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A marriage matching function with flexible spillover and substitution patterns

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Abstract

This paper proposes a new and easy-to-estimate marriage matching function (MMF). I show under minimal conditions the existence of the equilibrium marriage matching distribution associated with the proposed MMF and provide testable conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. This MMF allows more flexible spillover and substitution patterns than the existing MMFs. I show that the static frictionless transferable utility (TU) matching model with peer effects and the dynamic (imperfect) TU marriage matching model both generate MMFs that are each a special case of this proposed MMF. Moreover, I show that the MMF generated by the dynamic TU marriage matching model \(\grave{a}\) la Choo (Econometrica 83(4): 1373–1423, 2015) can be rationalized by a static frictionless TU marriage matching model with peer effects. I show how the estimation of this MMF can be used to estimate peer effect coefficients in a marriage matching model.

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Notes

  1. A complete list of the seven axioms originally compiled by McFarland (1972) is provided in Appendix A.

  2. The Cobb–Douglas MMF takes the following form: \(\mu _{ij}=\mu _{i0}^{\alpha ^{ij}}\mu _{0j}^{\beta ^{ij}} e^{\gamma _{ij}}\), with \(\alpha ^{ij}, \beta ^{ij}>0\). Galichon et al. (2018) independently proposed another class, i.e., \(\mu _{ij}=g(\mu _{i0},\mu _{0j})\) such that \(g(a\mu _{i0},a\mu _{0j})=ag(\mu _{i0},\mu _{0j})\).

  3. I am referring here to the Schoen’s (1981) harmonic mean mating rule, i.e., \(\mu _{ij}=\alpha _{ij}\frac{m_if_j}{m_i+f_j}\) which imposes a zero spillover restriction.

  4. Pollard and Schoen MMF: \(\mu _{ij}=\frac{k_{ij}m_if_j}{\sum ^I_{k=1} \eta _{kj}m_k+\sum ^J_{l=1} \zeta _{il}f_l}\) where \(\eta _{kj}\) represents the attractiveness between a man of age k and a woman of age j (similarly for \(\zeta _{il}\)).

  5. The detailed derivations are available under requests.

  6. I have in mind the Choo and Siow (2006), Chiappori et al. (2017), Dagsvik (2000), Menzel (2015), Mourifié and Siow (2017), and Galichon et al. (2018) MMFs.

  7. Please refer to Victor Chernozhukov and Christian Hansen’s series of papers related to this subject.

  8. The appellation log odds is taken from Siow (2015).

  9. Notice that the independent Type 1 Extreme Value distribution imposed by Choo and Siow (2006), Dagsvik (2000), Menzel (2015), and Chiappori et al. (2017) exhibits all the IIA property.

  10. Notice that this reasoning is readily extendable to all other ordered characteristics, such as education level.

  11. This is even confirmed in their empirical application, please see Mourifié and Siow (2017, Table 4, column 2b).

  12. The excess demand is defined as the mass of type j women willing to match with type i men minus the mass of type i men willing to match with type j women

  13. It is also worth noting that unlike the general marriage matching model with peer effects I entertain here, the seminal peer effect specification introduced in Mourifié and Siow (2014; 2017) cannot rationalize the dynamic frictionless marriage matching model \(\grave{a}\) la Choo (2015).

  14. See also Liu et al. (2014) which discusses both aggregate and average models.

  15. Using this notation, we consider that if \(T_{ij}=1\), then the quantities \(\frac{1}{2}\sum ^{T_{ij}}_{k=1}(\beta (1-\theta ))^k \ln \frac{\mu _{i+k,0}}{m_{i+k}}\) and \(\frac{1}{2}\sum ^{T_{ij}}_{k=1}(\beta (1-\theta ))^k \ln \frac{\mu _{0,j+k}}{f_{j+k}}\) are both identically equal to 0.

  16. While I use here a very simple peer effects specification for illustration, notice that a more complex structure could also generate the Choo (2015) MMF. However, the mapping between Choo’s parameters and the peer effect coefficients will be different and more complicated.

