Abstract
The notion of strategic maneuvering, introduced by van Eemeren and Houtlosser, is basically an analytic concept enabling a more refined, accurate and comprehensive account of ‘argumentative reality’ than can be achieved by means of the existing, purely dialectical tools of canonical, standard pragma-dialectics.
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Notes
- 1.
For our use of the terms effectiveness and persuasiveness and our use of the terms rationality and reasonableness, see van Eemeren (2010, 39 and 29), respectively.
- 2.
With the exception of the logical variant of the ad consequentiam fallacy, all differences in reasonableness between a particular fallacy and its non-fallacious counterpart are statistically significant—ordinary arguers not very often regard the reductio ad absurdum as a type of sound argumentation, just as they hardly see that the fallacy that copies this sound argumentation (namely the logical variant of the argumentum ad consequentiam) is an obvious fallacy. In some cases in Table 41.1 no effect size is reported—in those cases ES could not be computed, due to the specific characteristics of the chosen design. Moreover, from the data presented in Table 41.1 (and equally in Table 41.2) one may not infer that fallacies such as the tu quoque-variant are regarded as reasonable moves. In Table 41.1 we abstracted from the specific discussion context in which the fallacies were offered to the participants, but in a scientific discussion context the tu quoque fallacy is invariably judged as an unreasonable move.
- 3.
Notice that there is an enormous range in the judged unreasonableness of the various fallacies: the physical variant of the argumentum ad baculum, for example, is regarded as an absolute unreasonable move, while the tu quoque variant of the ad hominem fallacy tends to be considered as a reasonable move (provided we abstract from the specific discussion contexts in which this fallacy was presented). Such data make sense: threatening the other party in the discussion with brute physical violence is the example par excellence of irrational, unreasonable behavior, while committing a tu quoque fallacy has at least in some discussion contexts the appearance of being reasonable. Serious participants in a conversation may be expected to show some consistency between their (past and present) words and deeds.
References
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van Eemeren, F. H., & Houtlosser, P. (2002a). And always the twain shall meet. In F. H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), Dialectic and rhetoric: The warp and woof of argumentation analysis (pp. 3–11). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B., Meuffels, B. (2015). The Extended Pragma-Dialectical Argumentation Theory Empirically Interpreted. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_41
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