Abstract
For environmental protection, innovation in products and processes is often seen as the ideal solution. Contributing to economic activity while being ‘environmentally friendly’, it tends to have the favour of all, notably industry and governments. This paper takes the question of environmental protection from another angle and claims that it mainly relies on other kinds of tools than technical innovation—namely compensation schemes, norms, spatial zoning, Environmental Impact Assessments, economic instruments, management techniques, audits, lifecycle analysis, labels, etc. These tools are political, economic and legal in nature and they aim at controlling technical progress and its unwanted, negative side effects. Considering day-to-day usages of these tools, how they are concretely deployed, the compromises that define them, and the actors who mobilize them, it leads to an image that is less optimistic than the one often associated with innovation and green technologies. What it shows is the gap between claims and results, and the fact that these tools do not lead to serious reductions of environmental problems—the key reason being the unwillingness to alter growth and development, to transform our modes of production and our ways of life.
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Notes
- 1.
The way these markets of pollution rights were named varied over time and a detailed study of these nominations (depending on people and institutions) would be most instructive. Here are some quick examples. Economist Kolm used the crudest vocabulary and talked about ‘un droit à nuire’ in 1974. Economists Pearce in 1976, and Barde in 1977 talk about ‘the sell of pollution rights’; in 1981, a report on ‘experiences’ developed in the United States mention ‘marketable rights and banking’, ‘transferable rights’ and ‘marketable permits’; OECD 1985 talks of ‘market creation’ (‘artificial markets can be created where actors might buy “rights” for actual or potential pollutions or where they can sell their “pollution rights”’, p 15); in 1985, Tietenberg talks of ‘emissions trading’, as did OECD in 1989; in 1991 Barde talks about ‘permis négociables’ and OECD of ‘marketable permits’; in 2001 OECD talks about ‘transferable permits’; and in 2007 OECD uses ‘price-based instruments (e.g. taxes)’ and ‘quantity-based instruments (e.g. a ‘cap and trade’ permit system)’ (p 215). Apparently, euphemism has been on the rise.
- 2.
On the place of criminal organizations, http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2010/06/04/l’environnement-a-rapporte-20-5-milliards-d-euros-a-la-mafia-italienne-en-2009_1368086_3214.html.
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Pestre, D. (2019). Environment and Social Innovation: Why Technology Never Was the Solution. In: Lechevalier, S. (eds) Innovation Beyond Technology. Creative Economy. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9053-1_8
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