Abstract
Prior to the 2008 publication of Dignitas personae [DP] most ethical analyses of embryo adoption consisted in debates regarding the intrinsic morality of heterologous embryo transfer [HET]. Once DP spoke to the issue, interpretive disagreements arose. We classify the literature into three types of interpretations of DP: Inherent Wrongness Arguments, Inextricably Implicated Arguments, and Limited Permissibility Arguments. We argue against the first two types of interpretations of DP and interpret DP in keeping with what we refer to as Limited Permissibility Arguments. We demonstrate the possibility of morally pursuing embryo adoption [EA], showing both that it is not excluded by DP and that it is grounded in the moral and social teaching of the Church. We conclude not only that EA is a defensible option for “spare” frozen embryos under the terms of DP, but also that it is the only morally praiseworthy option for the disposition of frozen embryos under specific conditions. We argue that HET is morally praiseworthy when undertaken by married couples with the vocation for parenthood who intend to respond to the needs of vulnerable humans by welcoming embryos regardless of quality after thawing and who act in solidarity with both the commissioning parents of the embryos and with the embryos. We secure our argument through a preliminary discussion of the theology of adoption, the scripturally warranted call to Christian stewardship and two principles of Catholic Social Teaching: the preferential option for the poor and vulnerable and solidarity.
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Notes
- 1.
Material in this section first appeared in Brakman and Weaver (2007b).
- 2.
We use the term “commissioning couple” here because not all embryos are created from the couple’s own egg and sperm. Donor gametes are also used to create embryos for couples as well as for single individuals utilizing assisted reproductive technology .
- 3.
To date, these options have not been the main focus of moral debate and we will not engage them in this essay.
- 4.
- 5.
Other than attempted implantation in the woman who commissioned the existence of the embryos.
- 6.
In the Latin version of DP the phrase is “non alias ac.” See http://www.vatican.va//roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_dignitas-personae_lt.html. Accessed 23 May 2016.
- 7.
Oleson (2009a, b) and Patterson (2015) stand apart in the literature, arguing that DP clearly and explicitly opposes HET. They use a relatively new term against its moral permissibility: “artificial impregnation,” appearing to force the similarity of EA with “artificial reproductive technology” in general. We note impregnation itself would not be artificial as the embryo implants itself through natural processes; it is the insertion which may perhaps be described as “artificial.”
- 8.
Indeed, the worry about causing scandal proved justified a year later when Timothy Murphy (2011, p. 868) noted in the secular medical literature that the CDF missed an important opportunity to explain its reasoning: “It is hard to see why this option should be ruled out of bounds since the rescue of a human life is about as momentous a reason as can ever be offered as the justification for a choice.”
- 9.
An exception is Furton (2010), who changed his mind.
- 10.
This material from Brakman (2007b, p. 121).
- 11.
Premise 1 may be an issue to consider in the future for those who are interested in pursuing whether there is a different moral evaluation between embryo rescue and embryo adoption in the Catholic tradition. However, to date, arguments against embryo adoption have not focused on premise 1.
- 12.
We note that the Church has issued clear negative statements about technological interventions in the past—say, about IVF and surrogacy . The fact that DP does not do likewise in the case of HET seems unlikely to be the result of disagreements among scholars who are faithful to magisterial teaching, but rather because an in-principled comprehensive argument is not available. We conclude that DP’s reticence to clearly and definitely rule out EA leaves the decision to pursue it to pastoral dialogue and judgments of conscience in particular circumstances (cf. Grabowski and Gross 2010; Tollefsen 2010; Mayer 2011.)
- 13.
Labor-based accounts make sense for why motherhood through surrogacy is in fact motherhood and not properly described as “gestational carrier.” As such, to become with child for the express purpose of fracturing the genetic or biological bonds with a child is to act counter to the dignity of the child and oneself. It is not an expression of love but of treating a child as a product. In EA, a couple is responding to the needs of the most vulnerable of children, a being who already exists. Through the labor of her pregnancy, meant to promote the dignity of the child and oneself through lovingly welcoming the child, a mother becomes with her child. In traditional adoption, a woman becomes a mother through the labor of caring for and sacrificing for a child. It is the total self-giving on all aspects of human activity that establishes parenthood (Brakman 2014).
- 14.
Cf. Brakman (2007b, p. 121). In addition, moral consideration of EA largely takes the form of natural law analyses that are either Thomistic or are deeply indebted to John Paul II’s theology of the body . Our own “limited permissibility interpretation” in favor of EA exhibits features of natural law ethics in its attentiveness to experience.
- 15.
We recognize other principles may be relevant for an exhaustive presentation of the kind of Limited Permissibility Argument we are defending here; however, this is an initial presentation.
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Brakman, SV., Weaver, D.F. (2017). Embryo Adoption Before and After Dignitas personae: Defending an Argument of Limited Permissibility. In: Eberl, J. (eds) Contemporary Controversies in Catholic Bioethics. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 127. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55766-3_12
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