Abstract
We study the impact of collective effort in R&D in adaptation technologies, and also spillover effects on formation and size of stable international environmental agreements (IEAs). Our results suggest that it is possible to have more than one size of stable IEA. We can achieve a superior equilibrium, i.e., the grand coalition, if countries manage to keep knowledge spillovers low and arrange a minimum ratification threshold. This threshold is defined endogenously. We also shed light on the effects of two-sided spillover on global welfare and the size of stable IEAs.
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Notes
See the seminal paper by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
Note that we adopt the open membership assumption as in, e.g., the Kyoto protocol and Paris agreement, which means that insiders cannot block an entrant.
It turned out in all simulations that when emissions and the damage costs are positive, welfare is also positive; see “Appendix 2”.
The results for any other constellation of parameter values can be provided by the authors upon request.
For instance, the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol were initially signed by 28 and 46 countries, respectively, and both achieved universal ratification on 16 September 2009, we may interpret our \(S^{mpc}\) as 28 for the Vienna Convention and 46 for the Montreal Protocol.
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Acknowledgments
Funding was provided by SHHRC (Grant No. 435-2013-0532).
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We wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the editor for their very helpful comments.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 3.1
First-order conditions for 10 and 9 provide the following 4-unknown, 4-equation system:
Solving for the variables \(e^{N}, \, \kappa ^{N},\,e^{S}\) and \({\kappa ^{S}}\) gives the result.
Appendix 2: Calibration of the Parameters \(\gamma \) and \(\theta \)
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Masoudi, N., Zaccour, G. Adaptation and International Environmental Agreements. Environ Resource Econ 71, 1–21 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0080-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0080-9
Keywords
- International environmental agreements
- Adaptation technology
- Minimum participation clause
- Climate change
- Knowledge spillover