Abstract
We study the complexity of priced control in elections. Naturally, if a given control type is NP-hard for a given voting system ɛ then its priced variant is NP-hard for this rule as well. It is, however, interesting what effect introducing prices has on the complexity of those control problems that without prices are tractable. We show that for four prominent voting rules (plurality, approval, Condorcet, and Copeland) introducing prices does not increase the complexity of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters. However, we do show an example of a scoring rule for which such an effect takes place.
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Miasko, T., Faliszewski, P. The complexity of priced control in elections. Ann Math Artif Intell 77, 225–250 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-015-9478-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-015-9478-2