Abstract
We present the first homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) construction that simultaneously (1) has negligible correctness error, (2) supports integers from an exponentially large range, and (3) relies on an assumption not known to imply FHE—specifically, the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption. This resolves an open question posed by Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai (Crypto 2016). Homomorphic secret sharing is analogous to fully-homomorphic encryption, except the ciphertexts are shared across two non-colluding evaluators. Previous constructions of HSS either had non-negligible correctness error and polynomial-size plaintext space or were based on the stronger LWE assumption. We also present two applications of our technique: a two server ORAM with constant bandwidth overhead, and a rate-1 trapdoor hash function with negligible error rate.
L. Roy—Supported by a DoE CSGF fellowship.
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Notes
- 1.
A concurrent work [OSY21] has also independently solved this problem.
- 2.
Damgård–Jurik was originally defined using \(\exp (x) = (1 + N)^x\), which required \(\log \) to use Hensel lifting. We instead chose to use Taylor series because it simplifies the description of \(\log \), and only require O(s) additions and multiplications to evaluate with Horner’s rule, while the Hensel lifting algorithm took \(O(s^2)\) arithmetic operations.
- 3.
This structure may seem familiar to readers interested in category theory. In fact, we hit on these definitions by thinking of circuit semantics as functors. The homomorphism property then requires that \(\mathsf{Decode} \) be a natural transformation from the homomorphic evaluation semantics to the plaintext evaluation semantics.
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Roy, L., Singh, J. (2021). Large Message Homomorphic Secret Sharing from DCR and Applications. In: Malkin, T., Peikert, C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2021. CRYPTO 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12827. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_23
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