Abstract
We consider n-person games in which players are located in some Euclidean space. These locations represent affinity between players. Thus there are two reasons why coalitions might form: (a) the members are close together, and/or (b) there is much to be gained from a coalition. We determine, in such case, which coalitions are more likely to form. We also model how players are likely to move in this space, so that stronger coalitions might form.
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Owen, G., Carreras, F. Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation. Ann Oper Res 318, 1095–1115 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04493-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-021-04493-3