Abstract
Inspired by Owen’s (Nav Res Logist Quart 18:345–354, 1971) previous work on the subject, Shapley (A comparison of power indices and a non-symmetric generalization. Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1977) introduced the Owen–Shapley spatial power index, which takes the ideological location of individuals into account, represented by vectors in the Euclidean space \({\mathbb {R}}^{m}\), to measure their power. In this work we study the Owen–Shapley spatial power index in three-dimensional space. Peters and Zarzuelo (Int J Game Theory 46:525–545, 2017) carried out a study of this index for individuals located in two-dimensional space, but pointed out the limitation of the two-dimensional feature. In this work focusing on three-dimensional space, we provide an explicit formula for spatial unanimity games, which makes it possible to calculate the Owen–Shapley spatial power index of any spatial game. We also give a characterization of the Owen–Shapley spatial power index employing two invariant positional axioms among others. Finally, we calculate this power index for the Basque Parliament, both in the two-dimensional and three-dimensional cases. We compare these positional indices against each other and against those that result when classical non-positional indices are considered, such as the Shapley–Shubik power index (Am Polit Sci Rev 48(3):787–792, 1954) and the Banzhaf-normalized index (Rutgers Law Rev 19:317–343, 1965).
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This work has been partially supported by the Ministry of Science and Innovation (PID2019-105291GB-I00), and by UPV/EHU (GIU20/019)
Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
By 3DPI, without a loss of generality, we can suppose that \(\measuredangle aed=\measuredangle aec=\pi /2\) (fixing e, and moving c and d towards or outwards a). By DP and 3DPI, we have to prove
Let \(d^{\prime }=d+(b-a)\), \(e^{\prime }=e+(b-a)\) and \(c^{\prime }=c+(b-a)\) (Fig. 13). Consider \({\widetilde{N}}=\left\{ 0,1,2,3,4,5\right\} \) and \( {\widetilde{p}},{\widetilde{q}},{\widetilde{s}}\in C ^{{\widetilde{N}}}\) such that \({\widetilde{p}}_{\left\{ 0,1,2,3\right\} }=p_{\left\{ 0,1,2,3\right\} }\) , \({\widetilde{q}}_{\left\{ 0,1,2,3\right\} }=q_{\left\{ 0,1,2,3\right\} }\), \( {\widetilde{s}}_{\left\{ 0,1,2,3\right\} }=s\), \(\left( {\widetilde{p}}_{4}, {\widetilde{p}}_{5}\right) =\left( c^{\prime },d^{\prime }\right) \), \(\left( {\widetilde{q}}_{4},{\widetilde{q}}_{5}\right) =\left( e^{\prime },d^{\prime }\right) \) and \(\left( {\widetilde{s}}_{4},{\widetilde{s}}_{5}\right) =\left( c^{\prime },e^{\prime }\right) .\)
By DP and 3DPI, the equality to prove is
Since \(\varphi \) is a power index,
By AN and RI, taking Q the plane through \(a+0.5\left( b-a\right) \) with normal vector \(b-a\), equality (7) turns into
(i) We obtain another expression for \(\varphi _{2}\left( {\widetilde{N}},u_{ {\widetilde{N}}},{\widetilde{p}}\right) \). DP and 3DPI imply
and since \(\varphi \) is a power index,
Again, AN and RI, with Q the plane through \(a+0.5\left( b-a\right) \) with normal vector \(\left( b-a\right) \), transform this equality into
Taking into account that \(\left( \measuredangle {\widetilde{q}}_{0}\widetilde{q }_{1}{\widetilde{q}}_{2},\measuredangle {\widetilde{q}}_{0}{\widetilde{q}}_{1} {\widetilde{q}}_{4},\measuredangle {\widetilde{q}}_{2}{\widetilde{q}}_{1} {\widetilde{q}}_{4}\right) =\left( \pi /2,\pi /2,\pi /2\right) \), Lemma 4 implies
and hence
Therefore, this equality and (9) imply
(ii) We obtain another expression for \(\varphi _{1}\left( {\widetilde{N}},u_{ {\widetilde{N}}},{\widetilde{p}}\right) \). Similarly, by DP and 3DPI it holds
and reasoning as in (i) we obtain
And hence,
Substituting (11) and ( 12) in (8), equality (6) is obtained.
Finally, if \(\measuredangle cae=\measuredangle dae\), the equality to prove is
By AN and RI, with Q the plane through e with normal vector \(c-e\), we have
which, together with (10) and ( 12), implies
Substituting this equality in (6), we get the result we require. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 7
By 3DPI, without loss of generality, we can suppose that \(\measuredangle aed=\measuredangle aec=\pi /2\). Let \(a^{\prime }=e+(e-a)\), \(b^{\prime }=b+2(e-a)\), \(c^{\prime }=c+(b-a)\), \(d^{\prime }=d+(b-a)\) and \(e^{\prime }=e+(b-a)\) (Fig. 14), and consider \({\widetilde{N}} =\left\{ 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7\right\} \), \({\widetilde{p}}\in C ^{{\widetilde{N}} }\) such that \({\widetilde{p}}_{\left\{ 0,1,2,3\right\} }=p_{\left\{ 0,1,2,3\right\} }\), \(\left( {\widetilde{p}}_{4},{\widetilde{p}}_{5},{\widetilde{p}} _{6},{\widetilde{p}}_{7}\right) =\left( a^{\prime },b^{\prime },c^{\prime },d^{\prime }\right) \), and \({\widetilde{q}}\in C ^{{\widetilde{N}} \backslash \{1,6\}}\) such that \({\widetilde{p}}_{{\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\}}={\widetilde{q}}_{{\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\}}\).
By DP and 3DPI,
RI and AN imply
and
and therefore, taking the definition of a power index into account,
RI and AN imply \(\varphi _{2}\left( {\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\},u_{ {\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\}},{\widetilde{q}}\right) =\varphi _{7}\left( {\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\},u_{{\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\}}, {\widetilde{q}}\right) \) and
and hence, taking the definition of a power index into account,
Substituting ( 14) and ( 15) in ( 13) , we get:
Since \(\varphi _{1}\left( {\widetilde{N}},u_{{\widetilde{N}}},{\widetilde{p}} \right) \ge 0\), then \(\varphi _{0}\left( {\widetilde{N}},u_{{\widetilde{N}}}, {\widetilde{p}}\right) \le \varphi _{0}\left( {\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\},u_{{\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\}},{\widetilde{q}}\right) \). By DP and 3DPI, it holds \(\varphi _{0}\left( {\widetilde{N}},u_{{\widetilde{N}}}, {\widetilde{p}}\right) =\varphi _{0}\left( N,u_{S},p\right) \) and \(\varphi _{0}\left( {\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\},u_{{\widetilde{N}}\backslash \{1,6\}},{\widetilde{q}}\right) =\varphi _{0}\left( N,u_{S},q\right) \), and hence \(\varphi _{0}\left( N,u_{S},p\right) \le \varphi _{0}\left( N,u_{S},q\right) \). \(\square \)
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Albizuri, M.J., Goikoetxea, A. The Owen–Shapley Spatial Power Index in Three-Dimensional Space. Group Decis Negot 30, 1027–1055 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-021-09746-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-021-09746-x