Abstract
Who governs democratic regimes? The empirical analyses presented in this book provides a fairly clear answer to the question we raised in this book. The cabinets of these countries are composed by a majority of party-men and party-women, but also by a significant proportion of non-partisan technocrats. The recruitment of ministers is thus far more varied than the party government model expected.
The limited ability of contemporary party leadership to provide a sufficiently strong pool of qualified personnel to face the challenges of policy-making and the search by strong monocratic heads of the executive for competent and personally loyal ministers are probably the two factors which, combined, provide the best explanation. To some extent the phenomenon is due to long-term processes of change, but short-term critical episodes can significantly enhance these effects. If we want to understand the composition of cabinets the party government model is not sufficient anymore. It must be complemented with other models based on different political criteria. This obviously raises serious questions about the outcomes of this situation and about its potential impact upon the quality of democracy.
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Cotta, M. (2018). Technocratic Government Versus Party Government? Non-partisan Ministers and the Changing Parameters of Political Leadership in European Democracies. In: Costa Pinto, A., Cotta, M., Tavares de Almeida, P. (eds) Technocratic Ministers and Political Leadership in European Democracies. Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62313-9_10
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