Abstract
In addition to having unidimensional preferences, PIEs also require preferences to be static because dynamic preferences affect the dimensionality of legislative preferences (Poole and Rosenthal (1997) Congr Pres). Dynamic preferences are similar to multidimensional preferences where the salience of different dimensions varies across time (Nokken and Poole (2004) Legis Stud Q 29(4):545–568)?. If preferences are dynamic, then, this would also provide evidence against a PIE explanation for legislative stability in Paraguay because it would imply that preferences are multidimensional across time. In this chapter I pool all roll-call voting behavior for the entire 1993–2023 period, and I estimate static, global preferences using W-NOMINATE. Then, I estimate dynamic, yearly preferences using time-modeling procedures such as DW-NOMINATE or independent procedures such as subsetted W-NOMINATE. I then compare yearly estimates to global estimates. If preferences are static, we would expect high levels of concordance between global and yearly estimates (Poole (2007) Pub Choice 131:435–451). However, in Paraguay we find that in certain periods preferences change substantially even within legislative periods. The dynamic preferences revealed in this chapter are also incompatible with a PIE explanation for legislative stability in Paraguay.
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Notes
- 1.
Each legislative year ranges from July 1 to June 30 of the following year.
- 2.
- 3.
Notice that the initials of this movement match the initials of Horacio Cartes.
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Carrizosa, A. (2023). Preference-Induced Equilibriums II: Electoral Incentives Promote Chaos. In: Skewing Chaos. Springer Series in Electoral Politics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18625-7_4
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