Science as a Profession: And Its Responsibility

Abstract

Scientific responsibility has changed with the successful professionalization of science. Today, science is a privileged profession, one with a (tacit) management mandate for systematic knowledge acquisition. Within this framework, science acts with responsibility. This chapter reflects the responsibility of science in the German context. After Wold War 2, the extraordinary responsibility of scientists, which C.F. von Weizsäcker emphasized, referred to a specific phase in the institutional development of science, termed scientism (“science justifies society,” science as religion), and corresponded to an elite responsibility. Today, one responsibility of science as a profession is to safeguard and develop scientific standards. This also concerns, on the one hand, the self-organization and control of science as a profession and, on the other hand, the communication of science to society. As a professional scientist, one has two responsibilities, the commitments to good science (professional ethics plus co-responsibility for the development of science as a profession) and civic responsibility. Due to their special knowledge, the civic responsibility of the scientist differs from that of other professionals. This chapter introduces science as a profession and presents an integrative notion of responsibility, also shedding light on the social responsibility of science.

Introduction: Knowledge Is Power?

In April 1957, a group of 18 scientists published the Göttingen Declaration, which expressly opposed plans for nuclear armament in the Federal Republic of Germany. The declaration cited the enormous risks associated with nuclear weapons and “the responsibility for the possible consequences” that scientists must bear in this context. Among the signatories were several Nobel Laureates such as Otto Hahn and Werner Heisenberg. The declaration had a lasting effect by leading the public debate. Göttingen was intentionally chosen in reference to the protest of the Göttingen Seven from 1837. Seven Göttingen professors, including the Brothers Grimm, had protested against the abolition of the liberal state constitution. The king dismissed the professors, but the protest had set a lasting sign for political development.¹

A parallel could be seen today in the discussion on climate change. Here, too, scientific research has fired up a public debate, even though the culpability of science in the development of the problem is limited and consists of the general interaction of science with industrialization. A major distinction from the discussion on nuclear weapons is that the discussion on the scientific side cannot be tied to specific names. Rather, it is an institution close to science—the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)²—that has driven the translation of science into politics and alerted the global public. This is an example of scientific responsibility as corporate responsibility. The IPCC forms global teams of researchers in compiling its reports and attempts to achieve consensus within the scientific community.

The thesis presented herein is that: The question of responsibility has changed with the successful professionalization of science; science has acquired self-control as a profession. The professionalization was sustained by an enormous expansion of science, as can be seen from the number of universities and professorships. While in 1950 there were approximately 5500 full-time professorships in West Germany, by 1995 there were already about 34,000 (an increase of more than 500%). For the reunified Germany this number rose again from 37,672 in 1995 to 47,568 in 2017 (an increase of about 26%).³ With professionalization, many (but not all) ethical questions in science are brought up for discussion and regulation within the profession and translated into guidelines for good practice. This is more successful in central sectors of the scientific community, such as universities, than in industrial laboratories. It also succeeds better in subject areas whose progress depends on scientific and technical methods (for example in human genetics) than in open fields such as IT development, which are less dependent on professionalized science.

The phrase “Knowledge is power” is commonly attributed to Francis Bacon (1561–1626). Because of the power that knowledge represents, science should assume corresponding responsibility. Knowledge as power has always applied to all areas of life, from warfare and corporate governance to educational issues. Knowledge is not a privilege of science. Science, on the other hand, has professionalized (and largely monopolized) the systematic acquisition of knowledge. The professionalization of science means a certain relief for the individual for the sake of specialization. Today, one does not need to be a hero in order to do science; it is enough to have qualifications. Then the old legal principle “ultra posse nemo obligatur” applies: no person can be obliged to do more than they are able to do. The relief of the individual is accompanied by a new responsibility of science as a profession. This will be examined in more detail in the following sections.

Science as a Profession

Today, science is a privileged profession and first and foremost responsible within this framework. The privilege of science consists of its autonomy as a profession, i.e., a right to self-organization.⁴ Science shares this privilege with other professions such as medicine and architecture. In Germany, one expression of the self-organization of science is the DFG, the German Research Foundation.⁵ The DFG receives state funding with which it supports research projects, and organizes itself in line with the university subjects. A general autonomy—which would amount to a certain degree of self-sufficiency—is not close. For science, at least as far as the universities as the central expert organizations are concerned, is dependent on state support.

A prerequisite for autonomy is the authority to evaluate performance. What qualifies as good science is defined by science itself. Science has a monopoly over its own performance evaluation and quality definition. For this purpose, the peer review process has become established in the scientific community. A scientific contribution—be it an article or a project—is evaluated by at least two experts in the field. Science as a profession is almost as old as architecture. In a way, science has always been there. Aristotle systematized science and can be considered the first scientist. However, a real version as a profession—a social closure—occurred only much later, in the nineteenth century for architecture, in the twentieth century for science.