  17. It is worth noting that the choice of the functional form is also important since it can generate different model predictions. It was convenient for me to enter the aggregate group or average group peer effect log-linear since my error term specification follows the Type I extreme value distribution. Using this functional form allows me to derive a simple closed analytical form for the MMF.

  18. Notice that since the state-year pair is considered to be an isolated market, we can also use as instrument for \(\ln \mu _{k0st}\) and \(\ln \mu _{0lst}\) the lagged populations supplies of an adjacent state \(s^*\) of s, i.e., \(\ln m_{ks^*,t-r}-\ln m_{ks^*,t-r-1}\) and \(\ln f_{ls^*,t-r}-\ln f_{ls^*,t-r-1}\), for \(r\ge 1\).

  19. Such variation has been exploited in previous research to study how changes in divorce laws (e.g., Wolfers 2006), changes in rules governing welfare receipts (e.g., Bitler et al. 2004), and minimum age-of-marriage laws (Dahl 2010) affect marital outcomes. Second, variations in sex ratio across state and time have also been used to study the effect of this variation on marital behavior as well as intrahousehold allocations (e.g., Kerwin and Luoh 2010; Mechoulan 2011; Chiappori et al. 2002).

  20. For the first period \(t=1990\) we make use of the population supplies of the 1980, and 1970 US census.

  21. It is worth noting that as proved in Appendix B the evidence of a dynamic component of the models implies the violation of the Galichon and Salanié (2015)’s restriction.

  22. Because each row contains multiple hypotheses testing, I need to ensure that the FWER is controlled at targeted levels. For this, I use the multiple testing procedure of Holm (1979).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge Aloysius Siow for his continued support. Some ideas in this paper were directly motivated from my discussions with him. I have greatly benefited from insightful comments received from Matt Shum. I am grateful to Victor Aguirregabiria, Alfred Galichon, Faisal Ibrahim, Daniel Indacochea, Sonia Jaffé, Marcin Peski, Thomas Russell, and anonymous referees for valuable discussions and comments. I benefited from discussions with participants at OTEAE in NYU. I thank Xiao Lu and Thomas Russell for excellent research assistance.

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Correspondence to Ismael Mourifié.

Appendices

Appendix A: A McFarland’s MMF axioms

I briefly enumerate here McFarland’s Axioms as presented in Pollard (1975).

  1. Axiom 1:

    The MMF should be defined for all vectors M and F whose elements are nonnegative integers.

  2. Axiom 2:

    \(\mu _{} \ge 0\) for all (ij). (The number of marriages occurring cannot be negative.)

  3. Axiom 3:

    \(\sum _{i=1} \mu _{ij} \le f_j\), and \(\sum _{j=1} \mu _{ij} \le m_i\). (The number of marriages cannot exceed the number of available females and males: Populations constraints.)

  4. Axiom 4:

    The number of marriages should depend heavily on the ages of the males and females. So, in partitioning the male and female components of the population into distinct categories by factors relevant to marriage analysis, at the very least, age must be recognized as an essential factor.

  5. Axiom 5:

    \(\mu _{ij}\) should be nondecreasing in \(m_i\) and \(f_j\). (Increased availability should not decrease the number of marriages.)

  6. Axiom 6:

    \(\mu _{ij}\) should be a nonincreasing function of \(m_k\) for \(k \ne i\), and over some interval strictly decreasing. Similarly for the other sex. (Competition.)

  7. Axiom 7:

    If the categories are ordered, the negative effect on \(\mu _{ij}\) of an increase in \(m_k\) should be greater in magnitude than the negative effect on \(\mu _{ij}\) of an equivalent increase in \(m_r\), if k is closer to i than r is. (Substitution axiom.)

