Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

When are technocratic cabinets formed?

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Comparative European Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

This article provides first systematic quantitative insights into the patterns of the occurrence of technocratic cabinets (TCs) in all European countries. Using an original dataset, we identify the broad structural factors and the immediate political conditions that increase the probability that TCs, as opposed to partisan cabinets, are formed. The dataset covers all the 53 TCs in 36 European countries in years 1989–2015 and a random sample of 104 political cabinets in the same period. We find that TCs are more likely to occur in political systems not trusted by the citizens and in systems with poor economic performance. TCs are also systematically more likely to occur when the previous cabinet was dismissed by the president or when it fell due to a political scandal. Contrary to our initial expectations, TCs appear to be more likely in countries with institutionally weaker presidents, other things equal.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Source: own calculations

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. After the acceptance of this article for publication in CEP, we were made aware of a recent article by Wratil and Pastorella (2018) with a very similar research question and quantitative empirical design. The texts differ to some extent in several regards. Theoretically, Wratil and Pastorella’s text is explicitly constructed around a model of the behaviour of a potential government ‘formateur’ and focuses on crisis moments as the key explanatory driver of TC formation. In terms of data coverage, Wratil and Pastorella study 29 EU countries (without Croatia, plus Norway and Iceland) in period 1977–2013, identifying in total 25 TCs. The texts also differently operationalize the explanatory factors. In spite of that, they reach, in our perspective, compatible and mutually supportive conclusions.

  2. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of CEP for pointing to us the relevance of, specifically, trust in political parties as an important factor to consider in our analysis.

  3. The president, whose popular mandate is more recent (‘fresher’) than that of the parliament, enjoys the electoral legitimacy.

  4. We would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing to us the theoretical relevance of these two control variables.

  5. The on-line appendix is available also at http://www.michalparizek.eu/data.html.

  6. The term founding elections describes the first competitive multiparty elections, following the transition to democracy (Bogdanor 1993; O'Donnell et al. 1986: 61). For established long-term democracies, the first elections after the end of the WW2 are considered.

  7. Question “trstprt” in ESS waves of ESS2-2004 to ESS7-2014. For earlier years (before 2004), we use the data for the closest year, i.e. 2004 (ESS2). In the odd years in the period we always use the previous year, e.g. for year 2005 we impute the values for year 2004.

  8. Once again, we owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

  9. The last category of ‘other’ causes for the fall of the previous cabinet serves as the baseline category, against which we consider the effects of the other dummy variables.

References

  • Bergman, T., et al. 2015. Government formation and breakdown in Western and Central-Eastern Europe. Comparative European Politics 13(3): 345–375.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogdanor, V. 1993. Founding elections and regime change. Electoral Studies 9(4): 288–294.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brunclík, M. 2015. The rise of technocratic cabinets—What we know, and what we should like to know. Austrian Journal of Political Science 44(3): 1–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brunclík, M. 2016. Three technocratic cabinets in the Czech Republic: A symptom of party failure? Politics in Central Europe 12(2): 7–28.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ceka, B. 2013. The perils of political competition: Explaining participation and trust in political parties in Eastern Europe. Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1610–1635.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chang, E.C., and Y. Chu. 2006. Corruption and trust: Exceptionalism in Asian democracies? Journal of Politics 68(2): 259–271.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cochrane, J. 1967. Mexico’s new Científicos: The Díaz Ordaz cabinet. Inter-American Economic Affairs 21(1): 61–72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cotta, M., and L. Verzichelli. 2003. Ministers in Italy: Notables, party men, technocrats and media men. In Who Governs Southern Europe?: Regime change and ministerial recruitment, 1850–2000, ed. P.T. De Almeida, et al., 109–142. London: Frank Cass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dalton, R.J., and S. Weldon. 2007. Partisanship and party system institutionalization. Party Politics 13(2): 179–196.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, M. 1978. Echec au roi. Paris: Albin Michel.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Social Survey. 2017. European social survey—Data and documentation. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/. Accessed 13 July 2017.

  • Grofman, B., and P. Roozendaal. 1997. Modelling cabinet durability and termination. British Journal of Political Science 27(3): 419–451.

    Google Scholar 

  • Havlík, V., and Stanley, B. 2015. New populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Non-ideological or centrist? In Paper presented at the conference solving the puzzles of populism, London: Brigham Young University.

  • Herman, V., and J. Pope. 1973. Minority governments in western democracies. British Journal of Political Science 3(2): 191–212.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hloušek, V., and L. Kopeček. 2014. Caretaker governments in Czech Politics: What to do about a government crisis. Europe-Asia Studies 66(8): 1323–1349.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hooghe, M., and E. Quintelier. 2014. Political participation in European countries: The effect of authoritarian rule, corruption, lack of good governance and economic downturn. Comparative European Politics 12(2): 209–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huntington, S.P. 1991. Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy 2(2): 12–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • King, G., and L. Zeng. 2001a. Logistic regression in rare events data. Political Analysis 9(2): 137–163.