Science is a special profession,⁶ if only because one can still rightly ask whether it is a unified profession at all, because science breaks down into disciplines. Moreover, through the universities, it carries out subcontracting work for other professions, such as doctors or architects. Rudolf Stichweh depicted the productive relationship between discipline and profession⁷: Medicine exists as a scientific discipline; its task is to develop the scientific foundations and provide appropriate training. On the other hand, there is the medical profession; it comprises the practicing medical profession, whether in individual practices or clinics. This division of tasks between discipline and profession is obvious and would also fit lawyers, with the law as the discipline, and with advocacy and judges as their applied, professional side. However, what about other subjects, such as physics or philosophy? In those fields, independently practicing philosophers or physicists are the exception.

A strong indicator of professionalization is the formation of associations.⁸ In subjects that have both a strong scientific and practical side, there are usually two associations, one for research and one for practice. In psychology, for example, we find the DGPs (German Psychological Society, founded in 1904) as a scientific society and the BDP (German Association of Psychologists, founded in 1946) as a professional association. As mentioned above, there is a lobbying body for science as a whole, the DFG, which absorbs changes in subjects and disciplines.⁹ The professional exchange relevant for research is carried out through the scientific societies (e.g., DGPs for psychology). In contrast to the Hartmannbund, i.e., the German Professional Association of Doctors, or the BDP, i.e., the German professional association of psychologists, the DFG is not a professional association in the classic sense, and one cannot become a member as an individual researcher. In addition to the transfer of research funds, the DFG limits itself to one core task of professional self-organization: the definition of quality standards for science.

The final professionalization of science only took place in the last decades of the twentieth century. This delay was due less to organizational weakness than to its social, even ideological strength.¹⁰ In the twentieth century, science often served as a potential state religion or at least as a vehicle for justifying politics, in the USA as well as under National Socialism in Germany and Soviet Communism. Science was elitist. The turnaround was triggered by the crises that began after 1970. The oil crisis of 1973 made it clear that science-based, determinant planning was not possible. The world turned out to be more complex, more unpredictable than could be grasped through science. Nevertheless, scientific methods had proved indispensable for industrial innovation. In the case of engineering, chemistry, and medicine, this had long been known. What was new was that some, inevitably, applied science to fields far removed from the natural sciences (such as market research) that produced practical success. After the Second World War, science of all kinds was increasingly in demand by international institutions such as the OECD and WHO. Research on national innovation systems, which was funded under the aegis of the OECD, made it clear that national growth—measured by GDP—is linked to investment in research and development. The lever was now no longer in the direct application, the transfer, of science to politics and business, but in the promotion of the scientific system as a whole. The resurgence of globalization and digitalization since 1990 has finally put science on the path to professionalization. Science has always been global but, with the Internet, science in particular achieved a completely new acceleration and expansion potential.

Professionalization is expressed in social closure. A profession internalizes the discussion and processing competition for problems of a certain type. Medicine offers a vivid example. Many tasks that are now taken for granted as part of medicine previously lay in other areas of responsibility, for example, the internment and treatment of the mentally ill (psychiatry) or dental treatment. Even the treatment of external wounds was once not part of a doctor’s role. Over the years, more and more tasks have been successfully internalized, as has the professional competition. If the competition once took place between medicine and other professions, such as barbers (once responsible for wound and dental treatment), this is now shifting to medicine itself as internal competition between medical specialists.

Such closure processes are never finished; the treatment of moral questions shows this. Each profession develops a code of professional conduct. The Hippocratic Oath of the medical profession is quite old. Corresponding ethical codes for science were not established until long after the Second World War. The example of psychology shows how dynamic are professional codes of ethics. The first code of the American Psychology Association (APA) was created in 1953.¹¹ A revision seemed necessary in 1973, which was preceded by 7 years of discussion,¹² not least in response to the Milgram experiments (concerning obedience to authority figures, in which participants incorrectly believed that they were subjecting test subjects to electric shocks). A further revision took place a few years ago, when it became clear that APA psychologists were being employed to refine torture methods at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp. It is important to note the role of internalization: ethical questions confronting science as a whole are converted into rules of conduct for individual scientists.

