Abstract
We study fixation in large, but finite, populations with two types, and dynamics governed by birth-death processes. By considering a restricted class of such processes, which includes many of the evolutionary processes usually discussed in the literature, we derive a continuous approximation for the probability of fixation that is valid beyond the weak-selection (WS) limit. Indeed, in the derivation three regimes naturally appear: selection-driven, balanced, and quasi-neutral—the latter two require WS, while the former can appear with or without WS. From the continuous approximations, we then obtain asymptotic approximations for evolutionary dynamics with at most one equilibrium, in the selection-driven regime, that does not preclude a weak-selection regime. As an application, we study the fixation pattern when the infinite population limit has an interior evolutionary stable strategy (ESS): (1) we show that the fixation pattern for the Hawk and Dove game satisfies what we term the one-half law: if the ESS is outside a small interval around \({1}/{2}\), the fixation is of dominance type; (2) we also show that, outside of the weak-selection regime, the long-term dynamics of large populations can have very little resemblance to the infinite population case; in addition, we also present results for the case of two equilibria, and show that even when there is weak-selection the long-term dynamics can be dramatically different from the one predicted by the replicator dynamics. Finally, we present continuous restatements valid for large populations of two classical concepts naturally defined in the discrete case: (1) the definition of an \({\textsc {ESS}}_N\) strategy; (2) the definition of a risk-dominant strategy. We then present three applications of these restatements: (1) we obtain an asymptotic definition valid in the quasi-neutral regime that recovers both the one-third law under linear fitness and the generalised one-third law for \(d\)-player games; (2) we extend the ideas behind the (generalised) one-third law outside the quasi-neutral regime and, as a generalisation, we introduce the concept of critical-frequency; (3) we recover the classification of risk-dominant strategies for \(d\)-player games.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
First, observe that
Now we observe that
The last sum can be interpreted as a Riemann sum in two different ways: either as a right sum, or as a midpoint sum. The classical error bounds for the Riemann sums (Atkinson 1989; Stoer and Bulirsch 2002), are as follows:
for the right rule, and
for the midpoint rule, where
These bounds yield the following simple bounds:
for the former, whereas, in the latter, we have
In addition, we also have that
Combining these two results, we find that
where
and hence we have that \(\Vert R_1^0\Vert _\infty \) and \(\Vert R_2^0\Vert _\infty \) are bounded uniformly in \(N\). Recalling that
we then have that
Thus
where \(\bar{s}\) is any point where the global maximum of \({\fancyscript{F}}\) is attained, and \({\fancyscript{H}}(s)={\fancyscript{F}}(s)-{\fancyscript{F}}(\bar{s})\).
Let
Since \(\Vert {\fancyscript{G}}_N\Vert _\infty \le \varUpsilon _N\), we can find \(E_N(x)\), with \(\Vert E_N(x)\Vert _\infty \le \varUpsilon _N\), such that
Therefore, we have
with
where \(\bar{s}_j\in ({1}/{2N}+{(j-1)}/{N},{1}/{2N}+{j}/{N})\), and with \(m=\lfloor xN\rfloor \).
If we write
then, by combining all the previous calculations, we obtain the following approximation:
where
In addition, we have also used that
If \(\kappa _N^{-1}\) has a finite limit as \(N\rightarrow \infty \), then
Hence
For \(x>{1}/{N}\), since \(I_N(x)>I_N({1}/{N})\), we have
This proves Eq. (4).
For the remaining results, we first observe that an asymptotic argument using Watson’s lemma along the lines discussed in Sect. 4 and Appendix B yields
To bound \(R_N(x)\) we will need the following Lemma:
Lemma 1
If \(\kappa _N^{-1}\) is not bounded as \(N\rightarrow \infty \), then we have
Thus, we immediately obtain combining the asymptotic estimations together with the Lemma that:
Notice also that if \(\varPhi _N(x)\) is exponentially small then we must have \({\fancyscript{F}}(s)<0\), \(s\in (0,x)\). Hence we also have that \(\phi _N(x)\) is exponentially small and also \(R_N(x)\) is exponentially small. This proves Eq. (3).
To prove Eq. (5), notice that if \(\kappa _N^{-1}\) is not bounded, and if \(\phi _N(x)={1}/{N}\), then
Hence
Thus the continuous approximation can correctly identify the neutral boundary, provided \(\kappa _N={\mathrm {O}}\left( N^{\alpha }\right) \), with \(\alpha <{1}/{2}\), if \({\fancyscript{F}}\) is a boundary potential, or that evolution is in the moderate selection regime, if \({\fancyscript{F}}\) is an interior potential.
Proof
(Proof of the Lemma) We now observe that
where
with \(\hat{s}_j\in ({1}/{2N}+{(j-1)}/{N},{1}/{2N}+{j}/{N})\).
