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Interests, Information, and Incentives in Higher Education: Principal-Agent Theory and Its Potential Applications to the Study of Higher Education Governance

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Higher Education

Part of the book series: Handbook of Theory and Research ((HATR,volume 23))

In recent years, a handful of scholars have begun to focus on the role of individual and organizational interests, information flows, and incentives in higher education administration and governance, particularly in the realm of public institutions. These scholars ground their work on assumptions derived from the principal-agent framework, a theoretical perspective that views relationships from a contractual paradigm wherein a principal actor or organization contracts with an agent to carry out certain functions. The framework allows for analysis of how structures impact the agent’s willingness and/or ability to fulfill the contracted obligations. This chapter explores the economic and political assumptions of the principal-agent framework and introduces scholars to its utility for understanding how governance and policy making operates in the postsecondary setting. Further, the chapter provides insights as to how the principal-agent framework can help reframe and extend current practical and scholarly conceptions of postsecondary governance and policy decisions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Educational Administration and Policy Studies, University at Albany, USA

    Jason E. Lane

  2. Department of Management Studies, University of Tampere, Finland

    Jussi A. Kivisto

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  1. University of Memphis, USA

    John C. Smart

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Lane, J.E., Kivisto, J.A. (2008). Interests, Information, and Incentives in Higher Education: Principal-Agent Theory and Its Potential Applications to the Study of Higher Education Governance. In: Smart, J.C. (eds) Higher Education. Handbook of Theory and Research, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6959-8_5

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