Responsibility and Science in Former Times: From (Paid) Hobby to Scientism

People have always conducted research. The observation of nature and meteorological phenomena has probably always been important, at least since the beginning of agriculture and human settlement. Science as a systematic of research and its knowledge has existed in our civilization since the times of Greek antiquity. But if scientists have existed almost as long as doctors and architects, science has long been a non-plannable profession, unlike craftsman, mercenary, or nun. One became a scientist through a self-chosen secondary occupation, often in the service of the church or in the leisure time available to the nobility (the gentleman scientist). Notable examples were the busy judge Pierre de Fermat (1607–1665), who in his free time formulated groundbreaking propositions and riddles of mathematics; the farmer Johann Georg Palitzsch (1723–1788), who undertook astronomical research and was the first to observe the return of Halley’s Comet; and the nobleman Sir Henry Cavendish (1731–1810), who secretly conducted physical experiments and, for example, discovered the element hydrogen. In the late Middle Ages and early modern times, scientists were also employed at royal courts, even for astrological advice. Science for purposes of war was always in demand. Archimedes (287–212 BC) not only described the laws of leverage, but also invented catapults to repel enemy ships. Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), the great universal scholar, sought support and employment with the promise of inventing new types of weapons.

For a long time, science was left to self-selection. Only a few had the talent and opportunity to devote themselves to science. This only changed with the beginning of modern times. Francis Bacon (1561–1626) exemplifies this new beginning. He vehemently advocated the experiment as a means of science. This was new insofar as science in the sense of Aristotle was understood as the observation of nature, paradigmatically implemented in astronomy. Experimenting, on the other hand, meant controlled change. Not only that: according to Bacon, science should serve progress. This gave science its own responsibility.

The twinning of science and progress determined the development of science until the twentieth century. Industrialization was accompanied by an upswing in science. The rise of the German chemical industry is symbolic of this, going hand in hand with the upswing in chemical science and producing global corporations such as Bayer and BASF. The Nobel Prize¹³ in Chemistry, which has been awarded since 1901, went to a German researcher every second time during its early years. Scientific research was institutionally anchored in the newly established Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, founded in 1911, today known as the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (Max Planck Society). Science gained a new, prominent position and thus also responsibility—the responsibility of an elite. For science was still not really understood as a profession, but rather as the pursuit of excellence. The success of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft was also based on this. Harnack, its first president, had introduced a principle named after him: An institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was not conceived as an institution with specialist research tasks; it was not about a task, but about a person. The principle was that a researcher received generous funds to be able to build an institute for their research. The idea of the social positioning of science still concerned not the profession but rather the vocation.

While the German term for a scientist, “Wissenschaftler,” was still based on a nineteenth-century feuilletonistic joke title, science took an elitist turn in the twentieth century. Science became a substitute religion, scientism, and took on a state-defining function. The National Socialists (with the support of the DFG) were able to rely on science, as was the Soviet Union, and the USA long equated democracy with science.¹⁴ And everywhere this means progress at the same time. C.F. von Weizsäcker’s appeal to the responsibility of science belongs in this context. It is an elite responsibility, shaped by expectations of technology and planning. Science explores spaces of possibility. According to C.F. von Weizsäcker, the scientific elite had to limit these spaces. However, scientism also always means the possibility of national appropriation, right up to the idea of a specifically National Socialist or Soviet ‘science.’

The inner professional principle of science has always contradicted national appropriation, namely to exchange information and thus create transparency. National borders do not play a role here. The requirement to publish corresponds to an inner necessity of science: only what has been made known to colleagues counts. The discovery of nuclear fission became a globally conscious possibility for the construction of atomic weapons through its scientifically inevitable publication by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in January 1939. We can’t really stop science, but we can guide it and create framework conditions. This applies both to nuclear research and to modern medicine.

The fact that science is now professionalized has to do with the work of two other players, the universities and industry. Even though many famous scientists taught at universities, the symbiosis of university and science, as we know it today, is not yet old. Historically, universities are autonomous educational institutions. The university defines itself through the community of teachers and learners, professors, and students. For centuries, research has taken place outside universities, e.g., in academies or privately. The modern research university is an invention of the early nineteenth century that was successfully exported from Germany to the USA. The expansion of the university sector—academization—has created new opportunities. Both profit from the connection between university and science. For science, the universities offer employment with sufficient professional freedom; in turn, the universities gain legitimacy and reputation through science.

No less important is the role of industry, where there is a constant demand for cutting-edge science as a means of competitive advantage. In Germany, the bulk of investment in research and development comes from industry.¹⁵ The uptake of science by university and industry naturally has its price: in academic it is the obligation to teach; in industry it is marketability. Industry has become the hoard of scientific technology visions that were once nurtured by governments. This includes the great pioneering visions, for example in space travel, as well as the mechanization of entire living environments, for example as a smart city. Here, industry benefits from the success of scientifically supported market and advertising research. For industry, science itself is a marketable vision. In the slipstream of this new demand and challenges from universities and industry, science has become more professional.

