Abstract
Formal verification of safety-critical systems is crucial for demonstrating their safety to the certification bodies. In particular, the railway network validation requires rigorous analyses and the use of formal methods to meet railway standards. This student paper outlines objectives and the current progress of the work on verification of complex railway networks consisting of the areas with different signalling and interlocking.
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Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the RSSB SafeCap+ project. We are grateful to our colleagues from Siemens Rail Automation for invaluable feedback.
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Stankaitis, P., Iliasov, A. (2016). Safety Verification of Heterogeneous Railway Networks. In: Lecomte, T., Pinger, R., Romanovsky, A. (eds) Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification. RSSRail 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9707. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33951-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33951-1_11
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