Abstract
In this chapter, we look at the revenues and expenditures for postsecondary institutions. As in prior chapters, we begin this chapter by providing some background information on the early work that economists have done to examine organizational finances, and its eventual application to colleges and universities. We then turn to the ways in which economists analyze revenues for organizations, and how this relates to the revenues that are received by colleges and universities. Building on Chap. 5, we highlight the important role that subsidies play in funding the operations of institutions of higher education. From there, we examine the expenditure side of the ledger and how economists look at the cost structure for organizations and how this relates to colleges and universities. In the extension to this model, we focus on how some institutions assign revenues and costs to academic units within the institution using what is referred to as a decentralized budgeting process. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a policy discussion of decisions to close or merge postsecondary institutions and the connection to finances.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Throughout this chapter, we use the terms “expenditure” and “cost” interchangeably to refer to the monies spent by postsecondary institutions for the delivery of services. These terms should not be confused with the costs/expenditures incurred by students and their families to go to college, nor the cost/expenditures of federal and state governments to help support higher education.
- 3.
Early discussions of supply can be found in the work of Adam Smith (1776). Cournot (1838) is credited with being the first to introduce a supply curve to represent the schedule of quantities of output that would be supplied at different prices. The supply curve was later enhanced by Rau (1841) and most notably Mangoldt (1863). An excellent analysis of the history of supply curves can be found in Humphrey (1996).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Among the first economic studies of the non-profit sector was the Newhouse’s (1969) study of hospitals. Additional studies of note in the economic literature on not-for-profit organizations include Hansmann (1987), Weisbrod (2009), James (1983), Steinberg and Gray (1993), P. Hall (1987), Steinberg (2003), and Easley and O’Hara (1983).
- 7.
Details on the 2005 Carnegie classifications of postsecondary institution can be found at http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/resources/.
- 8.
A complicating factor in pinning down the total amount paid by students and their families is that they pay directly for services through their tuition and fees, and also indirectly as taxpayers whose payments are used by governments to support postsecondary education. They may also make charitable donations to the institution, and consume other postsecondary services.
- 9.
Of course there are exceptions to this rule. Some companies in the for-profit world receive subsidies from the government, for example, as a means to help make them more competitive with international competitors (e.g., automakers) or to ensure the survival of the industry.
- 10.
The reporting standards for public institutions are determined by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB, http://www.gasb.org), and the standards for private institutions are under the jurisdiction of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, http://www.fasb.org). Institutions are required to report financial data by designated categories to the federal government annually through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). Details on the revenue categories can be found at: http://www.nces.ed.gov/IPEDS/.
- 11.
Many studies in economics and political science rely on the median voter model to explain legislative behavior (see, for example, Comanor, 1976; Ahmed & Greene, 2000; Holcombe, 1989). Median voter theory posits that legislators vote in accordance with the preferences of the average, or median, voter within their jurisdiction. The model can be traced back to the work of Hotelling (1929), Black (1948), and Downs (1957). Studies of the median voter model applied to education include Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Lovell (1978), Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982), Holcombe (1980), Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998), and Corcoran and Evans (2010). Alternatively, some researchers have relied on competing interest group theory (G. Becker, 1983, 1985) to explain how the size of groups such as senior citizens and corrections have a disproportionate influence on the behavior of legislators.
- 12.
Much of the literature on charitable giving has focused on whether public subsidies discourage or crowd out private giving to organizations. Studies of note that have examined the determinants of donations include Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), Okten and Weisbrod (2000), Payne (2001), Cheslock and Gianneschi (2008), Gottfried (2008), and Heutel (2014).
- 13.
Source: Digest of Education Statistics 2012, Table 411.
- 14.
Brown, Dimmock, and Weisbenner (2015) studied the effects of both supply-side and demand-side factors on charitable donations to institutions of higher education. In addition, their study focused on the years before and during the Great Recession of the late 2000s. As part of their study, they examined the effects of the business cycle and fluctuations in the health of the economy on charitable donations to institutions of higher education.
- 15.
- 16.
The Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) was developed by Ken Halstead as a way to track changes in the cost of delivering higher education services (Halstead, 1991). The HEPI is based on the average prices in a market basket of goods and services that are typically purchased by institutions of higher education each year. Some of the items in the market basket are personnel compensation, fringe benefits, utilities, supplies and materials, contracted services such as data processing, library acquisitions, and other items purchased for current operations. The index is explained and maintained by the Commonfund Institute (https://www.commonfund.org/CommonfundInstitute/HEPI/Pages/default.aspx).