Two Individual Responsibilities of Science: Professional Ethos and Civic Responsibility

In 1957, shortly after the Göttingen Declaration, C.F. von Weizsäcker gave a lecture for student bodies on the “Responsibility of Science in the Atomic Age.” He saw the responsibility of science within the framework of the intertwining of science and technology, which he discussed under the title “Plan und Mensch” (“Plan and Man”): “If it is romantic to want to throw off technology, it is conversely childish to do everything that is technically possible.”¹⁶ He demanded in particular that we do not dismiss the opportunity for reflection. Our responsibility in the technical world therefore means at least: we must learn to remain human in the midst of planning and apparatuses. Or: “Correct, responsible planning and technology have distance from the apparatus.”¹⁷ In this way responsibility—according to C.F. von Weizsäcker—can become concrete. With regard to the Göttingen Declaration, he explained: “We had to turn to where we have a direct civic responsibility, namely to our own country…”¹⁸ The responsibility to which C.F. von Weizsäcker appeals here is civic, and the contact is with the state. The obligation of science associated with this is supererogatory, i.e., it goes beyond what is normally expected.¹⁹ The exemplary responsibility achieved by the Göttingen Declaration is ultimately the responsibility of the elite.

For scientists today, there are two kinds of responsibility (see Fig. 4.1). On the one hand, the commitment to the ethos, which is based on the scientific, professional role and is therefore coupled with the co-responsibility for science as a profession (not least in order to further develop the ethos). On the other hand, there is civic responsibility, to which C.F. von Weizsäcker also appealed, and which varies depending on the type and extent of knowledge, in accordance with the understanding of knowledge as power. In his lecture, C.F. von Weizsäcker explicitly addressed the scientific ethos only once. He commented on the publication by Hahn and Strassmann of their findings on nuclear fission: “Publication is considered a duty in science; it means subjecting one’s views to the control of colleagues.”²⁰ He did not even suggest a possible conflict with the interests of the Nazi war preparations, which would have suggested keeping secret the progress in nuclear physics.²¹ When C.F. von Weizsäcker states that the personal responsibility of the natural scientist “corresponds to the practical importance of his subject,”²² then the principle of “knowledge is power” is reflected here. The result is again civic responsibility. In today’s highly differentiated societies of the twenty-first century based on the division of labor, however, the general civic responsibility has been reduced almost to the unconditional obligation to pay taxes, which relieves us of further obligations. Even participation in the political process is not a ‘must’ in the context of civic responsibility, but a ‘should’ and counts as voluntary.

Fig. 4.1

Change in responsibility of science: from the responsibility of an elite (whose members have to interpret their civic responsibility) to professional responsibility. The (vocational) ethos is formalized in the course of professionalization and is no longer left solely to the professional understanding of an elitist (sub-)group. The frame of reference here is the sphere of responsibility of the nation state. Universal, moral, family, or corporate responsibility is not represented here. What is relevant, however, is co-responsibility for the vocational group or profession; in the course of professionalization, this is also formalized, e.g., within the code of ethics

The juxtaposition of scientific ethos and civic responsibility shows that there are different areas of responsibility in which duties can arise. In addition to responsibilities to science as a profession and those to the state or society, this includes one’s own family or circle of friends as well as the business context, for example in a company or university, to which one must be loyal. Not to forget an abstractly conceived but concrete responsibility “as human being,” howsoever it may be justified: as responsibility towards future generations, or else committed before God, or an ideal of humanity. Conflicts of loyalty and other dilemmas arise at the intersections of the areas of responsibility. Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker (a son of C.F. von Weizsäcker) speaks of the “doubled scientific community,”²³ on the one hand, with regard to science as the system oriented towards truth, and on the other hand with regard to exploitation orientation in order to collect money for the employment of assistants. E.U. von Weizsäcker demands a “new Enlightenment”²⁴: “Freedom and democracy must be protected against the market.”²⁵ What is needed is a “new balance between state and economy.”²⁶ Because, as mentioned, atomic bombs and embryo research, including the visions of technology, have become an industrial pursuit. The good—or difficult—thing about this situation is that science, too, has emancipated itself from the state and is a profession that represents its own interests alongside the state and the economy. No wonder that in this mixture of different loyalties, the role of the whistle blower receives new attention. With the legal protection of whistle blowers an element of civic responsibility is brought to bear. Whether a “new Enlightenment” can lead the way out of such dilemmas remains questionable.

