Abstract
In this paper, I assess what we have learned about tax evasion since Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo launched the modern analysis of tax evasion in 1972. I focus on three specific questions and the answers to these questions that have emerged over the years. First, how do we measure the extent of evasion? Second, how can we explain these patterns of behavior? Third, how can we use these insights to control evasion? In the process, I illustrate my own answers to these questions by highlighting various specific examples of research. My main conclusion is that we have learned many things but that we also still have many gaps in our understanding of how to measure, explain, and control tax evasion. I also give some suggestions—and some predictions—about where promising avenues of future research may lie.
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This paper is based on my keynote address at the 66th Annual Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF), “Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the Shadow Economy”, held at Uppsala University in Uppsala, Sweden in August 2010. I am greatly indebted to Friedrich Schneider for many helpful discussions.
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Alm, J. Measuring, explaining, and controlling tax evasion: lessons from theory, experiments, and field studies. Int Tax Public Finance 19, 54–77 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-011-9171-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-011-9171-2