Appendix B: Relaxing Galichon and Salanié (2015)’s restriction

Consider (Choo 2015’s) model with only two groups of individuals, i and \(i+1\) (young and old). In this simple example, the Choo MMF takes the following forms:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln \mu _{i+1,j+1}= & {} \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{i+1,0} + \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{0,j+1} + \gamma _{i+1,j+1},\\ \ln \mu _{i+1,j}= & {} \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{i+1,0} + \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{0j} + \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta ) \ln \frac{\mu _{0,j+1}}{f_{j+1}} + \gamma _{i+1,j}.\\ \ln \mu _{i,j+1}= & {} \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{i0} + \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{0,j+1} + \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln \frac{\mu _{i+1,0}}{m_{i+1}} + \gamma _{i,j+1}.\\ \ln \mu _{ij}= & {} \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{i0} + \frac{1}{2}\ln \mu _{0j} + \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln \frac{\mu _{i+1,0}}{m_{i+1}}\\&\quad + \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta ) \ln \frac{\mu _{0,j+1}}{f_{j+1}} + \gamma _{ij}. \end{aligned}$$

This can be rewritten as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma _{i+1,j+1}= & {} \ln \mu _{i+1,j+1}- \frac{1}{2}\ln (m_{i+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j}) \\&- \frac{1}{2}\ln (f_{j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i,j+1}),\\ \gamma _{i+1,j}= & {} \ln \mu _{i+1,j} - \frac{1}{2}\ln (m_{i+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j}) \\&- \frac{1}{2}\ln (f_j-\mu _{i+1,j}-\mu _{ij})+\frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln f_{j+1}\\&- \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln (f_{j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i,j+1}).\\ \gamma _{i,j+1}= & {} \ln \mu _{i,j+1} - \frac{1}{2}\ln (m_i-\mu _{i,j+1}-\mu _{ij}) \\&- \frac{1}{2}\ln (f_{j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i,j+1})+\frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln m_{i+1} \\&- \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln (m_{i+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j}).\\ \gamma _{ij}= & {} \ln \mu _{i,j} - \frac{1}{2}\ln (m_i-\mu _{i,j+1}-\mu _{ij}) \\&- \frac{1}{2}\ln (f_j-\mu _{i+1,j}-\mu _{ij})+\frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln (m_{i+1}f_{j+1}) \\&- \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\ln \Big ((m_{i+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j}) (f_{j+1}-\mu _{i+1,j+1}-\mu _{i,j+1}) \Big ). \end{aligned}$$

We then have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \gamma _{i+1,j+1}}{\partial \mu _{i+1,j}}= & {} \frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{\mu _{i+1,0}}; \; \; \;\; \frac{\partial \gamma _{i+1,j}}{\partial \mu _{i+1,j+1}}=\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{\mu _{i+1,0}} + \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\frac{1}{\mu _{i+1,0}}.\\ \frac{\partial \gamma _{i+1,j}}{\partial \mu _{i,j}}= & {} \frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{\mu _{0j}}; \; \; \;\; \frac{\partial \gamma _{i,j}}{\partial \mu _{i+1,j}}=\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{\mu _{0j}} + \frac{1}{2}\beta (1-\theta )\frac{1}{\mu _{i+1,0}}. \end{aligned}$$

Because the Galichon and Salanié (2015) restriction can equivalently be written as \( \frac{\partial \gamma _{kl}}{ \partial \mu _{ij}}= \frac{\partial \gamma _{ij} }{\partial \mu _{kl}}\), the above partial derivatives show that the Galichon and Salanié (2015) restriction is relaxed by the Choo (2015) MMF and therefore by the generalized Cobb–Douglas MMF as well. This implies that the Galichon and Salanié (2015) class do not cover the classes of behavioral matching models that can be rationalized by the generalized Cobb–Douglas.

Appendix C: Proof of the equilibrium existence

1.1 C.1 Proof of Theorem 1

Fixed-point representation of the existence of an equilibrium.