The Scientific Ethos: From Merton to the DFG

The American sociologist Robert K. Merton was one of the first to deal explicitly with the ethos of science. In his 1942 essay “The normative structure of science,” he identified four principles or “institutional imperatives” that made up the scientific ethos. Firstly, universalism: findings apply regardless of who makes them; they only have to prove themselves before the existing system of findings. Second, “communism” (original quotation marks): Scientific knowledge belongs to everyone and becomes a public good. Third, disinterestedness: By this Merton means that science has no primary interest in exploitation, but aims for knowledge in itself. Merton notes that science differs in this respect from the other classical professions such as medicine and law, since science lacks the usual client relationship. Fourth, organized skepticism, i.e., a norm for restraint in judgment until empirical evidence is available, and for questioning assertions.

Do these principles still apply today? Helmut F. Spinner spoke in connection with professional ethos, as defined by Merton, as “qualified superethics for privileged special environments.”²⁷ Increasing professionalization is accompanied by increased pressure from employers, i.e., universities and non-university research institutions. It is precisely the characteristic of disinterestedness that comes under pressure; doing science and remaining in the science system become existentially relevant. It is not only a matter of reputation but also of being able to support a family as a scientist—just as in other normal professions. The expansion of the science system makes it necessary to simplify and formalize performance assessment. Because the question: “What is good knowledge?” can often only be answered long after a research project has been completed. It is therefore hardly surprising that Schurr, for his considerations on an academic code of ethics, placed the measurability of standards in the foreground. Schurr’s list of criteria begins with auditability and ends with enforcement.²⁸ The price that science paid for professionalization in order to achieve freedom and responsibility—like other professions—was the quantitative evaluation of performance through the number of publications and citations, etc.

With the normalization of science as a profession, it became inevitable that here and there fraud came into play or became notorious. Even for Merton, in 1942, this seemed irrelevant. Merton justified disinterestedness as a principle of the ethos in science by hinting to the “virtual absence of fraud.”²⁹ In 1992, however, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of the USA took a step that other professions had already taken, that is to establish a code of practice.³⁰ The DFG followed in 1998.³¹ The NAS Code of Good Scientific Practice was aimed at individual researchers. Recommendation 1 was:

Individual scientists in cooperation with officials of research institutions should accept formal responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the research process. They should foster an environment, a reward system, and a training process that encourage responsible research practices.³²

The first version of the DFG code of practice, published in 1998, started with a general obligation to work lege artis (the state of the art).³³ The revised 2019 version contains 19 “guidelines” across three categories: “Principles,” “Research Process,” and “Noncompliance with Good Scientific Practice, Procedures.” The guidelines on research process make up more than half of the text. The DFG Code exemplifies the spirit of scientific freedom (while acknowledging the need for restrictions to prevent abuse), a position that Heather Douglas advocated as recently as 2003 in her account of the moral responsibilities of scientists.³⁴ In her 2014 update, Douglas redefines “the moral terrain of science” in terms of forms of responsibility, and explicitly in relationship to society as well.³⁵

In the course of the professionalization of science, attention inevitably also fell on the role of science in industry. C.F. von Weizsäcker directed his appeal to the state and the citizens, but today that would be insufficient. Many areas of research such as nuclear energy or space travel were previously reserved for government action due to their high investment requirements. Today, industry is taking on such tasks, to the extent that even the privately-conducted construction of nuclear weapons would be a legal rather than a technical–financial problem. The NAS Code of 1992 is primarily aimed at academic staff,³⁶ although it discusses its relevance for industry. Even if many areas of industry were fundamentally close to science, for example in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, the capitalist industrial exploitation of science takes place far from any elite responsibility or the corporate responsibility of science.

This made it necessary to critically consider dual use, i.e., research whose results can be used both civilly and militarily, or in an ethically questionable manner, e.g., to manipulate people. In this context, the DFG and the Leopoldina jointly published a paper in 2014 entitled “Scientific Freedom and Scientific Responsibility: Recommendations for Handling Security-Relevant Research.”³⁷ The long title likely refers more to the uncertainty of dealing with the subject than to a thematically focused treatise. Lenk sharply criticizes the text, saying that it remains analytically unclear.³⁸ However, this is not a code of ethics, but an additional deliberation for institutional, government-funded research, beyond or in addition to the guidelines for good scientific practice (and, on p. 11, to “researchers in the industrial sector”). Nevertheless, the introduction of priority rules, as requested by Lenk,³⁹ would have improved the text. Such rules clarify cases of conflict, for example: When does good scientific practice apply; when do general ethical considerations apply?

In the United Kingdom, the government had already attempted to develop a universal minimum code of conduct for scientists prior to 2007.⁴⁰ This comprised three points: rigor (lege artis), respect (respect for the law, respect for the freedom of decision of all those involved…), and responsibility (here, essentially: dialogue with society, responsibility towards society). However, professionalization means strengthening or at least demonstrating self-control in order to avoid alternative forms of control being imposed by the state. The DFG/Leopoldina text is to be seen precisely in this light of ensuring professional self-regulation. It was deemed necessary to proactively draw up internal regulations (on dual use technologies) within the profession before the state attempted to introduce its own regulations.

