Abstract
The symmetry principle is a central tenet of science studies, but clear statements of the principle are hard to find. A standard formulation is that true and false beliefs should be explained in the same way. This claim is multiply and harmfully ambiguous. The aim of this paper is to identify the main ambiguities and defend a more precise version of the symmetry principle. I argue that the principle should refer to types of cause not causes in general, that the relevant types are rational and irrational causes not social and non-social ones, that true and false beliefs should be explained impartially not identically, and that impartiality does not imply a ban on truth as an explanation of belief. The symmetry principle that emerges from these choices is that historians should not assume in advance of historical inquiry that true beliefs are best explained rationally and that false beliefs are best explained irrationally. I argue that this principle does what all symmetry principles should do: it is conducive to good historical writing, protects us from a genuine threat, makes room for the sociology of true beliefs, does not cast doubt on legitimate projects such as internal history of science, and does not commit us to controversial philosophical positions such as skepticism about present-day scientific theories.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. Barnes (1972), esp. pp. 376, 378.
- 2.
- 3.
Laudan (1981b, p. 178) makes the same point about philosophers of science.
- 4.
- 5.
Some would add a third option, which is to formulate the symmetry principle without reference to the “social”, the “rational”, or related concepts. Latour (1993, pp. 91–97) seems to take this option.
- 6.
- 7.
Of course, this caution also applies to the rival claim that the social rather than the rational has been the main bone of contention.
- 8.
“Regardless of whether the sociologist evaluates a belief as true or rational, or as false and irrational, he must search for the causes of its credibility” (Barnes and Bloor 1982, p. 23).
- 9.
Here “impartially” means simply “without bias,” and is unrelated to Bloor’s principle of “impartiality” (on the latter see above, Sect. 2.2).
- 10.
Cf. Laudan (1981b, p. 191).
- 11.
On the history of dubious interpretations of the Quine-Duhem thesis, see Zammito (2004, pp. 17–25, 148, 150, 159, 163, 173, 180).
- 12.
- 13.
On Colombe’s view on the moon, see e.g. Heilbron (2010, pp. 172–73).
- 14.
- 15.
In this I agree with Bricmont and Sokal (2001a, pp. 38–43), though my reasons are not identical to theirs.
- 16.
There are other promising approaches. One is to distinguish between live scientific debates, where many relevant experts disagree on a question, and settled debates, in which there is a wide though not universal consensus on the question. Here I focus on the restrictive/pessimistic distinction in order to show the importance of that distinction.
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Bycroft, M. (2016). How to Save the Symmetry Principle. In: Sauer, T., Scholl, R. (eds) The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 319. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30229-4_2
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