Manipulating the population constraints (9), (10) we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu _{i0}= & {} \frac{m_{i}}{1+\frac{1}{\mu _{i0}} \sum ^{J}_{j=1}g_{ij}(\mu _0;m,f)} \equiv B_{i0}, \quad 1\le i \le I \end{aligned}$$
(37)
$$\begin{aligned} \mu _{0j}= & {} \frac{f_{j}}{1+ \frac{1}{\mu _{0j}} \sum ^{I}_{i=1}g_{ij}(\mu _0;m,f)}\equiv B_{0j}, \quad 1\le j \le J. \end{aligned}$$
(38)

Let \(B(\mu _0; m, f) \equiv (B_{10}(.),\ldots ,B_{I0}(.),B_{01}(.),\ldots ,B_{0J} (.))^{\prime }\) where \(m \equiv (m_{1},\ldots ,m_{I})^{\prime }\), \(f \equiv (f_{1},\ldots ,f_{J})^{\prime } \). With this representation, showing the existence of an equilibrium matching distribution associated with the generalized MMF is equivalent to show that the mapping \(B(\mu _0; m, f)\) admits a fixed point. In other terms, there exists \(0<\mu _0^{eq} < (m',f')\) such that

$$\begin{aligned} B(\mu _0^{eq}; m, f)=\mu _0^{eq}. \end{aligned}$$
(39)
Step 0: :

Let \(\underline{\xi }^t=(\underline{\xi }_1^t,\ldots ,\underline{\xi }_{I+J}^t)\) and \({\overline{\xi }}^t=(\overline{\xi }_1^t,\ldots ,\overline{\xi }^t_{I+J})\) be vectors of arbitrarily small positive constants such that \(\underline{\xi }_i^t \le \mu _{i0} \le m_i-\overline{\xi }_i^t\) for \(1\le i \le I\) and \(\underline{\xi }_{I+j}^t \le \mu _{0j} \le f_j-\overline{\xi }_{I+j}^t\) for \(1\le j \le J\). And define, \(\mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }=\{\underline{\xi }_1\le \mu _{10}\le m_{1}-\overline{\xi }_1,\ldots ,\underline{\xi }_I \le \mu _{I0} \le m_{I}-\overline{\xi }_I, \underline{\xi }_{I+1} \le \mu _{01} \le f_{1}-\overline{\xi }_{I+1},\ldots ,\underline{\xi }_{I+J}\le \mu _{0J} \le f_{J} -\overline{\xi }_{I+J} \}\). Because \(g_{ij}(\mu _0;m,f)\) is a positive and continuous function, for all \(\mu \in \mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }\), there exists K a positive constant such that we have \(0<\frac{1}{\mu _{i0}} \sum ^{J}_{j=1}g_{ij}(\mu _0;m,f)<K <\infty \), and \(0<\frac{1}{\mu _{0j}} \sum ^{I}_{i=1}g_{ij}(\mu _0;m,f)<K <\infty \). Therefore, we have \(0< B_{i0}(\mu _0) <m_i\) for \(1\le i \le I\) and \(0< B_{0j}(\mu _0) <f_j\) for \(1\le i \le I\). Moreover, because \(B_{i0}(\mu _0)\), \(B_{0j}(\mu _0)\) are also continuous functions on a bounded set, there exist vectors of positive constants \(\underline{\eta }^t=(\underline{\eta }_1^t,\ldots ,\underline{\eta }_{I+J}^t)\) and \(\overline{\eta }^t=(\overline{\eta }_1^t,\ldots ,\overline{\eta }_{I+J}^t)\) such that \(\underline{\eta }_i^t \le B_{i0}(\mu _0) \le m_i-\overline{\eta }_i^t\) for \(1\le i \le I\) and \(\underline{\eta }_{I+j}^t \le B_{0j}(\mu _0) \le f_j-\overline{\eta }_{I+j}^t\) for \(1\le j \le J\). More precisely, just take \(\underline{\eta }_i^t=\inf _{\mu \in \mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }} B_{i0}(\mu _0)\), \(\underline{\eta }_{I+j}^t=\inf _{\mu \in \mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }} B_{0j}(\mu _0)\), and \(\overline{\eta }_i^t=m_i-\sup _{\mu \in \mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }} B_{i0}(\mu _0)\), \(\overline{\eta }_{I+j}^t=f_j-\sup _{\mu \in \mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }} B_{0j}(\mu _0)\). Notice that with this construction, \(\underline{\eta }_i^t>0, \underline{\eta }_{I+j}^t>0, \overline{\eta }_i^t>0, \overline{\eta }_{I+j}^t >0\), since \(0< B_{i0}(\mu _0) <m_i\) and \(0< B_{0j}(\mu _0) <f_j\) for all \(\mu \in \mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }\) where \(\mathbb {T}^t_{\xi }\) is a compact set.