The Threefold Concept of Responsibility and Its Normative Unity

We can assume that the appeal for responsibility is always made when uncertainty and risks are involved and where everyday rules and law do not apply. I have always understood responsibility as relational, i.e., following the literal meaning: An individual has to answer to someone for something.⁴¹ Furthermore, the concept of responsibility can be explained in three meanings, which essentially belong together.⁴² Firstly, in retrospect, responsibility is about guilt or merit and the attribution of the consequences of events, whether positive or negative. Responsibility, in retrospect, becomes relevant, for example, when a loss has occurred and a culprit is sought. In science, this ranges from cases of (falsified) data to the big questions of responsibility for deaths caused by accidents and wars (poison gas, nuclear and neutron bombs…) Secondly, prospectively, it is about assuming responsibility, i.e., a social service to be provided (responsibility as performance).⁴³ Hans Jonas has emphasized this aspect of responsibility. Science as a profession bears responsibility for systematic knowledge acquisition. Thirdly, responsibility can be explained in terms of authority and coordination: Someone is in charge by virtue of office, mandate, or role. The coordinative function is usually associated with status. Without this status-effective coordination function, it would be incomprehensible why responsibility can serve as a payment equivalent. Why should someone choose more responsibility rather than higher salary, when responsibility would mean performance in the first place? The three directions of meaning practically belong together, but can decouple at any time. Weber, in his ethics of responsibility, calls for the unity of responsibility⁴⁴: Whoever assumes a political office (status responsibility) should act accordingly (responsibility as performance, prospective) and be responsible for the consequences of his actions (retrospective). The unity of responsibility is normative.

A further differentiation results from the institutional question. Do institutions have their own responsibility, or only the individuals involved? Politics and law know institutional or corporate responsibility.⁴⁵ Institutions can be entrusted with task responsibility, and if they perform poorly they can be dissolved. Commercial enterprises can be punished, e.g., for violating antitrust laws. With regard to the responsibility of individuals in relation to institutions, we should distinguish between collective and co-responsibility. Co-responsibility corresponds to the principle of agreed complicity and refers to the original, individual decision to join an institution. In the case of professionalized science, the original decision means to follow a path as a professional scientist. Then we share responsibility for science in society. It may be a matter of further developing the organizational structures of science or communicating research results appropriately. In the case of collective responsibility, such a decision of origin is not essential or is only conceivable ex negativo via opting out. States are sometimes held responsible by other states, with often drastic consequences for the individual. As we are citizens of a state by birth and law, it is not easy to deselect this status.

Established responsibility systems are value neutral. Already Cicero discussed that criminal gangs may very well develop an internal morality, i.e., clarify responsibilities, obligations, and reward or punish accordingly; this is documented as far back as the days of piracy.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, they remain criminals. The presumed freedom of values is not surprising if we consider the three meanings of responsibility: ex post—mostly negative (Who was to blame?)⁴⁷; ex ante—mostly uncomfortably appellative (This person should show greater responsibility!); with regard to status—positive (She is the boss). Max Weber introduced the ethics of responsibility in contrast to an ethics of conviction. Acting in accordance with the ethics of responsibility takes into account the possible consequences of one’s own actions, anticipating conflicts of values,⁴⁸ whereas from the point of view of an ethics of conviction only the orientation towards a canon of values counts. In contrast to Weber, C.F. von Weizsäcker bases his concept of responsibility, and thus the responsibility of science, on religion.⁴⁹

This sober view of responsibility places institutions in the spotlight. There is a differentiated division of labor and thus responsibility in science, between scientific institutions (e.g., DFG or IPCC) on the one hand and individual scientists and researchers on the other. It is ultra posse nemo obligatur, institutions can achieve more and different things than a single person, we can expect different things from them. As a global organization, the IPCC lends climate change research a political and scientific weight that individual scientists, however well respected, would never achieve. Professionalization has given science a new and different power. No longer as a ‘state religion’ but as a knowledge method administrator, a global service provider. For this reason, science must expose itself to public criticism.

