Abstract
In the theory of congestion games, the Braess’ paradox shows that adding one resource to a network may sometimes worsen, rather than improve, the overall network performance. Here the paradox is investigated under a cooperative game-theoretic setting, in contrast to the non-cooperative one typically adopted in the literature. A family of cooperative games on networks is considered, whose utility function, defined in terms of a traffic assignment problem and the associated Wardrop equilibrium, expresses the average quality of service perceived by the network users.
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Acknowledgements
G. Gnecco, M. Passacantando and M. Sanguineti are members of the Gruppo Nazionale per l’Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni (GNAMPA–National Group for Mathematical Analysis, Probability and their Applications) of the Istituto Nazionale di Alta Matematica (INdAM–National Institute of Higher Mathematics). G. Gnecco and M. Sanguineti acknowledge support from the Università Italo Francese (project GALILEO 2021 no. G21_89). M. Sanguineti was partially supported by the Project PDGP 2018/20 DIT.AD016.001 “Technologies for Smart Communities” of INM (Institute for Marine Engineering) of CNR (National Research Council of Italy), where he is Research Associate. He is also Affiliated Resercher at IIT—Italian Institute of Technology (Advanced Robotics Research Line), Genova, and Visiting Professor at IMT—School for Advances Studies (AXES Research Unit), Lucca.
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Passacantando, M., Gnecco, G., Hadas, Y., Sanguineti, M. (2021). On Braess’ Paradox and Average Quality of Service in Transportation Network Cooperative Games. In: Cerulli, R., Dell'Amico, M., Guerriero, F., Pacciarelli, D., Sforza, A. (eds) Optimization and Decision Science. AIRO Springer Series, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86841-3_3
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