Step 1: :

Define \(\underline{\xi }_i^{t+1}=\min (\underline{\xi }_i^{t}, \underline{\eta }_i^t)\) for \(1\le i \le I+J\) and \(\overline{\xi }_i^{t+1}=\min (\overline{\xi }_i^t, \overline{\eta }_i^t)\) for \(1\le i \le I+J\).

Step 2: :

If \(\underline{\xi }_i^{t+1}= \underline{\xi }_i^t\) and \(\overline{\xi }_i^{t+1}=\overline{\xi }_i^t\) then stop the iteration and define \(\underline{\epsilon }_i= \underline{\xi }_i^{t+1}\), \(\overline{\epsilon }_i=\overline{\xi }_i^{t+1}\).

Step 3: :

If \(\underline{\xi }_i^{t+1}\ne \underline{\xi }_i^t\) or \(\overline{\xi }_i^{t+1}\ne \overline{\xi }_i^t\) then \(t \leftarrow t+1\) and go back to step 0.

By construction \(\underline{\xi }_i^{t}\) and \(\overline{\xi }_i^{t}\) are decreasing (strictly) positive sequences bounded away from below by 0 then converge. So, when the iteration will stop in Step 2, let \(\mathbb {T}_{\epsilon }=\{\underline{\epsilon }_1\le \mu _{10}\le m_{1}-\overline{\epsilon }_1,\ldots ,\underline{\epsilon }_I \le \mu _{I0} \le m_{I}-\overline{\epsilon }_I, \underline{\epsilon }_{I+1} \le \mu _{01} \le f_{1}-\overline{\epsilon }_{I+1},\ldots ,\underline{\epsilon }_{I+J}\le \mu _{0J} \le f_{J} -\overline{\epsilon }_{I+J} \}\) be a closed and bounded rectangular region in \(\mathbb {R}^{I+J}\).

\(B(\mu _0; m, f)\) is a continuously differentiable mapping such that \(B(\mu _0; m, f)\): \(\mathbb {T}_{\epsilon } \rightarrow \mathbb {T}_{\epsilon }\). Thus, the existence of an equilibrium matching distribution \(\mu ^{eq}\) associated with the generalized MMF exists by invoking the Brouwer fixed-point theorem.

1.2 C.2 Proof of Theorem 2

The existence of the equilibrium is already ensured by Theorem 1. Following Gale and Nikaido (1965)’s result, we know that the equilibrium is unique if the determinant of the Jacobian of \({\mathscr {G}}(.)\) is a P-matrix for all \(0<\mu ^{eq} \le (m',f')'\). However, this condition is generally difficult to verify in practice. However, a direct implication of Lemma 1 is that the Jacobian of \({\mathscr {G}}(.)\) is a P-matrix if the Jacobian \(J(\mu )\) or its transpose \(J^t(\mu )\) is positive diagonally dominant for all \(0<\mu \le (m',f')'.\) One can check that under condition (1) and (2) of Theorem 2, \(J^t(\mu )\) is a positive diagonally dominant matrix by just taking the special case of the definition where \(d_1=d_2=\cdots =d_n=1\). This completes the proof.

Appendix D: Tables

See Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Table 1 First-stage regressions for each endogenous variable (columns) used in the IV regression displays in Table 3
Table 2 First-stage regressions for each endogenous variable (columns) used in the IV regression displays in Table 4
Table 3 IV estimates of the generalized Cobb–Douglas MMF coefficients with the 2 closest age groups as reference group
Table 4 IV estimates of the generalized Cobb–Douglas MMF coefficients using the nearest age groups as reference group
Table 5 Numbers of matched and unmatched males and females by age types
Table 6 Numbers of matched and unmatched males and females by education level types

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Mourifié, I. A marriage matching function with flexible spillover and substitution patterns. Econ Theory 67, 421–461 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1148-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1148-2

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