Science and Values: The New Social Responsibility of Science

In November 1917 Max Weber gave a lecture on science as a vocation. Some of the problems and phenomena that Weber addressed are likely to continue to determine the existence of scientists, for example, the necessary specialization and fixation on a narrow field of research, which is the only way to make progress in science; or the “double face” of science at universities, namely the combination of teaching on the one hand and research on the other. If one reads Weber’s account through the eyes of a present-day researcher, it seems somewhat antiquated. This impression is due above all to Weber’s continual appeals against the presence of demagogues and prophets at universities and the attempts to distinguish between science and theology. Demagogues and theology still exist today, but do not currently present a problem; in Weber’s time, the university had not yet freed itself from authoritarian state structures and officials, whose reasoning was perceived within the universities as mediocre because it comprised unreflective indoctrination. In the meantime, the universities have managed to drive out the authoritarian state. Science as a profession has long since emerged from the status of a civilized intellectual aristocracy. Despite all its precariousness, science has become a plannable pattern for personal life plans, from a merely “inner profession” (Weber) to a privileged, “outer” profession⁵⁰ whose freedom is anchored in law. Unlike in Weber’s time, there is no longer any need to argue about freedom from value in science.

Moreover, the new professionalized role allows science to expand into value-defined areas. There have always been committed researchers who carried out value-oriented research, for example in community or peace research. However, among other colleagues, this was often perceived as bad research and part-time work in the sense of do-gooding. That particular situation changed with the advent of environmental sciences, applying scientific processes to environmental issues. The field is clearly not only about understanding and explaining environmental processes, but always about environmental protection. Environmental science requires a rethink, because:

• Environmental problems do not stop at disciplinary borders, and hence force different disciplines to work together;

• The dynamics of local environmental systems cannot be understood without the inclusion of local system experts.⁵¹

It was in this spirit that the Environmental Sciences program was established at ETH Zurich at the end of the 1980s. Wolf Lepenies, then Rector of the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, praised the program as an example of “committed scholarship” and the “return of values to science”⁵²:

Vigilance and a sense of value oriented towards the public spirit are also awakened in this course of study by the fact that questions from the humanities and social sciences, economics and jurisprudence have been part of the curriculum for natural scientists from the very beginning. In this way, attention to the social embedding of one’s own research and its possible social consequences is achieved without any pathos: it is not part of a facultative Studium generale, but is a natural part of everyday scientific life.⁵³

It became clear that environmental science cannot be pursued without “co-production of knowledge” (Jasanoff)⁵⁴ or “mutual learning” by science and society (R.W. Scholz).⁵⁵ The reasons are epistemic in nature. Knowledge is not otherwise available. This led to citizen science not only in birdwatching but also in “transdisciplinary” urban and regional development projects.⁵⁶ New disciplines such as Sustainability Science or Global Environmental System Science have emerged.⁵⁷ There, sustainability (as a value) has become a general obligation of scientific research.⁵⁸ Accordingly, the civic responsibility of scientists and scholars in these subjects has increased.

Today, science must present its contribution to society in order to justify the large, ongoing public investments. The question of application is as old as science and universities. However, expansion and professionalization have fueled the discussion of the social responsibility of science. The sciences share the fate of other, later professions, such as architecture, business management or social work, whose performance is seen by some as an unnecessary luxury and which are required to legitimize themselves anew through social responsibility—for example, through community orientation or a commitment to sustainable development or social equality⁵⁹. In 1992, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, along with partner institutions, published a manifesto on “responsible science.” It clearly states that science has a responsibility to a larger community:

Because scientists and the achievements of science have earned the respect of society at large, the behavior of scientists must accord not only with the expectations of scientific colleagues, but also with those of a larger community.⁶⁰

Computer-Aided Simulation as a New Method of Knowledge—New Relationship to Politics

The upswing in environmental science and especially in sustainability studies would not be possible without a new methodological confidence. Especially thanks to the availability of computers, unexpected possibilities for modeling and simulation have arisen. Models simulate and depict the world or parts of it. Creating a model, in the sense of a simple simulation, was long considered scientifically insufficient.⁶¹ Classical methods involve data collection, from simple observation to complex measurements, and experimentation. In the experiment, influencing variables are systematically varied and the resulting changes measured, ultimately to test causal relationships. Models become interesting if they can be used to test hypotheses and clarify specific questions. Climate change research is unthinkable without simulation.⁶² Modelling has long been known from macroeconomics and has sometimes been ridiculed. In the meantime, computer-aided simulation has been established as a knowledge method.⁶³ In climate change research, several models based on different approaches are usually used. The resulting scenarios, i.e., possible world conditions, can then be evaluated: Is the development described economically viable? Is it socially just?

