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Reasons for the Current Failure of the European Union as an International Security Actor

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Global Power Europe - Vol. 1

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Abstract

Even if the Lisbon Treaty tried to boost the EU’s international tools as a security actor, the outcome of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is discouraging: from the Libya crisis to the problems of agreeing on the European Defense Agency (EDA) budget, from a continuous lack of technical and operational capabilities to the role played individually by some member states (member states). Instead of promoting an active and strong international actor, we face the apparent decline of an international security actor in the making.

The thesis of this research is that there are two groups of negative variables: the lack of resources and the confusion concerning a vision about the exact position for the EU in the international arena. This paper will focus on the lack of institutional, economic, political and strategic resources.

The framework for our analysis is the international paradigm change and the upheaval in the distribution of global power. The Union finds itself bewildered and unable to take a position on the axis of world power, or stakes in the field of global dominance. Instead, member states show their reluctance to increase resources for the EU—or a disoriented CDSP. Yet, strengthening the CSDP would be a necessary approach for the EU to adapt to the current international environment, utilizing its specific civilian and military capacities to address its myriad security concerns.

Evaluating the outcome of the Common Security and Defence Policy today can be discouraging, as the results are not the ones intended by the reforms introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon (Howorth 2007): disappointments span from the Libya crisis to the problems of agreeing on the EDA budget, and from a continuous lack of capabilities to the role played individually by some member states (Lancaster agreement, Franco-German axis, national business with defence industry). In fact, only one new EU operation has been deployed since 2009 (with two ready for launch), compared with twenty-three from 2003 to 2008. In sum, instead of promoting an active and strong international actor, we face the apparent decline of an international security actor in the making.

Our analytic approach, more than strictly theoretical, will be political and strategic. As the logical consequence of exogenous forces, most notably the diminishing relative military significance attached by the United States (US) to European security, the CSDP should be promoted as a way for European countries to improve their own security—and then their power, and as a way to adapt to the current international environment, so different from the one existing when the CSDP started. Today it seems clear from the facts described below, as well as the economic weakness of member states, that the defense of Europe needs a European defense, the CSDP (Perruche 2012). If CFSP changes its aims, ambitions and capabilities, it will imply a change in the European Security Strategy too.

If there is a possibility to escape from the grim situation described, it should start by a clear analysis of the negative variables influencing the EU’s current defense position. A critical assessment of the achievements and the current weaknesses should be the starting point to overcome the paralysis. According to our thesis, we can summarize these negative variables in two groups: the lack of resources, and the confusion concerning the exact position the EU should strive for in international arena.

Head of the Research Group Global Governance and European Union, funded by Gobierno de Aragón, Spain.

Natividad FERNÁNDEZ SOLA is professor of International Law and International Relations, as well as Jean Monnet professor, at the University of Zaragoza; during 2011–2012, Visiting professor at the European Studies Institute in Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) and currently Visiting Professor at the State University Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

Main research interest: Common Security and Defense Policy, European External Action Service, Non Proliferation and Disarmament, Transatlantic Relations, International Conflicts, Security Strategy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    During the G.W. Bush administration, the US changed its traditional strategic approach based on Mahan theory on maritime power (Mahan, A. The Interest of America in Sea-Power. Sampson. London 1898, The Problem of Asia. Sampson. London. 1900), to the concept of heartland (Mackinder), applied in Af-Pak conflict. However, both theories find some common point to explain US foreign policy in Central Asia (See García Cantalapiedra, David (2009), “U.S. Strategic Policy in Caucasus and Central Asia: Geopolitics and US Strategic Policy in the 21st Century”, in Tomasz Gacek and Jadwiga Pstrusińska (eds.), Proceedings of the Nineth Conference of the European Society for Central Asian Studies: Cambridge Scholars Publishing).

  2. 2.