- 17.
The cost disease argument can be traced back to Baumol and W. Bowen (1966). They initially applied the idea to a string quartet, arguing that the production of this service requires a certain amount of labor inputs for which substitutes cannot be easily found. In subsequent work, Baumol and others have applied this notion to education and debated whether or not it is appropriate (Baumol & Blackman, 1995; Baumol, 1996; W. Bowen, 2013; Cowen, 1996; Wellman, 2010; Martin, 2011).
- 18.
Technically, the “not-for-profit” status of an institution means that the college or university may not distribute excess revenues to shareholders as a for-profit firm or organization would do (Hansmann, 1986). There are other reasons why revenues may exceed expenditures for not-for-profit institutions. The expenditures reported to the federal government through the annual IPEDS collection rely on GASB reporting rules, which may not cover all relevant spending in a given year. Other expenses and revenues may be carried over from one year to the next, which adds additional variation to reported financial data.
- 19.
More detailed descriptions of the various expenditure categories can be found on the NCES website for IPEDS.
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
In the translog production function (see, for example deGroot, McMahon, & Volkwein, 1991), the log of total cost is regressed against the log of outputs, log of squared outputs, and the interactions of log of outputs with each other.
- 23.
The flexible fixed cost function draws on the pioneering work of Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982). Studies of note that have used this approach in higher education applications include Cohn, Rhine, and Santos (1989), Koshal and Koshal (1995, 1999), and Laband and Lentz (2003). Interestingly, some of the flexible fixed cost studies that have received attention in the literature (e.g., Cohn et al., 1989; Koshal & Koshal, 1999; Laband & Lentz, 2003; Sav, 2004) used a quadratic total cost function. As noted by Laband and Lentz (2004, p.434): “To represent the classic textbook cost function that can show (dis)economies of scale, we estimated a total cost function that included squared and cubic measures of the three outputs in the model.” Other studies of note include Getz, Siegfried, and Zhang (1991), James (1978), and Lenton (2008).
- 24.
These relationships have been consistently demonstrated by economists as a result of estimating cost functions, as described in a previous section of this chapter. For example, Paulsen (1989) estimated the coefficients of instructional cost functions for small private, not-for-profit colleges, finding that many of these same factors create differences in instructional costs even at small private colleges. More specifically, results indicated that instructional costs were greater for upper-level undergraduates compared to lower-level undergraduates, for graduate students relative to undergraduate students; and instructional costs were directly affected by differences in faculty salaries as well as differences in student-faculty ratios.
- 25.
- 26.
Indiana University is often credited with being the first public institution to adopt a decentralized budgeting approach (Whalen, 1991). Other academics who have contributed to the study and analysis of decentralized budgeting systems include Brinkman (1993), Priest, Becker, Hossler, and St. John (2002), Strauss and Curry (2002), Strauss, Curry, and Whalen (1996), Toutkoushian and Danielson (2002), Hearn, Lewis, Kallsen, Holdsworth, and Jones (2006), Massy (1996), and Lopez (2006).
- 27.
- 28.
The survey was conducted by Inside Higher Education and can be downloaded from their website at https://www.insidehighered.com/system/files/media/IHE_Business%20Officers_Survey%202015%20final.pdf
- 29.
See the NCES report by Ginder, Kelly-Reid, and Mann (2015) for more details and statistics.
- 30.
Studies of note on the factors that influence campus closings include Hoenack and Roemer (1981) and Porter and Ramirez (2009). A list of college closings in recent years can be found at http://www.ehow.com/info_7965391_list-closed-universities.html.
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Glossary
Glossary
Symbol | Definition |
---|---|
TR | Total revenue |
P k | Price of k-th higher education output |
Q k | Quantity of k-th higher education output |
G | Government subsidy to higher education |
AR | Average revenue |
MR | Marginal revenue |
\( \overline{P} \) | Average price |
\( \pi /Q \) | Profit per unit of output |
TC | Total cost |
FC | Fixed cost |
VC | Variable cost |
AC | Average cost |
AFC | Average fixed cost |
AVC | Average variable cost |
MC | Marginal cost |
f(), g() | Functions |
X | Non-output variables that affect average cost |
Z | Non-output variables that affect total cost |
AIC | Average increment in total cost |
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Toutkoushian, R.K., Paulsen, M.B. (2016). Higher Education Revenues and Expenditures. In: Economics of Higher Education. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7506-9_7
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