If \(\kappa _N^{-1}\) is bounded then, we can bound
Hence, we have that
Otherwise, if \(\kappa _N^{-1}\) is not bounded, we have the following bounds:
Indeed, if \({\fancyscript{F}}\) is a boundary potential, then we have either that \({\fancyscript{H}}(0)=0\) or that \({\fancyscript{H}}(1)=0\). We we will treat the former, the latter being similar. In this case, let \(s^*\) be the smallest interior global minimum, if it exists, or \(s^*=1\) if there is no interior global minimum. Then there exists \(\tilde{K}\) and \(0<\tilde{x}={m}/{N}<s^*\), such that
Then
If \({\fancyscript{F}}\) is an interior potential, let us write \(x^*\) for any of its interior maxima. Recall that, in this case, we have \(\theta (x^*)=0\) and \(\theta '(x^*)>0\). Let
We claim that \(\Vert J\Vert _\infty ={\mathrm {O}}\left( \kappa _N^{1/2}\right) \). To see this, let
and compute
Then \(\tilde{J}'(x)=0\) is equivalent to
Firstly, we observe that we are only interested in solutions close to \(x^*\), since \(\tilde{J}\) is exponentially small otherwise. An analysis of the magnitude of the terms in the previous equation, suggests that if \(\bar{x}\) is a solution, then \(|\theta (\bar{x})|={\mathrm {O}}\left( \kappa _N^{1/2}\right) \). Since this problem is a regular perturbation—but where we can not apply the implicit function theorem—we write
which yields the following equation for \(x_1\):
The solutions are
and it can be easily verified that two of these solutions correspond to local minima of \(\tilde{J}\) that are close to \(x^*\), while the two other correspond to local maxima. In any case, a direct computation yields
Hence
Also
Therefore, we have
and hence we conclude that
Since we can easily bound
we can conclude that
This yields the bounds on \({\fancyscript{R}}_N\). We now proceed to estimate
If \({\fancyscript{F}}\) is a boundary potential, we have that either \({\fancyscript{H}}(0)=0\) or \({\fancyscript{H}}(1)=0\), and hence
If \({\fancyscript{F}}\) is an interior potential, let us write
Then
Now notice that a solution \(L'(x)=0\) is given by \(\bar{x}=x^*+\kappa _N^{1/2} x_1\). Direct substitution in \(L\) then yields
Hence, we obtain that
Appendix B: Proof of the asymptotic results
Write Eq. (3) as
1.1 B.1: Dominance
For dominance of \({\mathbb {A}} \), we have \(\theta (x)>0\) in unit interval, and hence the argument of the exponential has a maximum at \(s=0\). Let \(s=\kappa z \). Then, using Laplace’s method (Hinch 1991; Bender and Orszag 1999), we find
Hence, we have
For dominance of \({\mathbb {B}} \), recall that we have \(\theta (x)<0\) throughout \([0,1]\). Hence. the argument in exponential will then have a maximum at \(s=1\). Thus, we write \(s=1-\kappa z\) and, analogously as before, we find
Hence, we find
1.2 B.2: Coexistence
In the case of coexistence, the fitness potential has a minimum at \(x=x^*\); hence we have no contribution from the interior. On the other hand, \(\theta \) is positive near \(s=0\) and negative near \(s=1\). Hence, the argument in the exponential has a maximum at both \(s=0\) and \(s=1\). Hence combining the previous calculations we find
If \({\fancyscript{F}}(1)\ll -\kappa \), then the second term of (19) is exponentially small, and hence we obtain once again (17). On the other hand, if \({\fancyscript{F}}(1)\gg \kappa \), the second term is then exponentially large, and in this case we obtain (18).
Otherwise, if \({\fancyscript{F}}(1)\sim \kappa \), let
We now have that (19) becomes
Also, we have
Therefore,
1.3 B.3: Coordination
For coordination, we have that the fitness potential has a maximum at \(x=x^*\). Hence, we write
Then, if we write
Hence we have that
Therefore, we find that
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 5
As before, we write
Write
and integrate to obtain:
where
which is order one. Notice that this will be also true for its derivatives.
Since \(H\) is \(C^3\) and \(H(0,\kappa )=\partial _xH(0,\kappa )=\partial _x^2H(0,\kappa )=0\), we can invoke Hadamard Lemma, cf. Bruce and Giblin (1992), and write
with \({\fancyscript{H}}\) being \(C^2\).
Hence, we have
where,
Since \(R(0;\kappa )=0\), a further application of Hadamard Lemma yields
with \({\mathfrak {R}}\) being \(C^2\).
Finally, observe that integration by parts imply that
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Chalub, F.A.C.C., Souza, M.O. Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem. J. Math. Biol. 72, 283–330 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-015-0889-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-015-0889-9