    Google Scholar 

  • King, G., and L. Zeng. 2001b. Explaining rare events in international relations. International Organization 55(3): 693–715.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. 1984. Measures of cabinet durability: A conceptual and empirical evaluation. Comparative Political Studies 17(2): 265–279.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. 1999. Patterns of democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mainwaring, S., and M. Torcal. 2006. Party system institutionalization and party system theory after the third wave of democratization. In Handbook of party politics, ed. W. Crotty and R. Katz, 204–227. London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mair, P. 1997. Party system change: Approaches and interpretations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marangoni, F. 2012. Technocrats in Government: The composition and legislative initiatives of the Monti government eight months into its term of office. Bulletin of Italian Politics 4(1): 135–149.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marangoni, F., and L. Verzichelli. 2015. From a technocratic solution to a fragile grand coalition: The Impact of the economic crisis on parliamentary government in Italy. The Journal of Legislative Studies 21(1): 35–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDonnell, D., and M. Valbruzzi. 2014. Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments. European Journal of Political Research 53(4): 654–671.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neto, O.A., and K. Strøm. 2006. Breaking the parliamentary chain of delegation: Presidents and non-partisan cabinet members in European democracies. British Journal of Political Science 36(4): 619–643.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Donnell, G., et al. 1986. Transitions from authoritarian rule: Southern Europe. Baltimore: JHU Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parties & Elections in Europe. 2017. Parties & Elections. http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/. Accessed 30 Nov 2016.

  • Pasquino, G., and M. Valbruzzi. 2012. Non-partisan governments Italian-style: Decision-making and accountability. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 17(5): 612–629.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pastorella, G. 2013. Technocratic governments during the Eurocrisis: Nothing new under the sun? In Paper presented at Thesesus Ph.D. Workshop, 21–22 May, Paris, France.

  • Pastorella, G. 2014. Why have technocrats been appointed to govern European democracies? In Paper presented at the UACES general conference panel: Public opinion, representation and citizenship: Political parties, distrust, and compliance. Cork, September 2014.

  • Pastorella, G. 2016. Technocratic governments in Europe: Getting the critique right. Political Studies 64(4): 948–965.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pederzoli, P., and C. Guarnieri. 1997. Italy: A case of judicial democracy? International Social Science Journal 49(152): 253–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • Protsyk, O. 2005. Prime Ministers’ identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes. European Journal of Political Research 44(5): 721–748.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rae, D. 1968. A note on the fractionalization of some European party systems. Comparative Political Studies 1 (3): 413–418.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rothstein, B., and E.M. Uslaner. 2005. All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. World Politics 58(1): 41–72.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schleiter, P. 2013. Democracy, authoritarianism, and ministerial selection in Russia: How presidential preferences shape technocratic cabinets. Post-Soviet Affairs 29(1): 31–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schudson, M. 2006. The trouble with experts - and why democracies need them. Theory and Society 35(5/6): 491–506.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seligson, M.A. 2002. The impact of corruption on regime legitimacy: A comparative study of four Latin American countries. The Journal of Politics 64(2): 408–433.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, K. 2003. Parliamentary democracy and delegation. In Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies, ed. K. Strøm, et al., 55–108. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strøm, K., et al. (eds.). 2008. Cabinets and coalition bargaining: The democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tavits, M. 2013. Post-communist democracies and party organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tucker, A., et al. 2000. From republican virtue to technology of political power: Three episodes of Czech nonpolitical politics. Political Science Quarterly 115(3): 421–445.

    Google Scholar 

  • Verzichelli, L., and Cotta, M. 2012. Technicians, technical government and non-partisan ministers. The Italian experience. In Paper presented at IPSA XXII Congress, Madrid, July 2012 Panel: Experts and non-partisan ministers in European democracies.

  • World Bank. 2015a. World data bank: Worldwide governance indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=Worldwide-Governance-Indicators. Accessed 7 December 2015.

  • World Bank. 2015b. World data bank: GDP growth (annual %). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=2. Accessed 13 November 2015.

  • Wratil, C., and G. Pastorella. 2018. Dodging the bullet: How crises trigger technocrat-led governments. European Journal of Political Research 57(2): 450–472.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zulianello, M. 2013. When political parties decided not to govern. Party strategies and the winners and losers of the Monti Technocratic government. Contemporary Italian Politics 5(3): 244–261.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Miloš Brunclík would like to acknowledge the support from the Charles University Research Development Scheme “Progres”, programme Q17—Social Sciences: from multi-disciplinarity to interdisciplinarity. Michal Parízek would like to acknowledge the support from the Czech Science Foundation Grant 17-10543S “Global bureaucracy: The politics of international organizations staffing”.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, U Krize 8, 158 00, Prague 5, Czech Republic

    Miloš Brunclík & Michal Parízek

Authors
  1. Miloš Brunclík
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Michal Parízek
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Miloš Brunclík.

Electronic supplementary material

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Brunclík, M., Parízek, M. When are technocratic cabinets formed?. Comp Eur Polit 17, 759–777 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0124-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-018-0124-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation