Abstract
We solve the problem of a representative agent who maximises the expected present utility of his intertemporal consumption under the assumption that an optimal fraction of his wealth is hidden to the tax authorities (we show conditions under which evasion is expedient). Evasion affects the capital dynamics in two ways: the growth rate of capital increases because some taxes are not paid, but when caught evading the consumer has to pay a fine (proportional to evasion). Consumption can be allocated between ordinary goods and so-called visible goods. The latter are used by the Government for targeting the audit, since they are considered like an indicator of consumer’s income. In fact, the probability of being caught is a function of the distance between the actual and the presumed consumption in visible goods. We find a closed form solution to the dynamic optimization problem and show how fiscal and audit parameters affect the optimal evasion and the optimal allocation between the two types of consumptions.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
References
Allingham MG, Sandmo A (1972) Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. J Public Econ 1(3–4):323–338
Alm J (2012) Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies. Int Tax Public Finance 19(1):54–77. doi:10.1007/s10797-011-9171-2
Arrow KJ, Dasgupta PS (2009) Conspicuous consumption, inconspicuous leisure. Econ J 119(541):F497–F516
Bernasconi M, Levaggi R, Menoncin F (2015) Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context. Econ Lett 126:171–175
Bird RM, Wallace S (2004) Is it really so hard to tax the hard-to-tax? the context and role of presumptive taxes. In: Taxing the hard-to tax:lessons from theory and practice, vol 268 of contributions to economic analysis. Elsevier, New York, pp 121–158. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0573855504688067
Calvet Christian R, Alm J (2014) Empathy, sympathy, and tax compliance. J Econ Psychol 40(C), 62–82. http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/joepsy/v40y2014icp62-82.html
Chen B-L (2003) Tax evasion in a model of endogenous growth. Rev Econ Dyn 6(2):381–403
Cleary D (2011) Predictive analytics in the public sector: using data mining to assist better target selection for audit. In: Proceedings of the 11th European conference on e-Government, pp 166–176
Cont R, Tankov P (2009) Financial modelling with jump processes. Financial mathematics series, 2nd edn. Chapman & Hall/CRC, London
Corneo G, Jeanne O (1997) Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism. J Public Econ 66(1):55–71
Deaton A (1992) Understanding consumption. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Dzhumashev R, Gahramanov E (2010) A growth model with income tax evasion: some implications for australia. Econ Record 86(275):620–636
Engel EMRA, Hines JR (1999) Understanding tax evasion dynamics. NBER Working Papers 6903. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Feige EL, Cebula R (2011) America’s underground economy: measuring the size, growth and determinants of income tax evasion in the U.S. MPRA Paper 29672. University Library of Munich, Germany
Hashimzade N, Myles GD, Rablen MD (2015) Predictive analytics and the targeting of audits. J Econ Behav Org. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268115003054
Heffetz O (2011) A test of conspicuous consumption: visibility and income elasticities. Rev Econ Stat 93(4):1101–1117
HMR (2015) Measurng tax gap 2015. HM Revenue & Customs. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/measuring-tax-gaps
Hsu KW, Pathak N, Srivastava J, Tschida G, Bjorklund E (2015) Data mining based tax audit selection: a case study of a pilot project at the minnesota department of revenue. In: Abou-Nasr M, Lessmann S, Stahlbock R, Weiss GM (eds) Real world data mining applications, vol 17 of annals of information systems. Springer, New York, pp 221–245
Levaggi R, Menoncin F (2012) Tax audits, fines and optimal tax evasion in a dynamic context. Econ Lett 117(1):318–321
Levaggi R, Menoncin F (2013) Optimal dynamic tax evasion. J Econ Dyn Control 37(11):2157–2167
Levaggi R, Menoncin F (2016) Optimal dynamic tax evasion: a portfolio approach. J Econ Behav Org 124:115–129
Logue KD, Vettori GG (2011) Narrowing the tax gap through presumptive taxation. Columbia J Tax Law 2(1):100
Mejia D, Restrepo P (2016) Crime and conspicuous consumption. J Public Econ 135:1–14. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272715001188
Murphy R (2014) Closing the tax gap: a report for group of the progressive alliance of socialists and democrats in the European parliament. Tech. rep, Tax Research UK
Øksendal B, Sulem A (2007) Applied stochastic control of jump diffusions. Springer, New York
Pedone A (2009) Tax theory and tax practice: the problems of defining, measuring and assessing tax bases. Working Papers 119, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics. http://ideas.repec.org/p/sap/wpaper/wp119.html
Pulina G (2011) Tax evasion and presumptive taxation methods. a case study in Italy: sector studies. Tech. Rep. 2011–20, CRENOS
Quintana-Domeque C, Turino F (2016) Relative concerns on visible consumption: a source of economic distortions. B.E. J Theor Econ 16(1):33–45. http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2016.16.issue-1/bejte-2015-0025/bejte-2015-0025.xml
Sandmo A (2005) The theory of tax evasion: a retrospective view. Natl Tax J LVII 4:643–663
Slemrod J, Gillitzer C (2013) Tax systems. Zeuthen Lectures. MIT Press, Cambridge
Sproule R, Komus D, Tsang E (1980) Optimal tax evasion: risk-neutral behaviour under a negative income tax. Public Finance = Finances publiques 35(2):309–17
Srinivasan TN (1973) Tax evasion: a model. J Public Econ 2(4):339–346
Yaniv G (2013) Tax evasion, conspicuous consumption, and the income tax rate. Public Finance Rev 41(3):302–316. http://pfr.sagepub.com/content/41/3/302.abstract
Yitzhaki S (1974) Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. J Public Econ 3(2):201–202
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendices
Appendix
Optimization problem
Given the optimization problem (5) and the behaviour of the capital in (3) the corresponding Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation is
where \(J_{t}\left( k_{t}\right) e^{-\rho t}\) is the value function, whose boundary (transversality) condition is
Given (4), the derivatives of \(\lambda _{t}\left( c_{t},e_{t}\right) \) w.r.t consumption and evasion are
The Jacobian of the optimization problem, with respect to \(c_{t}\), \(e_{t}\) and \(g_{t}\) is
and the Hessian matrix is
In order to solve these FOCs (\(\nabla _{c_{t},e_{t},g_{t}}J=0\)), a functional form for the guess function must be guessed. Since the utility function is linear, also the value function should be linear in capital. Thus, we assumeFootnote 3
where F and G are constant that must solve the HJB equation. With this functional form the Jacobian and the Hessian become
where, for any positive F, we see that the stationary point is a saddle.
If this guess value function is substituted into the FOCs, the optimal evasion and consumption are obtained as functions of the constant F:
Now, \(c_{t}^{*}\), \(e_{t}^{*}\) and \(g_{t}^{*}\) are substituted into the HJB equation in order to find G and F. The HJB becomes
which can be split into two equations, one which contains \(k_{t}\) and one which does not:
from the first equation the value of F can be found:
while the value of G is obtained from the second equation (but it is immaterial to our purposes). After substituting this value of F into the FOCs, the optimal values \(c_{t}^{*}\), \(e_{t}^{*}\) and \(g_{t}^{*}\) in Proposition (1) are obtained.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Levaggi, R., Menoncin, F. Dynamic tax evasion with audits based on visible consumption. J Econ 119, 131–146 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0493-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-016-0493-5