |
NET CHARGEOFFS ON C&I LOANS FOR LARGE AND MID SIZED FIRMS | LRG_RATIO * ((RIAD4638 - RIAD4608) | NET_CHGOFF_CI_LRG |
CRE Loans | ||
LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION | RCONF158 | |
LOANS SECURED BY OTHER CONSTRUCTION LOANS AND ALL LAND DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER LAND LOANS | RCONF159 | |
REAL ESTATE LOANS SECURED BY MULTI-FAMILY (5 OR MORE) RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES | RCON1460 | |
LOANS SECURED BY OWNER OCCUPIED NONFARM NONRESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES | RCONF160 | |
LOANS SECURED BY OTHER NONFARM NONRESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES. | RCONF161 | |
TOTAL CRE LOANS | RCONF158 + RCONF159 + RCON 1460 + RCONF160 + RCONF161 | TOT_CRE |
LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION 30 DAYS PD + LOANS SECURED BY OTHER CONSTRUCT LOANS & ALL LAND DEVT AND OTHER LAND LOANS 90 DAYS PD | RCONF174 + RCONF175 | |
NONACCRUAL | RCONF176 + RCONF177 | |
REAL ESTATE LOANS SECURED BY MULTI-FAMILY (5 OR MORE) RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES 90 DAYS PD | RCON3500 | |
NONACCRUAL | RCON3501 | |
LOANS SECURED BY OWNER OCCUPIED NONFARM NONRESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES 90 DAYS PD & NONACCRUAL + LOANS SECURED BY OTHER NONFARM NONRESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES 90 DAYS PD | RCONF180 + RCONF181 | |
NONACCRUAL | RCONF182 + RCONF183 | |
TOTAL BAD CRE LOANS 90 DAYS PD & NONACCRUAL | RCONF174 + RCONF175 + RCONF176 + RCONF177 + RCON3500 + RCON3501 + RCONF180 + RCONF181 + RCONF182 + RCONF183 | BAD_CRE_LNS_90 |
LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION & OTHER CHARGEOFFS | RIADC891 + RIADC893 | |
LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION RECOVERY | RIADC892 + RIADC894 | |
LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION & OTHER NET CHARGEOFFS | (RIADC891 + RIADC893) - (RIADC892 + RIADC894) | |
REAL ESTATE LOANS SECURED BY MULTI-FAMILY (5 OR MORE) RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES CHARGEOFFS | RIAD3588 | |
REAL ESTATE LOANS SECURED BY MULTI-FAMILY (5 OR MORE) RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES RECOVERY | RIAD3589 | |
REAL ESTATE LOANS SECURED BY MULTI-FAMILY (5 OR MORE) RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES CHARGEOFFS | RIAD3588 - RIAD3589 | |
LOANS SECURED BY OWNER OCCUPIED NONFARM NONRESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES CHARGEOFFS | RIADC895 + RIADC897 | |
LOANS SECURED BY OWNER OCCUPIED NONFARM NONRESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES RECOVERY | RIADC896 + RIADC898 | |
LOANS SECURED BY OWNER OCCUPIED NONFARM NONRESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES NET CHARGEOFFS | (RIADC895 + RIADC897) - (RIADC896 + RIADC898) | |
TOTAL NET CHARGEOFFS ON CRE LOANS | (RIADC891 + RIADC893) - (RIADC892 + RIADC894) + RIAD3588 - RIAD3589 + (RIADC895 + RIADC897) - (RIADC896 + RIADC898) | NET_CHGOFF_CRE |
Residential Loans | ||
REVOLVING, OPEN-END LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES AND EXTENDED UNDER LINES OF CREDIT | RCON1797 | |
ALL OTHER LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES: SECURED BY FIRST LIENS | RCON5367 | |
ALL OTHER LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES: SECURED BY JUNIOR LIENS | RCON5368 | |
TOTAL RESIDENTIAL LOANS | RCON1797 + RCON5367 + RCON5368 | TOT_RESI |
REVOLVING, OPEN-END LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES AND EXTENDED UNDER LINES OF CREDIT 90 DAYS PD + ALL OTHER CLOSED END LOANS | RCON5399 + RCONC237 + RCONC239 | |
NON ACCRUAL | RCON5400 + RCONC229 + RCONC230 | |
TOTAL RESIDENTIAL LOANS 90 DAYS PD & NONACCRUAL | (RCON5399 + RCONC237 + RCONC239) + (RCON5400 + RCONC229 + RCONC230) | BAD_RESI_LNS_90 |
CHARGE-OFFS ON REVOLVING, OPEN-END LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES AND EXTENDED UNDER LINES OF CREDIT & CLOSED END CREDIT | RIAD5411 + RIADC234 + RIADC235 | |
RECOVERIES ON REVOLVING, OPEN-END LOANS SECURED BY 1–4 FAMILY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES AND EXTENDED UNDER LINES OF CREDIT & CLOSED END CREDIT | RIAD5412 + RIADC217 + RIADC218 | |
TOTAL NET CHARGEOFFS ON RESIDENTIAL LOANS | (RIAD5411 + RIADC234 + RIADC235) - (RIAD5412 + RIADC217 + RIADC218) | NET_CHGOFF_RESI |
Other | ||
TOTAL EQUITY CAPITAL | RCFD3210 | EQTY_CAP |
TOTAL NONINTEREST INCOME | RIAD4079 | NONINT_INC |
INTEREST AND FEE INCOME ON LOANS, TOTAL | RIAD4010 | LOAN_INT |
TOTAL NONINTEREST EXPENSE | RIAD4093 | NONINT_EXP |
TOTAL INTEREST INCOME | RIAD4107 | INT_INCOME |
TOTAL INTEREST EXPENSE | RIAD4703 | INT_EXP |
PROVISION FOR LOAN AND LEASE LOSSES | RIAD4230 | PLL |
TOTAL ASSETS | RCFD2170 | TOT_ASSETS |
ALLOWANCE FOR LOAN AND LEASE LOSSES | RIAD3123 | ALLL |
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES AND PROVISIONS | RIAD4301 + RIAD4230 | EBTP |
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Balasubramanyan, L., Thomson, J.B. & Zaman, S. Evidence of Forward-Looking Loan Loss Provisioning with Credit Market Information. J Financ Serv Res 52, 191–223 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-016-0255-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-016-0255-0