Abstract
On the powerful qualities view, every fundamental property is both dispositional and qualitative. Identity theory is the standard account of the view, which makes the stronger claim that a property’s dispositionality and qualitativity are identical to each other, and identical to the property itself. Recent defences of the powerful qualities view have involved novel theories of powerful qualities which are not also variants of identity theory. Giannotti (Erkenntnis 86:603–621, 2021a) has suggested a novel theory of his own, the dual aspect account, which makes use of a particular notion of aspects. For Giannotti, dispositionality and qualitativity are each an aspect of a property, and an aspect is a property’s way of being. The importance of aspects is twofold. Firstly, by introducing aspects to identity theory, the theory becomes more precise. Secondly, aspects allow for a novel theory of powerful qualities, the dual aspect account, which maintains that dispositionality and qualitativity are aspects, but rejects the identity claim. Giannotti’s aim is to show that even if identity theory is false, the dual aspect account remains an available theory for advocates of powerful qualities. This paper will be a critical examination of Giannotti’s ideas. Firstly, I will clarify Giannotti’s notion of aspects, explaining how it involves a misunderstanding of supervenience, and why it does not offer the advantages that he claims it does. Secondly, in light of my discussion of aspects, I will argue that the dual aspect account lacks relative advantages over the compound view of powerful qualities.
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Notes
In his formulation of identity theory, Heil includes the claim that “P’s dispositionality and qualitativity are not aspects or properties of P” (Heil, 2003, p. 111; emphasis added), which has been omitted in the in-text quotation. Here Heil thinks of aspects as parts or higher-order properties, but Giannotti, as we shall see, does not think of aspects in these terms (hence, the omission).
It should be noted that in the article under discussion (Giannotti, 2021a), Giannotti identifies but does not endorse the dual aspect account. He has further distanced himself from this view (see Giannotti, 2021b). Still, the challenge still stands against any attempt to develop a theory of powerful qualities that uses ontologically thin notions of dispositionality and qualitativity.
While the dual aspect account will be discussed later in this paper, it is important to briefly touch on the importance of having an adequate notion of qualitativity, and how it impacts the viability of the dual aspect account. According to Taylor (2022), Giannotti assumes a thin notion of qualitativity as simply being actual. Applied to aspects, this means that the qualitative aspect, insofar as it is qualitative, is a real feature of a property. Taylor finds this problematic since, if the dispositional aspect is supposed to be distinct from the qualitative (as the dual aspect account assumes), then this would imply that the dispositional aspect is not a real feature of properties. Livanios (2020) also sees the threat of the dual aspect account collapsing into the pure powers view, since the pure powers view can accept such a thin notion of qualitativity. Admittedly, when I initially read Giannotti, I had assumed that he was using a thicker notion of qualitativity, since he emphasizes a qualitative aspect’s contributions to the occurrent makeup of a property bearer (see Giannotti, 2021a, 2021b, p. 614). However, upon another reading, I can see how one can reasonably infer that Giannotti is using a thin notion of qualitativity. That being said, while defining qualitativity as such is of utmost importance for the powerful qualities view, my critique of Giannotti comes at another angle, aimed more at his notion of aspects per se, qualitative or not, and how they relate to properties.
Compare this to Giannotti’s description of having a certain electromagnetic charge, where he suggests that its qualitativity is the having a determinate quantity of coulombs (see Giannotti, 2021a, p. 617).
While not denying that a theory can involve ontological free lunches, Schulte (2011, pp. 253–4; cf. Cameron 2008, 2010) thinks that they are real entities, which are nonetheless “free lunches” in the sense that they do not count against a theory’s parsimony. On this interpretation, even if aspects are supervenient, ontological free lunches, it does not follow that they are non-entities.
Suppose that the supervenient is not an entity at all. It follows that there are no entities, since everything is identical to, and hence, supervenes on, itself.
If aspects were not entities, then there would be the additional question regarding their relation to the subvenient. It might make sense to infer that aspects are non-entities if aspects are representations of an invariant “something or other” from different points of view (conceptual, or even physical or geographical). Thanks to Robert DiSalle for this point. I suggest, though, that the inference is not available for those who think of aspects in Giannotti’s terms. Giannotti’s characterization of aspects suggests that they are not mere representations, but rather objective features of properties, which contribute to the occurrent makeup and dispositional profiles of objects.
An anonymous reviewer writes:
It is not clear to me why ways of being must be some kind of entities.... As far as I can see, one might embrace a higher order nominalistic view about aspects of properties and, consequently, not think that ways of being of properties are entities of some sort. By holding such a nominalistic view, one might also loosely talk about the aspects determining or contributing the dispositions of their bearers, although, strictly speaking, it is properties that do that.
I am not exactly clear about what the suggestion is, but here are some candidates plus responses. If the suggestion is to think of aspects as non-universal or non-abstract, that would not suffice for thinking of aspects as non-entities. If the suggestion is that aspects are just names, descriptions, or concepts for properties which support or facilitate, say, certain ascriptions regarding the qualities and dispositions of properties, then the worry is that a powerful qualities view that incorporates aspects will collapse into neutral monism. Or if aspects are somehow higher order properties of properties, which, strictly speaking, do not contribute qualities or dispositions to property bearers, then the worry is that aspects might be epiphenomenal, and so it is unclear why they should be posited in the first place (it is not clear what they are supposed to be doing).
Livanios (2020) arrives at a similar conclusion with respect to the dual aspect account. He argues that the dual aspect account is in danger of collapsing into identity theory. Under the assumption that aspects are non-entities, it is incoherent to claim that there can be a real distinction between a property’s qualitative and dispositional aspects. He suggests, instead, that the dual aspect account should maintain the threefold identity between a property and its aspects, but if so, it becomes indistinguishable from identity theory.
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I would like to thank Robert DiSalle and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts.
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Morales, D.J. On Aspects, Identity Theory, and the Dual Aspect Account. Erkenn (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00777-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00777-1