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Model-Based CPS Attack Detection Techniques: Strengths and Limitations

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Security in Cyber-Physical Systems

Part of the book series: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control ((SSDC,volume 339))

Abstract

Given the intricate interactions between the physical and cyber components found in urban cyber-physical systems (CPSs), the detection of attacks in such infrastructure has been approached in various ways. This work presents an exhaustive study that compares different kinds of attack detection mechanisms and evaluates them using a set of defined metrics. Model-based attack detectors are investigated in this report, which use mathematical system models with the input and output as the sets of actuators and sensors of the underlying physical processes, respectively. The detection methods comprise statistical change monitoring procedures (CUSUM and bad-data detectors) and a device fingerprinting technique. The case studies of two research facilities, a smart water treatment plant (SWaT) and a water distribution plant (WADI), have been used to assess these security measures. These testbeds represent the diversity of CPS infrastructures found in cities today. Several types of attacks have been simulated on the plants to experimentally analyse the performance of the detection methods.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Laboratory Virtual Instrument Engineering Workbench (LabVIEW) is a system-design software developed by National Instruments. For attack tool see: https://gitlab.com/gyani/NiSploit.

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank the reviewers for their comments. This work has extensively made use of the research facilities offered by the iTrust research centre at Singapore University of Technology and Design for which, the authors would like to express their gratitude.

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Correspondence to Surabhi Athalye .

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Athalye, S., Mujeeb Ahmed, C., Zhou, J. (2021). Model-Based CPS Attack Detection Techniques: Strengths and Limitations. In: Awad, A.I., Furnell, S., Paprzycki, M., Sharma, S.K. (eds) Security in Cyber-Physical Systems. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol 339. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67361-1_6

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