With professionalization, science has also gained a new role in relation to politics. The redefinition became necessary at the latest since the oil crisis of 1973. Science had not foreseen this and therefore did not offer a solution, especially in the political dimension of the crisis. Scientific policy advice was largely based on decision-theoretical models and approaches.⁶⁴ In comparison, mathematical game theory was embryonic. Moreover, science had predicted neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor the financial crisis of 2007/08 and thus ran into a problem of legitimacy. On the other hand, scientifically based input is essential for national administrations, e.g., statistical offices or in health monitoring. Politicians demand certainty from science; anything else is often dismissed as a question of faith or opinion-forming. In science communication, it remains difficult to communicate probabilities and present risks. Simulation allows us to deal with hypothetical knowledge and risks, as we see what happens if we do not know… This approach is increasingly proving its worth in local infrastructure planning and global climate change research, for which the IPCC stands.⁶⁵

The inclusion of values, for example for the purpose of environmental protection, together with new forms of knowledge production, e.g., the co-production of knowledge, open up new governance options for science policy. This is reflected at EU level in the normative framework of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). Here, two values or principles—responsibility and innovation—are combined in a trade-off between protection and change, a difficult task in which science must now prove its potential social contribution. The classic definition of RRI, which we find in von Schomberg, is correspondingly pragmatic:

Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society).⁶⁶

In practical terms, RRI means that research projects must provide for specific measures, namely with regard to public engagement, open access, gender, ethics, and science education.⁶⁷ RRI had been actively promoted by the European Commission as a cross-cutting issue in its Horizon2020 funding scheme (2014–2020) and defined the sub-programme “Science with and for Society” (SwafS).⁶⁸

Consequences of Professionalization, Conclusion

Science as a profession has a legitimate self-interest. Individual scientists must be able to live from their scientific work; scientific institutions rely on state subsidies. Thus, over time, operating conditions of science have emerged. In addition to peer review, these are the disciplines that organize the scientific process.⁶⁹ The expansion of science as a profession brings with it new professional roles, e.g., research management, and new responsibilities in science, which cross the systemic boundaries of science both inside and outside. The task now is to create structures, provide resources, develop standards… Science is no longer alone in the scholarly republic. Academic administration positions are being created and, in order to ensure quality, these must be made career-ready.⁷⁰

Another consequence of professionalization, which is reluctantly perceived, is a new relativization of science. After its adoption as a (potential) state religion, i.e., ‘scientism,’ science is today only one voice among many. New and unexpected is the fight against disinformation, termed ‘fake news.’⁷¹ Here we can see a responsibility of science as a whole, patiently putting things right, adding question to things… Helmut F. Spinner⁷² saw a parallel between journalism and science. However, journalism is subject to different operating conditions than science, although the noble goal of enlightenment may be the same.⁷³ Science communication is a task that falls within the responsibility of science as a profession, but does not necessarily have to be relevant to science training or research activities. For the majority of researchers, research is the main focus whereas communication is secondary. In addition to research, working science often does not even have time for anything other than writing contributions to scientific journals.⁷⁴

Another consequence of professionalization (one could also speak of a creeping effect) is shown in the power of formalization. The practice is increasingly permeated by formulas, technical terms, and model approaches. Not as truths, but as working tools of scientifically trained people in practice, who bring their expertise and professional socialization to their work.⁷⁵ This formalization means a scientificization of practice. Compared to the situation in which C. F. von Weizsäcker saw himself and science, this professionalization brings a certain relief but also new burden for individual scientists. Science no longer exists in a vacuum without ‘administrative stuff’; that is the price of professionalization. The weight of responsibility in science has been redistributed. Today, science communication and dialogue with society is more a focus of the science-supporting institutions, i.e., associations and universities. Individual scientists are largely free to make such commitments. On the other hand, they have a new, obligatory co-responsibility in the cooperation with the practice. It is important to ensure that science and the appropriate discipline are well represented and that science-based procedures are further developed in the relevant field of work.⁷⁶

To conclude, science as a systematic method of knowldege production is much older than the science profession.⁷⁷ The responsibility of science as a system has changed with professionalization. Here we can distinguish an inward and an outward responsibility (see Figure 2). The inward responsibility refers to good scientific practice; the outward responsibility to the social or organizational context, which can range from education and scientific sense-making to economic and war fitness, and today may include a contribution to civil society development, to demonstrate social responsibility.⁷⁸ With professionalization, science has received a tacit administrative mandate for systematic knowledge acquisition and emancipated itself from further-reaching appropriation. Many inner-scientific responsibilities, such as method development or quality assurance, have risen over time and passed into institutional hands, namely to the disciplines. In the past, science was embodied in the individual scientists and scholars, whereas today it is embodied in the disciplines. In summary, Fig. 4.2 provides an overview of the current scope of the responsibility of science.

Fig. 4.2

Responsibility of professionalized science (shaded in gray): With the professionalization of science, individual scientists are relieved of many non-scientific constraints and can plan their careers and live from them (with similar professional risks as in an independent architectural practice). For more details cf. Mieg (2015) and Mieg and Evetts (2018)