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Deviant Behavior in a Moderated-Mediation Framework of Incentives, Organizational Justice Perception, and Reward Expectancy

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Abstract

This study introduces the concept of deviant behavior in a moderated-mediation framework of incentives and organizational justice perception. The proposed relationships in the theoretical framework were tested with a sample of 311 academics, using simple random sampling, via causal models and structural equation modeling. The findings suggest that incentives might boost the apparent performance, but not necessarily the intended performance. The results confirm that employees’ affection for incentives has direct, indirect, and conditional indirect effects on their deviant behavior likelihood. The relationship between employee deviant behavior likelihood and affection for incentives was moderated by organizational justice perception and partially mediated by reward expectancy, thus having significant contributions toward the extant literature of deviant behavior and incentives. The findings have important implications for managers, academicians, and policy makers for mitigating adverse behavior in professional employees through proper use of incentives.

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Shoaib, S., Baruch, Y. Deviant Behavior in a Moderated-Mediation Framework of Incentives, Organizational Justice Perception, and Reward Expectancy. J Bus Ethics 157, 617–633 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3651-y

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