Abstract
Raimo Tuomela’s we-mode groups are partly characterized by norms. Some norms may be characteristic of all we-mode groups like the norm restricting a member’s right to leave the group. Some think that this aspect of Tuomela’s theory has implausible ethical implications concerning the rights and autonomy of members in we-mode groups. That worry vanishes, I argue, on a plausible interpretation of Tuomela’s notion of social normativity and a reasonable precisification of the notion of autonomy in this context. On the other hand, Tuomela’s general silence on the nature of moral normativity makes it unclear how his distinction between social and moral normativity should be drawn more precisely. Is this a difference in kind, or merely a difference in the scope or social basis of the norms in question? I find this worth exploring with the aid of resources available within a broadly Tuomelian framework. Like Jeremy Koons (2019), I believe that Tuomela’s framework could be used to refine Wilfrid Sellars theory of ethical judgments as expressions of we-intentions. My preferred interpretation of Tuomela differs from Koons’ though, and so does the resulting reconstruction of Sellars, which is more Humean than Kantian.
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Notes
- 1.
It may be a slight exaggeration to say that Tuomela´s theory has no ethical implications, or that Tuomela completely refrains from claims about ethical, or for that matter political, norms. For instance, he says the following. “A liberal communitarianism (which the present theory is compatible with) enriched by the conceptual tools and theses of this book might result in a normative political doctrine contributing to ‘saving the world’” (Tuomela 2013, p. 17). But I think that it is fair to say that while Tuomela sometimes makes tentative ethical claims from the perspective of his social ontology, he mostly leaves it to others to develop them.
- 2.
“Given this prominence of practical philosophical concerns and the rich body of work Sellars produced on practical philosophical issues, it is surprising that the steep uptick in Sellars scholarship in the last two decades did until now almost completely bypass Sellars’ practical philosophy” (Loeffler 2020, p. 114).
- 3.
In the conventional use of the term “mode” about attitudes, a mode is what makes an intentional state the kind of state that it is. Hoping that P, wondering whether P, believing that P are different modes of attitudes with the same content. The term mode is therefore a bit unfortunate in the present context, because the we-mode/I-mode distinction is supposed to cut across the modes in the conventional sense. The we-mode is not supposed to be a distinct attitudinal mode on a par with beliefs and desires. (Schmid 2017) I think that the term “perspective” would be less likely to create misunderstandings. My preferred version of this idea of a we-perspective starts from the assumption that some intentional states are self- and agent-referential. That is, if we want to give an analysis, in terms of success conditions, of the kind of state that it is, this analysis must include a reference to the state itself and its bearer. My intention to raise my arm is only successful if I raise my arm by way of this very intention, and “I perceive this flower” is only veridical if the flower causes my perception. But arguably (John Searle, Kirk Ludwig and others think otherwise) the flower’s causal relation to me is not part of the content of my perception—what I perceive is the flower and what I intend is to raise my arm. The intentional subject of the perception is instead a perspectival feature of the intentional state. The idea is that the intentional subject, the perspective from which a certain content is conceived, can be a 1st person plural perspective, although the ontological subject—the bearer of the intentional state—is a single individual. (Just as the perspective of some types of intentional states need not be “here and now”). (Petersson 2014, 2017)
- 4.
I believe I got some support for this strategy when I questioned some of these analyses in a panel debate with Tuomela, where one of his responses to me was that the passages that I had read as strict conceptual analyses were not meant to be read in that strict way. (ENSO IV, Palermo 2015)
- 5.
A related issue is whether the account presupposes consensus, or even requires conformism, about moral evaluations. It would reach too far to deal with this issue here, but as Sellars says, “An individual can have an intention of intersubjective form even if no one else in point of fact shares it” (Sellars 1967, quoted by Koons 2019, p. 93).
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Acknowledgements
One of the last times I saw Raimo Tuomela was at Social Ontology 2018, where he noticed me across the room at a big reception and rapidly approached me, shadow boxing towards me because of something I had written that he disagreed with. He was in a good mood and wanted me to come to Helsinki to discuss the matter but sadly we never found the time. I am very grateful to Raimo, for his works, for fun and useful conversations at various ISOS events over the years, and for taking the initiative in the International Social Ontology Society to let me host ENSO V in Lund 2017.
Versions of this paper have been presented at Social Ontology 2021, San Diego (online) and at the Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy in Lund. I am grateful to both audiences for helpful comments and criticisms. Special thanks to Olle Blomberg, Mattias Gunnemyr, and Arto Laitinen.
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Petersson, B. (2023). Group Morality and Moral Groups: Ethical Aspects of the Tuomelian We-Mode. In: Garcia-Godinez, M., Mellin, R. (eds) Tuomela on Sociality. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_10
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