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Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Among Three Players with Incomplete Information

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Game Theory and Applications (China GTA 2016, China-Dutch GTA 2016)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 758))

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Abstract

The tripartite bargaining problem of mutual deterrence has been investigated from the perspective of Rubinstein indefinite bargaining and cooperative game theory. Considering the situation of incomplete information in reality, this paper established a tripartite mutual deterrence bargaining model with unilateral and bilateral incomplete information by introducing incomplete information into the model and defining a discount factor. And particularly, the formula is furnished for calculating the Nash equilibrium distribution of every player under the incomplete information. Finally, an illustrative example is presented to show that the established model is feasible and effective and can provide a new way and method to analyze and solve multi mutual deterrence or conflict problems with incomplete information.

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the Key Project of Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 71231003).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, China

    Yan Xiao & Deng-Feng Li

Authors
  1. Yan Xiao
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  2. Deng-Feng Li
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Correspondence to Deng-Feng Li .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, Fujian, China

    Deng-Feng Li

  2. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Xiao-Guang Yang

  3. University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

    Marc Uetz

  4. Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, China

    Gen-Jiu Xu

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Xiao, Y., Li, DF. (2017). Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Among Three Players with Incomplete Information. In: Li, DF., Yang, XG., Uetz, M., Xu, GJ. (eds) Game Theory and Applications. China GTA China-Dutch GTA 2016 2016. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 758. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6753-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6753-2_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-6752-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-6753-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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