    The same geopolitical priority seems to govern Russian foreign policy, its promotion of Siberia and its Far East and the promotion of Asian Fora and trade exchanges with Asian countries. (“Russia and the changing world”, Russian Prime Minister and Presidential candidate Vladimir Putin, Moskovskiye Novosti, 27/2/2012; statement on Foreign Policy Priorities)

  3. 3.

    In May, NATO announced its plan to upgrade the US’s estimated 180 tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe and to replace them with precision-guided weapons that would be carried by US F35 strike aircraft. According to European media, it is unnecessary, expensive and likely to exacerbate already difficult relations with Russia; NATO States are fully secure without this additional capability and should be focused on removing all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, not on modernizing them. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/11/nato-nuclear-weapons-upgrade. Accessed 07 July 2012.

  4. 4.

    Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministries in Phnom Penh, July 2012. Comments in Kommersant, July 11, 2012, p. 6.

  5. 5.

    Tashkent withdrew from CSTO in 1999 and came back in 2006 after pushing US to close military bases in the country, which supported logistically the antiterrorist mission in Afghanistan (2001). The return to the Organization took place after the bloody repression of a popular movement in Andizhan (Fergana Valley). On 28 June 2012, Uzbekistan suspended CSTO membership.

  6. 6.

    While “Kemalism” tended to laicism and the westernization of the country, AKP policies go back to a certain “Otomanism” with Islam as a “flag”.

  7. 7.

    There are currently 14 missions ongoing. The mission in South Sudan is completely civilian. EUCAP Sahel, in Niger, is be a civilian CSDP mission with important gendarmerie component and two militaries; to be launched on July. EUCAP Nestor is a civilian regional maritime capacity building mission assisting States in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, including Somalia, to improve their judicial and legal systems (the suggested police mission off the Somaliland and Puntland coasts was not approved by the moment). EUTM Mali, is military training mission is ready for deployment.

  8. 8.

    Following the Capability Development Plan, European Defense R&T Strategy, European Defense Technological and Industrial base Strategy and European Armaments Cooperation Strategy were approved.

  9. 9.

    NATO Smart Defence initiative, overlaps, in some way to EU pooling & sharing initiative.

  10. 10.

    Lancaster agreements between UK and France are paradigmatic, but also there are bilateral agreements between Belgium and the Netherlands, between Germany and Italy or between France and Germany. The existence of these frameworks is damaging EDA as projects such as the one on anti-submarine mines, are being developed outside the Agency, bilaterally or through the OCCAR.

  11. 11.

    Cieza González, A., Introduction, European Defence Agency: Past, Present & Future, Ministerio de Defensa—CESEDEN 2010, p. 18.

  12. 12.

    In 2012, there were voices in favor of the rotation system to be scaled down as no member state had volunteered to take care of a battle group in the second half of the year.

  13. 13.

    Italy, Finland and Ireland offered to take the lead on each of these projects. The Netherlands, France and Germany announced they would cooperate to lead the work on air-to-air refueling together with the EDA for a globally increased European capacity. See the EDA website, http://www.eda.europa.eu/news/12-04-20/EU_defence_ministers_discuss_Pooling_Sharing_in_the_long_term

  14. 14.

    The Code of Conduct on P&S presented in November 2012 aims to mainstreaming P&S in Member States planning and decision-making processes, but recognizes that the main role remain at the hands of member states.

  15. 15.

    Gross, “The EU and the Comprehensive Approach”.

  16. 16.

    Quille et al., “Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination”.

  17. 17.

    We want to underline that, in our opinion, the concept of “neutrality” it is not appropriate here, in the context of an attack against an allied state, but only with reference to international conflicts in which a state decide to keep outside giving its constitutional neutral status.

  18. 18.

    Factors blocking Europe’s defence ambitions, Europes World, 2011, p. 42.

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Sola, N.F. (2013). Reasons for the Current Failure of the European Union as an International Security Actor. In: Boening, A., Kremer, JF., van Loon, A. (eds) Global Power Europe - Vol. 1. Global Power Shift. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32412-3_5

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