Abstract
We present an attack detection scheme for a water treatment system. We leverage the connectivity of two stages of the process to detect attacks downstream from the point of attack. Based on a mathematical model of the process, carefully crafted and executed attacks, are detected by deploying CUSUM and Bad-Data detectors. Extensive experiments are carried out and the results show the performance of the proposed scheme.
This work was supported in part by the National Research Foundation (NRF), Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, under its National Cybersecurity R&D Programme (Award No. NRF2014NCR-NCR001-040) and administered by the National Cybersecurity R&D Directorate.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Ahmed, C.M., Sridhar, A., Aditya, M.: Limitations of state estimation based cyber attack detection schemes in industrial control systems. In: IEEE Smart City Security and Privacy Workshop, CPSWeek (2016)
Ahmed, C.M., Murguia, C., Ruths, J.: Model-based attack detection scheme for smart water distribution networks. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2017, pp. 101–113. ACM, New York (2017). http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3052973.3053011
Bai, C.Z., Gupta, V.: On Kalman filtering in the presence of a compromised sensor: fundamental performance bounds. In: 2014 American Control Conference, pp. 3029–3034. IEEE (2014)
Bai, C.Z., Pasqualetti, F., Gupta, V.: Security in stochastic control systems: fundamental limitations and performance bounds. In: 2015 American Control Conference (ACC), pp. 195–200. IEEE (2015)
Cardenas, A.A., Amin, S., Lin, Z.S., Huang, Y.L., Huang, C.Y., Sastry, S.: Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response. In: Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, pp. 355–366. ACM (2011)
ICS-CERT: Ics-mm201408: May-august 2014. Report no., U.S. Department of Homeland Security-Industrial Control Systems-Cyber Emergency Response Team, Washington, D.C. (2014). https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov
Kwon, C., Liu, W., Hwang, I.: Security analysis for cyber-physical systems against stealthy deception attacks. In: American Control Conference (ACC), pp. 3344–3349 (2013)
Lee, E.A.: Cyber physical systems: design challenges. EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley, Technical report UCB/EECS-2008-8, January 2008. http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-8.html
Miao, F., Zhu, Q., Pajic, M., Pappas, G.J.: Coding sensor outputs for injection attacks detection. In: IEEE Conference in Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 5776–5781 (2014)
Mo, Y., Garone, E., Casavola, A., Sinopoli, B.: False data injection attacks against state estimation in wireless sensor networks. In: 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 5967–5972. IEEE (2010)
Mujeeb, C.A., Mathur, A.P.: Hardware identification via sensor fingerprinting in a cyber physical system. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C), pp. 517–524. IEEE (2017)
Murguia, C., Ruths, J.: Characterization of a CUSUM model-based sensor attack detector. In: 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control Conference (CDC) (2016)
Murguia, C., Ruths, J.: CUSUM and chi-squared attack detection of compromised sensors. In: 2016 IEEE Conference on Control Applications (CCA), pp. 474–480, September 2016
Pasqualetti, F., Dörfler, F., Bullo, F.: Attack detection and identification in cyber-physical systems. IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 58(11), 2715–2729 (2013)
Ross, M.: Introduction to Probability Models, 9th edn. Academic Press Inc., Orlando (2006)
Sridhar, A., Aditya, M.: Generalized attacker and attack models for cyber physical systems. In: 40th IEEE COMPSAC (2016)
Urbina, D., Giraldo, J., Tippenhauer, N.O., Cardenas, A.: Attacking Fieldbus communications in ICS: applications to the SWaT Testbed. In: Singapore Cyber-Security Conference (SG-CRC), vol. 14, pp. 75–89 (2016)
Urbina, D.I., Giraldo, J., Cardenas, A.A., Tippenhauer, N.O., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Candell, R., Sandberg, H.: Limiting the impact of stealthy attacks on industrial control systems. In: ACM CCS 3(iii) (2016)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Qadeer, R., Murguia, C., Ahmed, C.M., Ruths, J. (2018). Multistage Downstream Attack Detection in a Cyber Physical System. In: Katsikas, S., et al. Computer Security. SECPRE CyberICPS 2017 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10683. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72817-9_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72817-9_12
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-72816-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-72817-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)